Defense Intelligence Agency
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Research output, citation impact, and the most-cited recent papers from Defense Intelligence Agency (United States). Aggregated across the NobleBlocks index of 300M+ scholarly works.
Top-cited papers from Defense Intelligence Agency
A wide range of research has promised new tools for forecasting infectious disease dynamics, but little of that research is currently being applied in practice, because tools do not address key public health needs, do not produce probabilistic forecasts, have not been evaluated on external data, or do not provide sufficient forecast skill to be useful. We developed an open collaborative forecasting challenge to assess probabilistic forecasts for seasonal epidemics of dengue, a major global public health problem. Sixteen teams used a variety of methods and data to generate forecasts for 3 epidemiological targets (peak incidence, the week of the peak, and total incidence) over 8 dengue seasons in Iquitos, Peru and San Juan, Puerto Rico. Forecast skill was highly variable across teams and targets. While numerous forecasts showed high skill for midseason situational awareness, early season skill was low, and skill was generally lowest for high incidence seasons, those for which forecasts would be most valuable. A comparison of modeling approaches revealed that average forecast skill was lower for models including biologically meaningful data and mechanisms and that both multimodel and multiteam ensemble forecasts consistently outperformed individual model forecasts. Leveraging these insights, data, and the forecasting framework will be critical to improve forecast skill and the application of forecasts in real time for epidemic preparedness and response. Moreover, key components of this project-integration with public health needs, a common forecasting framework, shared and standardized data, and open participation-can help advance infectious disease forecasting beyond dengue.
The discovery of many cases of wrongful conviction in the criminal justice system involving admissions from innocent suspects has led psychologists to examine the factors contributing to false confessions. However, little systematic research has assessed the processes underlying Human Intelligence (HUMINT) interrogations relating to military and intelligence operations. The current article examines the similarities and differences between interrogations in criminal and HUMINT settings, and discusses the extent to which the current empirical literature can be applied to criminal and/or HUMINT interrogations. Finally, areas of future research are considered in light of the need for improving HUMINT interrogation.
Advances in biological research likely will permit development of a new class of advanced biological warfare (ABW) agents engineered to elicit novel effects. In addition, biotechnology will have applications supporting ABW weaponization, dissemination, and delivery. Such new agents and delivery systems would provide a variety of new use options, expanding the BW paradigm. Although ABW agents will not replace threats posed by traditional biological agents such as Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) and Variola (smallpox), they will necessitate novel approaches to counterproliferation, detection, medical countermeasures, and attribution.
Critical loads and the corresponding reactions, maximum moments, and crown deflections of two-hinged and fixed, parabolic and circular arches of constant cross section subjected either to a vertical concentrated load at the crown or a vertical load uniformly distributed along the arch axis are tabulated for a wide range of rise/span ratios. It is shown that the critical loads and the corresponding horizontal reactions for antisymmetrical (sidesway) modes are rather insensitive to the prebuckling displacements while the opposite is true for the symmetrical models. The antisymmetrical mode corresponds to a bifurcation type instability while the symmetrical mode corresponds to a snap-through type of buckling. The data are analyzed and simplified methods for estimating the critical loads and the critical horizontal reactions, or both, are suggested for antisymmetrical buckling. In addition to the solutions described previously, accurate values of the critical loads and horizontal reactions are reported for antisymmetrical buckling of two-hinged and fixed, parabolic and catenary arches subjected to loadings which cause pure axial compression and no prebuckling displacements.
