Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po

Public policy instrumentation and its choice of tools and modes of operation are treated either as a kind of evidence (governing means making regulations, taxing, entering into contracts, communicating, etc.) or as if the questions it raises (the properties of instruments, justifications for choosing them, their applicability, etc.) are part of a rationality of methods without any autonomous meaning. This paper aims to explain the significance of a political sociology approach to public policy instruments in accounting for processes of public policy change: (1) public policy instrumentation is a major issue in public policy, since it reveals a (fairly explicit) theorization of the relationship between the governing and the governed: every instrument constitutes a condensed form of knowledge about social control and ways of exercising it; and (2) instruments at work are not neutral devices: they produce specific effects, independently of the objective pursued (the aims ascribed to them), which structure public policy according to their own logic.

= 21,649) to study gender differences in COVID-19-related beliefs and behaviors. We show that women are more likely to perceive COVID-19 as a very serious health problem, to agree with restraining public policy measures, and to comply with them. Gender differences in attitudes and behavior are sizable in all countries. They are accounted for neither by sociodemographic and employment characteristics nor by psychological and behavioral factors. They are only partially mitigated for individuals who cohabit or have direct exposure to the virus. We show that our results are not due to differential social desirability bias. This evidence has important implications for public health policies and communication on COVID-19, which may need to be gender based, and it unveils a domain of gender differences: behavioral changes in response to a new risk.

Populism has become a favourite catchword for mass media and politicians faced with the challenge of protest parties or movements. It has often been equated with radical right leaders or parties. This

Abstract This is the first book to present a systematic analysis of specialized clusters of small manufacturing enterprises in the main European economies. Combining knowledge from case-study literature with original analyses of statistical data enables the authors to present full accounts of the role of these clusters in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, showing the considerable diversity of forms they take. Local production systems (as these clusters are termed) are seen to exist where there are either particular competitive advantages for participation by clusters of small and medium-sized, as opposed to large, firms, or where such clusters at least stand as good a chance as large firms. Small firms may work through a diversity of forms of governance: certain forms of market; cooperation among themselves; through associations; with larger firms located in the same area; or by making use of local facilities provided by governmental or other external agencies - or a combination of all five. The introduction shows how previous literature has been divided into two strands. First came optimistic, mainly 1980s, writings, which assumed that the search for flexibility and quality, typical of post-Fordist models of economic organization, would enhance the role of SMEs. In the ensuing decade, a more pessimistic analysis was put forward. It was argued that the increasing globalization of the economy would bring about a demise of local production systems, under pressure from new global large firms. The authors discuss the possibility of more nuanced findings, and propose a combination of the literature on local production systems with theories of economic governance to assist this process. There follows a chapter which surveys overall economic development in the four countries, concentrating on local economies. Then four national surveys take up the theme of the governance of local production systems in Italy, Germany, France, and Britain. A concluding chapter identifies a diversity of forms of clusters of small firms, and on that basis develops a sociological critique of current neo-institutionalist theories of markets. Local production systems are found to be growing, not declining, in importance, as they facilitate the circulation of tacit knowledge - a precious resource in all sectors which depend on both constant innovation and the flexibility of small enterprises. However, the most rapidly growing form of these systems is that where groups of small suppliers depend on a major customer firm - a form that in the long run might undermine the autonomous capacities of local small-firm systems.

Has the Weberian disenchantment with the world finally freed people from the illusion that democracy is a panacea? For the past decade, once the glory and triumph of the western model over the socialist regimes had evaporated, we have been able to observe the numerous manifestations of popular misgivings about political participation and democratic institutions. Democratic malaise (Dahl 1998), the politics of resentment (Betz 1994, 1998a, b), political anomie, and protest movements are among the most frequent manifestations of this disillusion in many western democracies. Both electoral turnout and opinion polls testify to the endurance and extension of the problem. Nor have the new democracies which emerged from the collapse of the socialist systems escaped this general phenomenon of disillusion as shown by the return to power—in sheep’s clothing—of former communist party officials. These challenges to democratic governance vary according to the specificity of each national polity, but share some common features such as the decline of electoral support for political incumbents, a marked increase in electoral abstentionism, the volatility of the electorate, the growing fragmentation of the party system, the emergence of ad hoc social movements unrepresented by traditional political organisations, and the emergence of single-issue and/or radical parties.

During international crises, trust in government is expected to increase irrespective of the wisdom of the policies it pursues. This has been called a ‘rally-round-the-flag’ effect. This article examines whether the COVID-19 crisis has resulted in such a rally effect. Using multi-wave panel surveys conducted in Austria and France starting from March 2020, in the article it is examined how government trust was affected by the perceived threats to the nation’s health and economy created by the pandemic as well as by the perceived appropriateness of the government’s crisis response. A strong rally effect is shown in Austria, where trust was closely tied to perceived health risks, but faded away quickly over time. Perceptions of government measures mattered, too, while perceived economic threat only played a minor role. In France, in contrast, a strong partisan divide is found and no rally effect. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1925017 .

