Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy

Michael Strevens Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2009 xvii + 516 pp., ISBN 9780674031838, US$59.95, £44.95 (hardback) Michael Strevens’s Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation is an e...

Concerns have been growing about the veracity of psychological research. Many findings in psychological science are based on studies with insufficient statistical power and nonrepresentative samples, or may otherwise be limited to specific, ungeneralizable settings or populations. Crowdsourced research, a type of large-scale collaboration in which one or more research projects are conducted across multiple lab sites, offers a pragmatic solution to these and other current methodological challenges. The Psychological Science Accelerator (PSA) is a distributed network of laboratories designed to enable and support crowdsourced research projects. These projects can focus on novel research questions, or attempt to replicate prior research, in large, diverse samples. The PSA's mission is to accelerate the accumulation of reliable and generalizable evidence in psychological science. Here, we describe the background, structure, principles, procedures, benefits, and challenges of the PSA. In contrast to other crowdsourced research networks, the PSA is ongoing (as opposed to time-limited), efficient (in terms of re-using structures and principles for different projects), decentralized, diverse (in terms of participants and researchers), and inclusive (of proposals, contributions, and other relevant input from anyone inside or outside of the network). The PSA and other approaches to crowdsourced psychological science will advance our understanding of mental processes and behaviors by enabling rigorous research and systematically examining its generalizability.

Abstract This paper presents an overall view of the Philosophy of Tian-xia, a particular form of neo-universalism developed by its author and very much debated in the last years. The system of Tian-xia, or ‘all-under-heaven’, is a philosophical re-elaboration of an ancient form of Chinese universalism. The world is constituted as a global unity and a basic concept of political philosophy. It aims at a world institution as a way to rethink all problems in the world as problems of the world . Zhao Tingyang has analytically developed this view in some recent publications in Chinese. This article represents the most recent attempt to provide a synthetic view of his philosophy of ‘all-under-heaven’.

Much recent research has sought to uncover the neural basis of moral judgment. However, it has remained unclear whether "moral judgments" are sufficiently homogenous to be studied scientifically as a unified category. We tested this assumption by using fMRI to examine the neural correlates of moral judgments within three moral areas: (physical) harm, dishonesty, and (sexual) disgust. We found that the judgment of moral wrongness was subserved by distinct neural systems for each of the different moral areas and that these differences were much more robust than differences in wrongness judgments within a moral area. Dishonest, disgusting, and harmful moral transgression recruited networks of brain regions associated with mentalizing, affective processing, and action understanding, respectively. Dorsal medial pFC was the only region activated by all scenarios judged to be morally wrong in comparison with neutral scenarios. However, this region was also activated by dishonest and harmful scenarios judged not to be morally wrong, suggestive of a domain-general role that is neither peculiar to nor predictive of moral decisions. These results suggest that moral judgment is not a wholly unified faculty in the human brain, but rather, instantiated in dissociable neural systems that are engaged differentially depending on the type of transgression being judged.

The concept of truth arguably plays a central role in many areas of philosophical theorizing. Yet, what seems to be one of the most fundamental principles governing that concept, i.e. the equivalence between ‘ ‘ P ’ is true’ and ‘ P ’, is inconsistent in full classical logic, as shown by the semantic paradoxes . I propose a new solution to those paradoxes, based on a principled revision of classical logic. Technically, the key idea consists in the rejection of the unrestricted validity of the structural principle of contraction . I first motivate philosophically this idea with the metaphysical picture of the states-of-affairs expressed by paradoxical sentences as being distinctively “ unstable” . I then proceed to demonstrate that the theory of truth resulting from this metaphysical picture is, in many philosophically interesting respects, surprisingly stronger than most other theories of truth endorsing the equivalence between ‘ ‘ P ’ is true’ and ‘ P ’ (for example, the theory vindicates the validity of the traditional laws of excluded middle and of non-contradiction , and also vindicates the traditional constraint of truth preservation on logical consequence). I conclude by proving a cutelimination theorem that shows the consistency of the theory.

By the year 2030, the average life expectancy of women in industrialized countries could reach ninety-exceeding that of men by about ten years. At the present time, postmenopausal women represent more than fifteen percent of the world's population and this figure is likely to grow. From an evolutionary perspective, these demographic numbers pose some intriguing questions. Darwinian theory holds that a successful life is measured in terms of reproduction. How is it, then, that a woman's lifespan can greatly exceed her childbearing and childrearing years? Is this phenomenon simply a byproduct of improved standards of living, or do older women-grandmothers in particular-play a measurable role in increasing their family members' biological success? Until now, these questions have not been examined in a thorough and comprehensive manner. Bringing together theoretical and empirical work by internationally recognized scholars in anthropology, psychology, ethnography, and the social sciences, Grandmotherhood explores the evolutionary purpose and possibilities of female post-generative life. Students and scholars of human evolution, anthropology, and even gerontology will look to this volume as a major contribution to the current literature in evolutionary studies.