A Inteligência Artificial – IA pode ser definida como o estudo de agentes computacionais inteligentes que recebem percepções do ambiente e executam ações, bem como tomam decisões autônomas. Na contemporaneidade, esse mecanismo é aplicado em diversos segmentos, desde o agronegócio até os serviços relacionados à saúde. Ademais, em consonância às recentes pesquisas, a utilização da IA, em nível mundial, cresce consideravelmente. Posto isto, este estudo se configura em natureza exploratória, com auxílio de pesquisa documental, a partir do acesso à base de dados de patentes inglesa Questel Orbit Intelligence. Nesse contexto, por meio da metodologia PRISMA, identificaram-se 87.959 patentes depositadas sobre o tema, em âmbito mundial, entre os anos 2003 e 2022. Ademais, há um crescimento acentuado de depósitos de patentes de IA a partir de 2015. Notou-se, também, a China como propulsora internacional no desenvolvimento dessa tecnologia, principal nação depositante. Diante disso, constatou-se que a publicação de patentes de IA acompanha o progresso exponencial de tal tecnologia, levando em consideração os aspectos de proteção de propriedade intelectual e de segurança jurídica, o que possibilita vantagens competitivas frente aos concorrentes, obtidas por intermédio do direito à concessão de patentes.
Abstract This article describes an ethical and effective science‐based model of interviewing. An initial planning phase assists the investigative team in separating facts from inferences, decreases the likelihood of errors based on cognitive biases, and prompts careful preparation of the environment. The interview begins with an explanation of why the subject is being questioned. The interviewer then metaphorically hands the interview over to the subject, making him the talker and the interviewer the listener. The interviewer engages in active listening, soliciting as much information from the subject as possible by deploying tactics that enhance memory based on science, including elements of the cognitive interview. Cues to deception are found in the details of the story, rather than in signs of anxiety or nonverbal behaviours, and by deploying Strategic Use of Evidence. This model has been shown to increase cooperation, decrease resistance, and provoke useful information in real‐world criminal interviews.
(2003). China's Use of Perception Management. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 1-15.
(1984). Modernisation and ethnic Equalisation in the USSR. Soviet Studies: Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 159-184.
In light of the cost and complexity of Plan Colombia, this essay makes two central arguments. First, despite receiving $6.1 billion in assistance from Washington from 2000–2008, Plan Colombia has not been a particularly cost-effective framework for the United States. And second, because drug interdiction and crop eradication programs—the centerpiece of US funding—have not achieved all the desired results based on cocaine production trends, there is a need to rethink current funding priorities. If the history of bilateral cooperation in the war on drugs is any guide, the emphasis on “hard-side” elements (e.g., drug control) in dealing with the cocaine phenomenon will endure. This has important policy implications. Although the United States and Colombia agree on the desired ends for Plan Colombia, Washington's pursuit of certain objectives at the expense of others, or the improper synchronization of policy instruments, may actually hinder the sustainment of hard-fought achievements.
Abstract Using Iraq and Afghanistan as case studies, this article explores several critical questions. First, what is the scope of the relationship among criminal organizations, terrorists, and insurgents? The analysis is drawn from theoretical approaches but also relies on government studies and open source reports. Second, how has the transitional period between post-conflict and reconstruction/nation-building created fertile ground for strengthening the criminal–terrorist–insurgent continuum? This is a particularly important issue as the Bush administration engages international organizations. Lastly, what can the United States and its Coalition allies do to mitigate the security challenges presented by the criminal–terrorist–insurgent problem in the these two countries? This article reflects the analysis, views, and opinions of the author and in no way represents the official or unofficial position of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The author thanks Dr. Joanna Spear, Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this research. Notes 1. For recent debates on the Bush doctrine, see the following selections: Robert Jervis, "Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained," Political Science Quarterly 118 (Fall 2003), pp. 351–377; John L. Hammond, "The Bush Doctrine, Preventive War, and International Law," Philosophical Forum 36(1) (Spring 2005), pp. 97–111; G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition," Foreign Affairs 81(5) (September/October 2002), pp. 44–60; Melvin P. Leffler, "Bush's Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy 144 (September/October 2004), pp. 22–28; Ivo Daadler and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions, 2002); and Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin Press, 2004). 2. Philip H. Gordon, "The End of the Bush Revolution," Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006), pp. 75–86. 