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The conjecture that negative emotions underpin support for far‐right politics is common among pundits and scholars. The conventional account holds that authoritarian populists catalyze public anxiety about the changing social order and/or deteriorating national economic conditions, and this anxiety subsequently drives up support for the far right. We propose that while emotions do indeed play an independent causal role in support for far‐right parties and policies, that support is more likely built upon the public’s anger rather than fear. This article explores the relative impact of fear and anger in reaction to the 2015 Paris terror attacks on the propensity to vote for the French far‐right party, the Front National, in the 2015 regional elections. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that anger is associated with voting for the Front National, while fear is associated with voting against the Front National. Moreover, anger boosts the Front National vote most powerfully among far‐right and authoritarian voters. On the other hand, fear reduces support for the far right among those same groups.

The COVID-19 disease was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, having since spread rapidly across the world. The infection and mortality rates of the disease have forced governments to implement a wave of public health measures. Depending on the context, these range from the implementation of simple hygienic rules to measures such as social distancing or lockdowns that cause major disruptions in citizens’ daily lives. The success of these crucial public health measures rests on the public's willingness to comply. However, individual differences in following the official public health recommendations for stopping the spread of COVID-19 have not yet to our knowledge been assessed. This study aims to fill this gap by assessing the sociodemographic and psychological correlates of implementing public health recommendations that aim to halt the COVID-19 pandemic. We investigate these associations in the context of France, one of the countries that has been most severely affected by the pandemic, and which ended up under a nationwide lockdown on March 17. In the next sections we describe our theoretical expectations over the associations between sociodemographics, personality, ideology, and emotions with abiding by the COVID-19 public health measures. We then test these hypotheses using data from the French Election Study.

This study presents data from content analyses of the websites of all parties that stood in the 2009 European parliamentary elections in France, Germany, Great Britain and Poland. It cross-nationally examines the main functions of the websites, the adoption of Web 1.0 and Web 2.0 features, and the political and cultural factors that determine parties’ online communication. The findings show that while the main website function varies across countries, Web 1.0 is still the dominant mode of campaigning. Moreover, offline inequalities within and between nations determine differences in parties’ individual online strategies: specifically, major parties in states with long histories of democracy and EU membership lead the way and offer more interactive and innovative modes of campaigning. On the other hand, minor parties, particularly in Poland, remain in a more Web 1.0, information-heavy mode of communication. This supports the so-called normalization thesis on both the meso and the macro level.

This article analyzes the specific and critical role of trust in scientists on both the support for and compliance with nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) during the COVID-19 pandemic. We exploit large-scale, longitudinal, and representative surveys for 12 countries over the period from March to December 2020, and we complement the analysis with experimental data. We find that trust in scientists is the key driving force behind individual support for and compliance with NPIs and for favorable attitudes toward vaccination. The effect of trust in government is more ambiguous and tends to diminish support for and compliance with NPIs in countries where the recommendations from scientists and the government were not aligned. Trust in others also has seemingly paradoxical effects: in countries where social trust is high, the support for NPIs is low due to higher expectations that others will voluntary social distance. Our individual-level longitudinal data also allows us to evaluate the effects of within-person changes in trust over the pandemic: we show that trust levels and, in particular, trust in scientists have changed dramatically for individuals and within countries, with important subsequent effects on compliant behavior and support for NPIs. Such findings point out the challenging but critical need to maintain trust in scientists during a lasting pandemic that strains citizens and governments.

Abstract The results of a survey conducted after the second round of the 1988 presidential election stress the inadequacy of the classical models of voting behaviour, as far as the Le Pen vote is concerned. The majority of lepenist electors identify themselves neither with the National Front, nor with the extreme-Right; they show no electoral stability, no strong sociological specificity. Less educated than the average, they do not correspond to the profile of the rational voter. With the exception of a small hardcore of regular voters, politicized, extremist and dedicated to the National Front, Le Pen supporters are protest voters that come and go.

(2000). ‘Defrosting’ the French welfare state. West European Politics: Vol. 23, Recasting European Welfare States, pp. 113-136.

Michelat Guy. Sur l'utilisation de l'entretien non directif en sociologie. In: Revue française de sociologie, 1975, 16-2. pp. 229-247.

Abstract A growing body of work has examined the relationship between media and politics from an agenda‐setting perspective: Is attention for issues initiated by political elites with the media following suit, or is the reverse relation stronger? A long series of single‐country studies has suggested a number of general agenda‐setting patterns but these have never been confirmed in a comparative approach. In a comparative, longitudinal design including comparable media and politics evidence for seven European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), this study highlights a number of generic patterns. Additionally, it shows how the political system matters. Overall, the media are a stronger inspirer of political action in countries with single‐party governments compared to those with multiple‐party governments for opposition parties. But, government parties are more reactive to media under multiparty governments.