A battery comprising 4 fluid reasoning tests as well as 13 working memory (WM) tasks that involved storage, recall, updating, binding, and executive control, was applied to 318 adults in order to evaluate the true relationship of reasoning ability and WM capacity (WMC) to insight problem solving, measured using 40 verbal, spatial, math, matchstick, and remote associates problems (insight problems). WMC predicted 51.8% of variance in insight problem solving and virtually explained its almost isomorphic link to reasoning ability (84.6% of shared variance). The strong link between WMC and insight pertained generally to most WM tasks and insight problems, was identical for problems solved with and without reported insight, was linear throughout the ability levels, and was not mediated by age, motivation, anxiety, psychoticism, and openness to experience. In contrast to popular views on the sudden and holistic nature of insight, the solving of insight problems results primarily from typical operations carried out by the basic WM mechanisms that are responsible for the maintenance, retrieval, transformation, and control of information in the broad range of intellectual tasks (including fluid reasoning). Little above and beyond WM is unique about insight. (PsycINFO Database Record

Filip Vostal examines the changing nature of academic time, and analyzes the 'will to accelerate' that has emerged as a significant cultural and structural force in knowledge production.

Inflationary cosmology won a large following on the basis of the claim that it solves various problems that beset the standard big bang model. We argue that these problems concern not the empirical adequacy of the standard model but rather the nature of the explanations it offers. Furthermore, inflationary cosmology has not been able to deliver on its proposed solutions without offering models which are increasingly complicated and contrived, which depart more and more from the standard model it was supposed to improve upon, and which sever the connection between cosmology and particle physics that initially made the inflationary paradigm so attractive. Nevertheless, inflationary cosmology remains a promising research program, not least because it offers an explanation of the origin of the density perturbations that seeded the formation of galaxies and other cosmic structures. Tests of this explanation are underway and may settle the issue of whether inflation played an important role in the early universe.

Sections R1 to R3 attempt to take the sting out of hostile commentaries. Sections R4 to R5 engage Berlin and Kay and the World Color Survey to correct the record. Section R6 begins the formulation of a new theory of colour as an engineering project with a technological developmental trajectory. It is recommended that the colour space be abandoned.

We review the physical meaning and mathematical implementation of the condition of local detailed balance for a class of nonequilibrium mesoscopic processes. A central concept is that of fluctuating entropy flux for which the steady average gives the mean entropy production rate. We repeat how local detailed balance is essentially equivalent to the widely discussed fluctuation relations for that entropy flux and hence is at most ``only half of the story.''

Abstract Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction describes the nature, varieties, and justifications of utilitarianism, from its origins to arguments that draw on current research in neuroscience. Utilitarianism remains as influential—and controversial—as it was when Mill drew on it to argue for equality for women. It is often rejected because it seems to clash with widely accepted moral views. Could utilitarianism justify torture? Is only pleasure or happiness of intrinsic value? This VSI presents the strengths of utilitarian ethics and its challenge to our thinking on such issues as global poverty, speciesism, climate change, reducing the risk of human extinction, and end-of-life decisions for terminally ill patients.

Abstract In this article, we propose a pluralistic approach to the explanation of social understanding that integrates literature from social psychology with the theory of mind debate. Social understanding in everyday life is achieved in various ways. As a rule of thumb we propose that individuals make use of whatever procedure is cognitively least demanding to them in a given context. Aside from theory and simulation, associations of behaviors with familiar agents play a crucial role in social understanding. This role has been neglected so far. We illustrate the roles of fluency and associations in social understanding in false belief tasks.

One of the many ways that ‘deflationary’ and ‘inflationary’ theories of truth are said to differ is in their attitude towards truth qua property. This difference used to be very easy to delineate, with deflationists denying, and inflationists asserting, that truth is a property, but more recently the debate has become a lot more complicated, owing primarily to the fact that many contemporary deflationists often do allow for truth to be considered a property. Anxious to avoid inflation, however, these deflationists are at pains to point out that the truth property, on their view, is not a property of any significant interest. Correspondingly, inflationists have seen this as an opportunity to refine what kind of property they think truth is, which—according to them—moves their views beyond deflationism. The upshot of this is that there are number of different accounts in the literature of what distinguishes an inflationary truth property from a deflationary one, or—as it is sometimes put—what distinguishes a ‘substantive’ property from an ‘insubstantive’ one. This has made it hard to pin down exactly what is at issue at the metaphysical level between deflationists and inflationists, which makes it increasingly hard to see how debates between them are properly phrased. Given that these positions represent the two central attitudes towards truth in contemporary debates, this makes for a serious obstacle for the project of discerning the correct theory of truth. The aim of this paper is to discern the best way to distinguish between substantive and insubstantive properties, and thus to restore some focus to these debates. I argue that the three central distinctions in the literature fail, and offer what I take to be a more promising distinction in terms of a graded distinction between abundant and sparse properties.