3. The core of the insurgency is dominated by Sunni elements and their allies, but Shi'a groups probably constitute the largest organized criminal threat in Iraq. In particular, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), the armed component of the political movement led by powerful cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, is not only blamed for instigating much of the sectarian violence, but also for stimulating the growth of organized criminal networks over the past few years. In fact, many of the criminals associated with the JAM may simply be opportunists who have taken advantage of the schisms in the Sadr movement. 4. These gaps can be loosely defined as ungovernable rural areas, pockets of chaos in urban centers, and municipalities where the legitimacy of government institutions is questionable. For a broad discussion on the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction, see Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter, and Jeremy Weinstein, "Rebuilding Weak States," Foreign Affairs (January/February 2005), pp. 134–146. 5. Louise Shelley, "The Unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and Terrorism," Brown Journal of World Affairs XI(2)(Winter/Spring 2005), p. 103. 6. Louise Shelley, "The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism," International Annals of Criminology 20 (2002), pp. 85–92; and Louise Shelly, John T. Picarelli, Allison Irby, Douglas M. Hart, Patricia A. Craig-Hart, Phil Williams, Steven Simon, Nabi Abdullaev, Bartosz Stanislawski, and Laura Covill, Methods and Motives: Exploring the Links between Transnational Organized Crime and International Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 23 June 2005). 7. This zone can be conceptually differentiated from a nation-state that is progressing through a transition period, where the government has crossed a "tipping point" and is likely to become more stable and functional over time. Conversely, if a country is trapped in an interstitial zone, essentially on the brink of chaos or stability, it remains much more susceptible to exploitation by non-state actors. One recent study argues that the underlying core assumptions scholars have used to define the authoritarianism-to-democracy "transition paradigm" do not reflect actual experience today. Democratization does not unfold in a set sequence of stages, and underlying conditions in "transitional" countries—for example, economic level, levels of violence, ethnic disharmony, and institutional legacies—are major factors that impact the process. Most transitional countries enter a political gray zone for a long period of time, where they are neither authoritarian nor clearly headed toward democracy. See Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13(1) (2002), pp. 5–21. 8. Tamara Makarenko, Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime: The Emerging Nexus, White Paper, Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, 2002, pp. 1–10. 9. The level of inter-group cooperation and interaction is dependent on a variety of interdependent variables, not least of which includes the assessment of risk, opportunities, advantages, and capabilities. Specific factors that probably encourage greater association, at least from an operational perspective, include: access to greater financial resources, expertise, and intelligence; enhanced protection and logistical capabilities; and the sharing of tactics, techniques, and methods. 10. Shelley et al., Methods and Motives. 11. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 11 January 2007), pp. 12–13; Christopher M. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 10 December 2006); and Amalendu Misra, Afghanistan (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2004). 12. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006 (Executive Summary). Available at (http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf); see also Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, pp. 2–4. 13. U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2006, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005). Note: The GDP estimate came from the UN Office of Drug and Crime. 14. Ibid., p. 15. 15. Raphael F. Perl, Taliban and the Drug Trade, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 5 October 2001); and Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy. For two U.S. federal criminal cases that shed light on the conspiracy among Taliban operatives, drug traffickers, and Islamic extremists, see U.S. v. Bashir Noorzai, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S1 05 Cr. 19, 25 April 2005 and U.S. v. Baz Mohammed, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, S14 03 Cr. 486 [DC], 25 October 2005. 16. Misra, Afghanistan, p. 128. 17. Larry Goodson, "Bullets, Ballots, and Poppies in Afghanistan." Journal of Democracy 16(1) (January 2005), p. 24. 18. Pakistani nationals play a prominent role in all aspects of the drug trade in the Southern region, where distribution networks frequently are organized along regional and ethnic lines. Other organized criminal groups from Central Asia are reportedly involved in smuggling drugs to Turkey, Russia, and Central Europe. See U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2005, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006). 19. Thomas M. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines." SAIS Review 24(1) (2004), pp. 49–61. 20. Chris Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24(1) (January 2001), p. 55. 21. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, January 2007, National Intelligence Estimate (Key Judgments), available at (http://www.dni.gov/). 22. James A. Baker, Lee Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan Jr., Edwin Meese III, Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K. Simpson, The Iraq Study Group Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2006), p. 9. 