Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy

Climate change mitigation research is fundamentally motivated by the preservation of human lives and the environmental conditions which enable them. However, the field has to date rather superficial in its appreciation of theoretical claims in well‐being thought, with deep implications for the framing of mitigation priorities, policies, and research. Major strands of well‐being thought are hedonic well‐being—typically referred to as happiness or subjective well‐being—and eudaimonic well‐being, which includes theories of human needs, capabilities, and multidimensional poverty. Aspects of each can be found in political and procedural accounts such as the Sustainable Development Goals. Situating these concepts within the challenges of addressing climate change, the choice of approach is highly consequential for: (1) understanding inter‐ and intra‐generational equity; (2) defining appropriate mitigation strategies; and (3) conceptualizing the socio‐technical provisioning systems that convert biophysical resources into well‐being outcomes. Eudaimonic approaches emphasize the importance of consumption thresholds, beyond which dimensions of well‐being become satiated. Related strands of well‐being and mitigation research suggest constraining consumption to within minimum and maximum consumption levels, inviting normative discussions on the social benefits, climate impacts, and political challenges associated with a given form of provisioning. The question of how current socio‐technical provisioning systems can be shifted towards low‐carbon, well‐being enhancing forms constitutes a new frontier in mitigation research, involving not just technological change and economic incentives, but wide‐ranging social, institutional, and cultural shifts. WIREs Clim Change 2017, 8:e485. doi: 10.1002/wcc.485 This article is categorized under: Climate and Development > Sustainability and Human Well‐Being

ABSTRACT This paper is the first large scale, quantitative study of the impact of corporate carbon management practices on corporate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Using data for 2009 and 2010 from the Carbon Disclosure Project survey, we find little compelling evidence that commonly adopted management practices are reducing emissions. This finding is unexpected and we propose three possible explanations for it. First, it may be because corporate carbon data and management practice information have not been reported in a standardized way. Second, there may be a delay between the application of corporate carbon management practices and their impact on emissions performance. Third, carbon management practices are not sufficiently impact‐oriented, meaning there is no relationship to observe. Our findings are important for policymakers designing corporate GHG reporting standards, for the multiple stakeholders trying to understand the drivers of corporate carbon performance, and for the corporate managers responsible for measuring, reporting and mitigating emissions. Copyright © 2015 The Authors. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management published by ERP Environment and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Local government has a crucial role to play in climate change adaptation, both delivering adaptation strategies devised from above and coordinating bottom-up action. This paper draws on a unique longitudinal dataset to measure progress in adaptation by local authorities in Britain, comparing results from a national-scale survey and follow-up interviews conducted in 2003 with a second wave of research completed a decade later. Whereas a decade ago local authority staff were unable to find scientific information that they could understand and use, we find that these technical-cognitive barriers to adaptation are no longer a major problem for local authority respondents. Thanks to considerable Government investment in research and science brokerage to improve the quality and accessibility of climate information, local authorities have developed their adaptive capacity, and their staff are now engaging with the ‘right’ kind of information in assessing climate change risks and opportunities. However, better knowledge has not translated into tangible adaptation actions. Local authorities face substantial difficulties in implementing adaptation plans. Budget cuts and a lack of political support from central government have sapped institutional capacity and political appetite to address long-term climate vulnerabilities, as local authorities in Britain now struggle even to deliver their immediate statutory responsibilities. Local authority adaptation has progressed farthest where it has been rebranded as resiliency to extreme weather so as to fit with the focus on immediate risks to delivering statutory duties. In the current political environment, adaptation officers need information about the economic costs of weather impacts to local authority services if they are to build the business case for adaptation and gain the leverage to secure resources and institutional license to implement tangible action. Unless these institutional barriers are addressed, local government is likely to struggle to adapt to a changing climate.