Abstract Out of Time is an exploration of the possibility of timelessness. Time, it is argued, might not exist. This claim is defended by attacking three reasons to think otherwise; to suppose that time must exist. First, that our concepts of time are immune to error in a special sense: no matter what we discover about the world, we will all just continue to agree that time exists. Second, that the loss of time is incompatible with what we know from science and, third, that time’s absence would do extreme violence to our self-conception as agents. In response, a range of empirical studies are used to show that everyday concepts of time are not immune to error. It is likewise argued that recent developments in physics may in fact recommend the loss of time. And, finally, a viable notion of timeless agency is rebuilt using only causation. The book is ambitious in its scope, unyielding in its naturalistic methodology, and wide-ranging in the areas of philosophy it touches on. It explores a number of themes in the study of concepts, in the metaphysics of emergence, and in spacetime metaphysics. By doing so, it deepens our understanding of the relationship between three constants of everyday life: time, causation, and agency.

Humans have been shown to be capable of performing many cognitive tasks using information of which they are not consciously aware. This raises questions about what role consciousness actually plays in cognition. Here, we explored whether participants can learn cue-target contingencies in an attentional learning task when the cues were presented below the level of conscious awareness and how this differs from learning about conscious cues. Participants' manual (Experiment 1) and saccadic (Experiment 2) response speeds were influenced by both conscious and unconscious cues. However, participants were only able to adapt to reversals of the cue-target contingencies (Experiment 1) or changes in the reliability of the cues (Experiment 2) when consciously aware of the cues. Therefore, although visual cues can be processed unconsciously, learning about cues over a few trials requires conscious awareness of them. Finally, we discuss implications for cognitive theories of consciousness.

Recognition is one of the most debated concepts in contemporary social and political thought. Its proponents, such as Axel Honneth, hold that to be recognized by others is a basic human need that is central to forming an identity, and the denial of recognition deprives individuals and communities of something essential for their flourishing. Yet critics including Judith Butler have questioned whether recognition is implicated in structures of domination, arguing that the desire to be recognized can motivative individuals to accept their assigned place in the social order by conforming to oppressive norms or obeying repressive institutions. Is there a way to break this impasse? Recognition and Ambivalence brings together leading scholars in social and political philosophy to develop new perspectives on recognition and its role in social life. It begins with a debate between Honneth and Butler, the first sustained engagement between these two major thinkers on this subject. Contributions from both proponents and critics of theories of recognition further reflect upon and clarify the problems and challenges involved in theorizing the concept and its normative desirability. Together, they explore different routes toward a critical theory of recognition, departing from wholly positive or negative views to ask whether it is an essentially ambivalent phenomenon. Featuring original, systematic work in the philosophy of recognition, this book also provides a useful orientation to the key debates on this important topic.

The concepts expressed by social role terms such as artist and scientist are unique in that they seem to allow two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is inherently normative (Knobe, Prasada, & Newman, 2013). This study presents and tests an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension of these "dual character concepts." Experiment 1 suggests that the normative dimension of a social role concept represents the commitment to fulfill the idealized basic function associated with the role. Background information can affect which basic function is associated with each social role. However, Experiment 2 indicates that the normative dimension always represents the relevant commitment as an end in itself. We argue that social role concepts represent the commitments to basic functions because that information is crucial to predict the future social roles and role-dependent behavior of others.

Philosophy of mind as traditionally understood has rarely engaged directly with psychology and psychiatry. This collection establishes the importance of this interdisciplinary approach and explores new directions in the 'philosophy of psychiatry and psychology'. The essays are by a distinguished group of contributors whose interests and expertise embrace the cognitive, biological and medical sciences as well as the social sciences and humanities. The topics are wide ranging and raise fundamental questions such as what establishes personality or personal identity; how should insanity - or sanity - be defined; what is 'consent'? Readers, like the contributors, will come from a wide range of backgrounds, and find the volume suggests new approaches and offers new insights.

In spite of their striking differences with real-life perception, films are perceived and understood without effort. Cognitive film theory attributes this to the system of continuity editing, a system of editing guidelines outlining the effect of different cuts and edits on spectators. A major principle in this framework is the 180° rule, a rule recommendation that, to avoid spectators' attention to the editing, two edited shots of the same event or action should not be filmed from angles differing in a way that expectations of spatial continuity are strongly violated. In the present study, we used high-density EEG to explore the neural underpinnings of this rule. In particular, our analysis shows that cuts and edits in general elicit early ERP component indicating the registration of syntactic violations as known from language, music, and action processing. However, continuity edits and cuts-across the line differ from each other regarding later components likely to be indicating the differences in spatial remapping as well as in the degree of conscious awareness of one's own perception. Interestingly, a time-frequency analysis of the occipital alpha rhythm did not support the hypothesis that such differences in processing routes are mainly linked to visual attention. On the contrary, our study found specific modulations of the central mu rhythm ERD as an indicator of sensorimotor activity, suggesting that sensorimotor networks might play an important role. We think that these findings shed new light on current discussions about the role of attention and embodied perception in film perception and should be considered when explaining spectators' different experience of different kinds of cuts.