23. Robert E. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency." National Interest No. 81 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–72. 24. David Kaplan, "Paying for Terror." US News and World Report, 5 December 2005, pp. 40–53. 25. Ibid., p. 67. 26. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67–72. 27. Ibid., p. 69. 28. Jessica Stern, "The Protean Enemy." Foreign Affairs 82(4) (July/August 2003), pp. 27–40; see also Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67–72. 29. Loretta Napoleoni, Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2003) and Douglas Fare, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York: Broadway Books, 2004). 30. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67–72. 31. According to Interpol, "In placement, money derived from criminal activities is introduced into the financial system. … In layering, the money launderer manipulates the illicit funds to make them appear as though they were derived from a legitimate source. A component of many layering schemes has been seen to be the transfer of money from one account to another. … In the final stage of money laundering, integration, the launderer invests in other assets, uses the funds to enjoy his ill-gotten gains or to continue to invest in additional illegal activities." Interpol General Secretariat, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and Its Role in Money Laundering, January 2000. Available at (http://www.interpol/int/Public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/hawala/default.asp). 32. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, p. 22. 33. Looney, "The Business of Insurgency," pp. 67–72. 34. Mark S. Hamm, Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice (Washington, DC), 1 June 2005; Dishman, "Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation." See also Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston: Little, Brown, 1999); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004); and Rohan Gunaratna, Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002). 35. David Gootnick, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to be Better Defined, General Accountability Office, 30 June 2005, p. 25. 36. Kenneth Katzman, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance, General Accountability Office, 5 July 2005. 37. William Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success." Parameters (Autumn 2003), pp. 95–112; see also Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report. 38. The U.S. Department of Defense identifies the four planning phases as the Shape Phase (I), Deter Phase (II), Stabilize Phase (III), and Enable Civil Authority Phase (IV). Joint Publication 5.0 states that the last two phases "generally require a high level of coherent, coordinated interagency activity. The complex nature of the security, transition, and reconstruction operations—and other stability operations conducted during these phases—also normally includes joint force interaction with many IGOs [intergovernmental organizations], NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], regional security organizations, and host-nation organizations. Continual liaison and sharing of information between the joint forces and these agencies via the JIACG [joint interagency coordination group], civil-military operations center, and other venues will be instrumental in accomplishing US national objectives." Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5.0, 26 December 2006, pp. II-7–II-8. 39. David C. Henderson and Robert W. Tucker, Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2005), p. 7. 40. For detailed discussion on the systemic problems in Iraq's criminal justice system, see Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, pp. 52–55. 41. Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq's Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience (National Defense Research Institute, RAND Corporation, 2005), p. 11. 42. Flavin, "Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success," pp. 95–112. 43. Tucker B. Mansager, "Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan," Joint Forces Quarterly, No. 40 (2006), pp. 81–82. 44. Raymond A. Millen, Afghanistan: Reconstituting a Collapsed State, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, April 2005. 45. Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy. 46. This USAID-managed program is one element of a five-part program targeted to eliminate poppy cultivation and increase licit crop activity and total agriculture contribution to the country's gross national product. The program, which affects poppy cultivation, income levels, and economic development, comes with a cost to farmers. Because of the loss of income, farmers are provided with short-term income opportunities through cash-for-work programs (Source: USAID, Afghanistan Operational Plan for FY 2006, 12 June 2006). 47. Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Hasty Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan Can Sow More Problems," Christian Science Monitor 80(81) (23 March 2006), p. 9; Carl Robichaud, "Remember Afghanistan: A Glass Half Full, On the Titanic." World Policy Journal 23(1) (Spring 2006), pp. 17–24. 48. Rathmell et al., Developing Iraq's Security Sector, pp. 86–91. 49. United Nations, Rule-of-Law for Post-Conflict States: Mapping the Justice Sector, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (New York and Geneva: United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2006), pp. 31–32. 50. Ibid., pp. xvi–xvii. 51. Baker et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, pp. 10–11. 52. Sanderson, "Transnational Terror and Organized Crime," pp. 49–61.