Abstract Billed as the creation and provision of timely, tailored information for decision-making at all levels of society, climate services have garnered a great deal of attention in recent years. Despite this growing attention, strategies to design, diagnose, and evaluate climate services remain relatively ad hoc—and while a general sense of what constitutes “good practice” in climate service provision is developing in some areas, and with respect to certain aspects of service provision, a great deal about the effective implementation of such service remains unknown. This article reviews a sample of more than 100 climate service activities as a means to generate a snapshot of the state of the field in 2012. It is found that a “typical climate service” at this time was provided by a national meteorological service operating on a national scale to provide seasonal climate information to agricultural decision-makers online. The analysis shows that the field of climate services is still emerging—marked by contested definitions, an emphasis on capacity development, uneven progress toward coproduction, uncertain funding streams, and a lack of evaluation activities—and stands as a signpost against which the development of the field can be measured. The article also reflects on the relative contribution of this sort of sampling activity in informing “good practice” and offers suggestions for how both sampling and case study efforts can be better designed to increase the potential for learning. This article concludes with some observations on the relative contribution that broad-based analyses can play in informing this emerging field.

While the parties to the UNFCCC agreed in the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord that a 2°C global warming over pre-industrial levels should be avoided, current commitments on greenhouse gas emissions reductions from these same parties will lead to a 50 : 50 chance of warming greater than 3.5°C. Here, we evaluate the differences in impacts and adaptation issues for water resources in worlds corresponding to the policy objective (+2°C) and possible reality (+4°C). We simulate the differences in impacts on surface run-off and water resource availability using a global hydrological model driven by ensembles of climate models with global temperature increases of 2°C and 4°C. We combine these with UN-based population growth scenarios to explore the relative importance of population change and climate change for water availability. We find that the projected changes in global surface run-off from the ensemble show an increase in spatial coherence and magnitude for a +4°C world compared with a +2°C one. In a +2°C world, population growth in most large river basins tends to override climate change as a driver of water stress, while in a +4°C world, climate change becomes more dominant, even compensating for population effects where climate change increases run-off. However, in some basins where climate change has positive effects, the seasonality of surface run-off becomes increasingly amplified in a +4°C climate.

This paper assesses the importance of a strategic legal framework for action against climate change, using the UK Climate Change Act as an example. Passed in 2008, the Climate Change Act is one of the earliest and most prominent examples of framework legislation on climate change. It contains several innovative features that have since been replicated in other framework laws. We use stakeholder interviews to assess the strengths of the Act and whether it has succeeded in creating an integrated, informed and forward-looking policy process. Respondents felt that the Act had established a firm long-term framework with a clear direction of travel. However, they differed on whether the Act provided sufficient policy certainty and protection against political backsliding. Most respondents felt that the Act had changed the institutional context and the processes through which climate change is addressed. As a result, interviewees believe that the Act has helped UK climate policy to become better informed, more forward looking and better guided by statutory routines.Key policy insights A strong legal framework with statutory targets, processes and institutions can be an important tool for effective climate change governance.A broad-based framework law can make action on climate change more predictable, more structured and more evidence-based.The UK Climate Change Act is a model for such framework legislation, with important institutional features that have already been emulated in other framework laws.The main such features are statutory short-term and long-term emissions targets, a new independent advisory body (the Committee on Climate Change), clear accountability and an iterative approach to adaptation planning.

There is widespread interest in the ability of retrofit schemes to shape domestic energy use in order to tackle fuel poverty and reduce carbon emissions. Although much has been written on the topic, there have been few large-scale ex post evaluations of the actual impacts of such schemes. We address this by assessing domestic energy use before and after the Kirklees Warm Zone (KWZ) scheme, which by fitting insulation in 51,000 homes in the 2007–2010 period is one of the largest retrofit schemes completed in the UK to date. To do this, we develop and apply a new methodology that isolates the impacts of retrofit activity from broader background trends in energy use. The results suggest that the actual impacts of the KWZ scheme have been higher than predicted, and that the scale of any performance gaps or rebound effects have been lower than has often been assumed. They also suggest that impacts on energy use in lower income areas are consistent with predictions, but that impacts in middle and higher income areas are higher than predicted. These findings support the case for the wider and/or accelerated adoption of domestic retrofit schemes in other contexts.