L‘observation montre que l‘activité militante génère des rétributions qui la stimule en retour. La prise en compte de ces rétributions est un élément important de la compréhension des investissements et désinvestissements militants. Cette hypothèse apparaît pourtant iconoclaste et hérétiques à beaucoup d‘acteurs et aussi de chercheurs. C‘est que les univers militants sont officiellement désintéressés et censurent l‘existence d‘intérêts propres distincts de l‘attachement à la cause de l‘action collective. Mais les résistances sont aussi un effet des difficultés des sciences sociales à rendre compte des états de “conscience“ (ou d‘aperception) des intérêts socialement censurés. De ce point de vue, l‘hypothèse de rétributions “inconscientes“ et aussi inadéquate que la conception cynique d‘une recherche délibérée. L‘analogie de la scotomisation permet de comprendre comment des rétributions du militantisme peuvent être à la fois aperçues et refusées. Mais les rétributions, comme les coûts, de l‘action collective n‘existent pas en eux-mêmes. Ils se constituent comme tels tout au long de l‘itinéraire militant. L‘importance qui leur est attribuée varie selon les étapes et les moments de la carrière militante. L‘existence de rétributions dépend également de l‘adéquation entre les satisfactions offertes par les “styles“ de fonctionnement d‘une organisation et les attentes de ceux que l‘organisation est en mesure d‘attirer. L‘investissement dans la cause est notamment une condition des rétributions du militantisme. Mais les gratifications associées à cet investissement sont en compétition avec celles que l‘on peut retirer d‘autres activités. L‘attractivité de la cause est une condition pour que les satisfactions de l‘engagement gardent suffisamment de prix pour stimuler le militantisme.

The COVID-19 crisis has demanded that governments take restrictive measures that are abnormal for most representative democracies. This article aims to examine the determinants of the public’s evaluations towards those measures. This article focuses on political trust and partisanship as potential explanatory factors of evaluations of each government’s health and economic measures to address the COVID-19 crisis. To study these relationships between trust, partisanship and evaluation of measures, data from a novel comparative panel survey is utilised, comprising eleven democracies and three waves, conducted in spring 2020. This article provides evidence that differences in evaluations of the public health and economic measures between countries also depend on contextual factors, such as polarisation and the timing of the measures’ introduction by each government. Results show that the public’s approval of the measures depends strongly on their trust in the national leaders, an effect augmented for voters of the opposition. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1930754 .

Abstract Understanding Europeanization through its instrumentation raises the issue of the supposed neutrality of policy tools used as soft modes of action. The aim of this article is to assess how this ‘new governance’ tends to guide policy-making on a specific path. Indeed, European construction cannot be restricted to the direct impact of Community law or to the indirect effects of economic integration. A new form of non-constraining co-ordination has been developing since the mid-1990s. In order to explain how the cognitive mechanisms of Europeanization work, we open the ‘toolboxes’ that allow European institutions to have an effect on national representations and practices. The use of benchmarking for building the European Research Area, the elaboration of gender equality policy according to the principle of mainstreaming, and the open method of co-ordination (OMC) in the field of pension reforms, illustrate how such policy instruments lead national governments to meet the competitiveness requirements of the Lisbon strategy.

Abstract The French welfare system is characteristic of those ‘immovable objects’ (Pierson 1998) often found in Continental Europe. As in the German and other Continental European cases, French social policies are usually considered to be not only the most in need of reform, but also the most difficult to change (Esping-Andersen 1996; Scharpf, Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001). The resistance to change demonstrated by welfare programs is commonly analyzed as a consequence of path dependence phenomena (Pierson 1998, 2000). Most of what has happened in French social policy since the 1980s can be related to the field of path dependence (blockages, strikes and demonstrations, limited and difficult cutbacks; Palier 2000). One can argue that it is the institutional design of the French welfare system that explains why it is so difficult to change (Bonoli and Palier 2000). However, the data on welfare state development in France also show that a series of deep, even transformative changes have occurred, emerging first in the late 1980s and manifesting their full impact and significance during recent years (Palier 2000, 2001a, 2002).

Emotion, after a long period of inattention, began to attract greater scrutiny as a key driver of human behavior in the mid‐1980s. One approach that has achieved significant influence in political science is affective intelligence theory (AIT). We deploy AIT here to begin to understand the recent rise in support for right‐wing populist leaders around the globe. In particular, we focus on specific emotional appraisals on elections held at periods of heightened threat, including the two 2015 terror attacks in France, as influences on support for the far‐right Front National among conservatives. Contrary to much conventional wisdom, we speculate that threats can generate both anger and fear, and with very different political consequences. We expect fear to inhibit reliance on extant political dispositions such as ideological identification and authoritarianism, while anger will strengthen the influence of these same dispositions. Our core findings, across repeated tests, show that fear and anger indeed differentially condition the way habits of thought and action influence support for the far right in the current historical moment. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is anger that mobilizes the far right and authoritarians. Fear, on the other hand, diminishes the impact of these same dispositions.