For a sample of 71 full-time students attending a large community college in the San Francisco Bay area, the objective of this investigation was to examine the degree of relationship between GPA earned during one academic quarter and: (a) an ability measure defined as scores on the composite of four academic tests in the ACT Assessment (American College Testing Program, 1959–1980) or scores on the College Board Scholastic Aptitude Test (Educational Testing Service, 1948–1980) that had been converted to scores on the academic composite of the ACT Assessment; (b) standing on an expectancy measure defined as a student's anticipated GPA; (c) scores on each of six measures representing a valence construct that indicates the relative desirability of long-range student goals; (d) scores on each of six measures portraying an instrumentality construct reflecting the facilitative effect of college grades (a short-term goal) as perceived by students in realizing long-term goals (such as vocational success or enduring friendships); and (e) an unweighted linear combination of a scholastic aptitude test score and placement on a contrived motivational construct constituting a multiplicative function of the expectancy, valence and instrumentality constructs consistent with Vroom's (1964, 1965) conceptualization. Ability and expectancy measures were found to be useful in predicting academic performance of community college students. The valence and instrumentality constructs contributed little, if any, validity to prediction of academic performance.
Recommendations for prioritizing COVID-19 vaccination have focused on the elderly at higher risk for severe disease. Existing models for identifying higher-risk individuals lack the needed integration of socio-demographic and clinical risk factors. Using multivariate logistic regression and random forest modeling, we developed a predictive model of severe COVID-19 using clinical data from Medicare claims for 16 million Medicare beneficiaries and socio-economic data from the CDC Social Vulnerability Index. Predicted individual probabilities of COVID-19 hospitalization were then calculated for population risk stratification and vaccine prioritization and mapping. The leading COVID-19 hospitalization risk factors were non-white ethnicity, end-stage renal disease, advanced age, prior hospitalization, leukemia, morbid obesity, chronic kidney disease, lung cancer, chronic liver disease, pulmonary fibrosis or pulmonary hypertension, and chemotherapy. However, previously reported risk factors such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes conferred modest hospitalization risk. Among all social vulnerability factors, residence in a low-income zip code was the only risk factor independently predicting hospitalization. This multifactor risk model and its population risk dashboard can be used to optimize COVID-19 vaccine allocation in the higher-risk Medicare population.
Com o intuito de contribuir para o aumento da eficiência e eficácia das unidades de inteligência competitiva (IC) no âmbito da gestão de pessoas, o presente trabalho teve como objetivo geral desenvolver um modelo para mapear conhecimentos, habilidades e atitudes de profissionais de IC, com vistas ao estabelecimento do processo de gestão de pessoas por competências (GPPC). O método de pesquisa adotado foi a pesquisa-ação, e a aplicação foi realizada junto ao Núcleo de Informação Tecnológica em Materiais (NIT/Materiais) da Universidade Federal de São Carlos (UFSCar). Foram os seguintes resultados obtidos: a) uma base de referência para apoio ao mapeamento de competências em IC; b) um glossário de atributos de competência de IC (conhecimentos, habilidades e atitudes); c) a ferramenta "Coletor de percepções de competências", para a coleta e análise de atributos de competência; d) procedimento para iniciar a gestão das competências individuais. A partir dos resultados obtidos e da discussão suscitada em torno da temática das competências em IC, foi possível concluir que o modelo de mapeamento pode contribuir para a criação e desenvolvimento de equipes de IC, em um processo de melhoria contínua.
The Global Strategic Partnership, a research consortium led by RAND, was commissioned by the UK Ministry of Defence to support the development of a concept of Multi-Domain Integration enabling the UK to maintain advantage by exploiting the integration of activities across domains. In particular, the study aimed to investigate the nature, extent and drivers of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea's own evolving thinking on multi-domain integration.