Meeting the commitments made in the Paris Agreement on climate change will require different approaches in different countries. However, a common feature in many contexts relates to the continued and sometimes increasing significance of the carbon footprints of urban centres. These footprints consider both production or territorial (i.e. Scope 1 and 2) emissions, and consumption or extra-territorial (i.e. Scope 3) emissions. Although a growing number of cities have adopted targets for their production-based emissions, very few have even started to analyse or address their consumption-based emissions. This presents a potential challenge for urban policymaking if consumption emissions rise while production emissions fall, and for climate mitigation more broadly if emissions are effectively migrating to areas without carbon reduction targets or capabilities. To explore these issues, in this paper we analyse and compare production- and consumption-based emissions accounts for urban centres in China, the UK and the US. Results show that per-capita income and population density are strong predictors of consumption-based emissions levels, and consumption-based emissions appear to diminish but not decouple with higher per-capita incomes. In addition, results show that per-capita income is a predictor of net emissions - or the difference between production- and consumption-based accounts - suggesting that continuing increases in per capita income levels may drive the ‘leakage’ of urban emissions. These findings highlight a risk in placing too much faith in city-level climate strategies focused only on production-based emissions, and stress the importance of new city-level initiatives that focus on consumption-based emissions, especially in cities that are shifting from producer to consumer city status.

Rendón Thompson, O. R., J. Paavola, J. R. Healey, J. P. G. Jones, T. R. Baker, and J. Torres. 2013. Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+): transaction costs of six Peruvian projects. Ecology and Society 18(1): 17. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05239-180117

This report provides the results of an analysis of “intended nationally determined contributions”, or INDCs, that were submitted by more than 180 countries ahead of the Paris climate change summit in December 2015, focusing on the credibility, rather than the ambition, of pledges about future emissions. No G20 country is found to have ‘no credible basis’ for their INDC across the determinants explored in this analysis. However, there are significant differences in the level of and balance among the determinants of credibility for the individual countries. Notably, three broad groups of countries can be identified: ◾Countries with most of the determinants at a level ‘largely supportive’ to credibility; this includes the EU and its individual G20 members (France, Germany, Italy and the UK), as well as South Korea; ◾Countries with most of the determinants at least ‘moderately supportive’ to credibility, but displaying significant weakness in one of the determinants; this includes Australia, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, South Africa and the US; ◾Countries that have scope to significantly increase their credibility across most determinants. These are Argentina, Canada, China, India, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia.

While most adaptation actions occur at the local level, there is an absence of commitment at the international level to channel adaptation finance to local communities. Without such a commitment, there is a risk that climate finance will continue to support top-down, centralized activities that may struggle to address the needs of vulnerable communities. This paper explores ways in which community-based adaptation is presently being mainstreamed through the multilateral funds that are used to channel adaptation finance under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change process, and points to two promising examples that demonstrate this. The first is the Small Grants Programme of the Global Environmental Facility, an established modality through which community organizations can access finance to manage their adaptation needs. The second is the direct access modality of the Adaptation Fund, which devolves decision-making power from multilateral agencies towards the national and local levels. At the country level, experiences from Nepal demonstrate an institutional environment that helps to prioritize the adaptation needs of the most vulnerable. Nepal achieves this by mandating that at least 80% of available finance flows to the community level, and that the implementation of projects is conducted in a bottom-up and inclusive process.

Increasingly challenged by climate variability and change, many of the world’s governments have turned to climate services as a means to improve decision making and mitigate climate-related risk. While there have been some efforts to evaluate the economic impact of climate services, little is known about the contexts in which investments in climate services have taken place. An understanding of the factors that enable climate service investment is important for the development of climate services at local, national and international levels. This paper addresses this gap by investigating the context in which Uruguay’s Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries invested in and developed its National System of Agriculture Information (SNIA), a national-level climate service for the agriculture sector. Using qualitative research methods, the paper uses key documents and 43 interviews to identify six factors that have shaped the decision to invest in the SNIA: (1) Uruguay’s focus on sustainable agricultural intensification; (2) previous work on climate change adaptation; (3) the modernization of the meteorological service; (4) the country’s open data policy; (5) the government’s decision to focus the SNIA on near-term (e.g., seasonal) rather than long-term climate risk; and (6) the participation of key individuals. While the context in which these enablers emerged is unique to Uruguay, it is likely that some factors are generalizable to other countries. Social science research needed to confirm the wider applicability of innovation systems, groundwork, data access and champion is discussed.

The Multiple Streams Framework offers a theoretical account of how policy proposals move from latent possibilities to becoming favored for implementation. We apply this framework in the context of the policy response to the 2013–2014 flooding of the Somerset Levels and Moors. Stakeholder interviews and analysis of news media coverage evidence the way in which a specific policy option that had fallen out of favor with the national Environment Agency – dredging – came to the fore and was eventually adopted during the period in which the conjunction of problem, policy, and political pressures came to a head. Local political activists mobilized a wider campaign with the help of social media and capitalized on national political sensitivities to successfully promote dredging. What is less clear is the longevity of the policy reversal, given funding constraints.

Heat waves can cause death, illness, and discomfort, and are expected to become more frequent as a result of climate change. Yet, United Kingdom residents have positive feelings about hot summers that may undermine their willingness to protect themselves against heat. We randomly assigned United Kingdom participants to 1 of 3 intervention strategies intended to promote heat protection, or to a control group. The first strategy aimed to build on the availability heuristic by asking participants to remember high summer temperatures, but it elicited thoughts of pleasantly hot summer weather. The second strategy aimed to build on the affect heuristic by evoking negative affect about summer temperatures, but it evoked thoughts of unpleasantly cold summer weather. The third strategy combined these 2 approaches and succeeded in evoking thoughts of unpleasantly hot summer weather. Across 2 experiments, the third (combined) strategy increased participants' expressed intentions to protect against heat compared with the control group, while performing at least as well as the 2 component strategies. We discuss implications for developing interventions about other "pleasant hazards." (PsycINFO Database Record

This paper addresses the probable levels of investment needed in new technologies for energy conversion and storage that are essential to address climate change, drawing on past evidence on the rate of cost improvements in energy technologies. A range of energy materials and technologies with lower carbon emissions over their life cycle are being developed, including fuel cells (FCs), hydrogen storage, batteries, supercapacitors, solar energy and nuclear power, and it is probable that most, if not all, of these technologies will be needed to mitigate climate change. High rates of innovation and deployment will be needed to meet targets such as the UK's goal of reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent by 2050, which will require significant levels of investment. Learning curves observed for reductions in unit costs of energy technologies, such as photovoltaics and FCs, can provide evidence on the probable future levels of investment needed. The paper concludes by making recommendations for policy measures to promote such investment from both the public and private sectors.

Abstract There are now a plethora of data, models, and approaches available to produce regional and local climate information intended to inform adaptation to a changing climate. There is, however, no framework to assess the quality of these data, models, and approaches that takes into account the issues that arise when this information is produced. An evaluation of the quality of regional climate information is a fundamental requirement for its appropriate application in societal decision-making. Here, an analytical framework is constructed for the quality assessment of science-based statements and estimates about future climate. This framework targets statements that project local and regional climate at decadal and longer time scales. After identifying the main issues with evaluating and presenting regional climate information, it is argued that it is helpful to consider the quality of statements about future climate in terms of 1) the type of evidence and 2) the relationship between the evidence and the statement. This distinction not only provides a more targeted framework for quality, but also shows how certain evidential standards can change as a function of the statement under consideration. The key dimensions to assess regional climate information quality are diversity, completeness, theory, adequacy for purpose, and transparency. This framework is exemplified using two research papers that provide regional climate information and the implications of the framework are explored.