Active systems, because they provide their own illumination, are capable of operating 24 hours a day and are not dependent upon the angle of the sun. Unlike passive systems, they can provide three-dimensional imaging. DARPA is currently developing systems, technologies, and signal processing to pioneer new or improve existing capabilities that employ active imaging capabilities. These involve both radar and ladar, ranging from a few MHz for foliage penetration to near-visible IR to achieve ultra-high resolution at long range. These capabilities would improve Battlefield Awareness (BA) and provide persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to perform target detection, recognition, and identification. This paper discusses two different approaches to active optical imaging. One is a coherent approach that uses synthetic aperture techniques with infrared laser radar, and another approach uses only the intensity of the speckle pattern in the aperture plane. Both are capable of producing ultra-high resolution at long range.
The concepts of social and collective intelligence are placed within the context of the Information and Knowledge Society. The development of the economic intelligence is given as well as its application and development in organizations as competitive intelligence. The thesis defended is that the joint action of the information and knowledge management processes, both in support to strategies and organization’s mission , have na emerging property for the decision making process – that is the institutional intelligence.
In lithium-ion battery systems for electric vehicles (EVs), the high voltage battery is composed of several modules, and a balance between them is essential to improve battery life and safety. In this paper, a novel low-voltage DC/DC converter (LDC) with integrated inter-module battery equalization circuit (IBEC) is proposed. The proposed converter can be implemented by adding a small number of elements to the existing phase shift full bridge (PSFB) DC/DC Converter, which is widely used as an LDC, and can effectively balance the target module in both directions of charging and discharging. IBEC switches are capable of ZVS operation over the entire load range, while PSFB converter switches can achieve ZVS without additional inductors, especially in discharge mode. To verify the balancing and powering operations, a prototype of 1kW is implemented and experimented.
Antecedentes: La educación emocional es una estrategia de orientación psicopedagógica.Esta formación permite el desarrollo de la inteligencia emocional, fortalece competencias necesarias para un profesor estratégico y garantiza un proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje que dinamiza el desarrollo integral y el bienestar general de alumnos y profesores.Objetivos: conocer el nivel de inteligencia emocional del profesorado de educación primaria, y comprobar la existencia de correlaciones estadísticamente significativas entre los factores de la inteligencia emocional y las competencias del profesorado estratégico.Método: se realizó un estudio transversal explicativo, se llevó a cabo un muestreo no probabilístico n = 205 profesores de educación primaria de Ecuador.Se aplicaron los instrumentos de Trait Meta-Mood Scale-24 y la Escala de Evaluación de la Competencia Auto-percibida del
Dois grupos (G1 e G2) de três crianças, entre oito e doze anos, repetentes, participaram do estudo. Ambos foram submetidos à aplicação do WISC e do IAR no início e final do estudo. O G1 foi submetido a um treino de discriminações condicionais, com palavras faladas como modelos e palavras impressas como comparação. Todas as crianças do G1 aprenderam a ler, com aumento maior de QI do que as crianças do G2. Nos testes apresentaram porcentagem elevada de leitura das palavras ensinadas e de generalização. No IAR, tanto os sujeitos do G1 quanto do G2 apresentaram mudanças nas habilidades medidas pelo teste, em especial, lateralidade, análise-síntese e coordenação motora, com maior porcentagem de itens alterados para os sujeitos do G1. Os resultados indicam a existência de uma relação entre a emergência de leitura generalizada e aumento de QI.
Results of the second meeting of a panel of distinguished specialists who review annually Soviet economic performance are presented in the form of proceedings interwoven with tabular material, references, and occasional abstracts. Because of serious inconsistences and discrepancies in official Soviet statistical data for the year 1986, a debate on the quality of Soviet economic statistics is included in the review of performance. PlanEcon estimates are compared with those of the CIA. Also discussed are perspectives on agriculture and industry and prospects for 1987. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: 052, 124, 221.