A significant portion of finance for a low-carbon transition is expected to come from private sources. This may be particularly the case in the transport sector, where there is a large private sector presence and substantial investment needs, and in low-income countries, where climate action is unlikely to be the first priority for public finances. However, it is unclear whether private finance can deliver the full range of actions that are needed for a low carbon transition, or what role the public sector can and should play to mobilise these resources. Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, is one of many cities in lower and middle income countries seeking to break away from business-as-usual trajectories and pursue more sustainable forms of urban development. In this paper, the economic case for a large set of low carbon transport investments in Kigali, Rwanda, is analysed from the perspective of a private investor and from the perspective of the city as an economic unit drawing on a data and methods used in a city-wide review of low carbon study of Kigali conducted in 2015 by the Climate Smart Cities team at the University of Leeds. Comparing the public and private perspectives provides the opportunity to explore the financing mechanisms and policy frameworks appropriate for different kinds of low-carbon investment, and to consider how governments in developing countries can lay the foundations for compact, connected low-carbon cities.

The permafrost carbon feedback (PCF) is not currently taken into account in economic assessments of climate change, yet it could have important implications for the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the associated choice of the optimal greenhouse gas emission pathway. Although this feedback is still imperfectly known, there are enough estimates of its potential strength to now include it in our assessments. In this paper, I present a model of the PCF and integrate this feedback in the DICE Integrated Assessment Model to examine its consequences. I find that doing so increases the SCC by 10–20% in the baseline scenario, but that this impact is much more significant in the case of a damage function which is more reactive to very high temperature changes, and can reach up to 220%. It follows that setting industrial emission targets without taking into account this feedback would lead to excessive atmospheric carbon: I find that it increases the optimal emission control rate by circa 5% points on average over the period 2015–2110 and that this difference becomes much more significant when the constraint of limiting the increase in global mean temperature to [Formula: see text] or [Formula: see text] is added to the model.

Countries differ markedly in their production of climate science. While richer nations are often home to a variety of climate models, data infrastructures and climate experts, poorer sovereigns often lack these attributes. However, less is known about countries' capacity to use global climate science and customise it into products informing national adaptation. We use a unique global dataset, the UNFCCC National Communications, to perform a global documentary analysis of scientific submissions from individual countries (n = 189). Comparing countries' climate projections with their competence in publishing climate science, our research examines the existence of geographical divides. Although countries proficient in publishing climate science use more complex climate modelling techniques, key characteristics of climate projections are highly similar around the globe, including multi-model ensembles of Global Circulation Models (GCMs). This surprising result is made possible because of the use of pre-configured climate modelling software packages. One concern is that these tools restrict customisation, such as country-specific observations, modelling information, and visualisation. Such tools may therefore hide a new geographical divide where countries with higher scientific capacities are able to inform what goes into these software packages, whereas lower scientific capacity countries are dependent upon these choices - whether beneficial for them or not. Our research suggests that free-to-use modelling and training efforts may unwittingly restrict, rather than foster, countries' capacity to customise global climate science into nationally relevant and legitimate climate information.

Research has begun to uncover the extent that greenhouse gas emissions can be attributed to cities, as well as the scope for cities to contribute to emissions reduction. But assessments of the economics of urban climate mitigation are lacking, and are currently based on selective case studies or specific sectors. Further analysis is crucial to enable action at the urban level. Here we consider the investment needs associated with 11 clusters of low carbon measures that could be deployed across the world’s urban areas in a way that is consistent with a broader 2°C target. Economic assessment of these low carbon measures finds that they could be deployed around the world with investments of c$1 trillion per year between 2015 and 2050 (equivalent to 1.3% of global GDP in 2014). When the direct savings that emerge from these measures due to avoided energy costs are considered, under the central scenario these investments have a net present value of c$16.6 trillion USD in the period to 2050. However, discount rates, energy prices and rates of technological learning are key to the economic feasibility of climate action, with the NPV of these measures ranging from -$1.1 trillion USD to $65.2 trillion USD under different conditions.