Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

This article establishes six stylized facts about firms' export prices using detailed customs data on the universe of Chinese trade flows. First, across firms selling a given product, exporters that charge higher prices earn greater revenues in each destination, have bigger worldwide sales, and enter more markets. Second, firms that export more, enter more markets, and charge higher export prices import more expensive inputs. Third, across destinations within a firm-product, firms set higher prices in richer, larger, bilaterally more distant and overall less remote countries. Fourth, across destinations within a firm-product, firms earn bigger revenues in markets where they set higher prices. Fifth, across firms within a product, exporters with more destinations offer a wider range of export prices. Finally, firms that export more, enter more markets, and offer a wider range of export prices pay a wider range of input prices and source inputs from more origin countries. We propose that trade models should incorporate two features to rationalize these patterns in the data: more successful exporters use higher quality inputs to produce higher quality goods (stylized facts 1 and 2), and firms vary the quality of their products across destinations by using inputs of different quality levels (stylized facts 3, 4, 5, and 6). Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Shocks to the real price of oil may reflect oil supply shocks, shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities, or demand shocks that are specific to the crude oil market. Each shock has different effects on the real price of oil and on US macroeconomic aggregates. Changes in the composition of shocks help explain why regressions of macroeconomic aggregates on oil prices tend to be unstable. Evidence that the recent surge in oil prices was driven primarily by global demand shocks helps explain why this shock so far has failed to cause a major recession in the United States. (JEL E31, E32, Q41, Q43)

This paper develops and estimates a macro-finance model that combines a canonical affine no-arbitrage finance specification of the term structure with standard macroeconomic aggregate relationships for output and inflation. From this new empirical formulation, we obtain several important results: (1) the latent term structure factors from finance no-arbitrage models appear to have important macroeconomic and monetary policy underpinnings, (2) there is no evidence of monetary policy inertia or a slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate by the Federal Reserve, and (3) both forward-looking and backward-looking elements play important roles in macroeconomic dynamics.

This paper studies the relationship between public debt expansion and economic growth and investigates whether the debt-growth relation varies with the level of indebtedness. We contribute theoretically by developing tests for threshold effects in the context of dynamic heterogeneous panel data models with cross-sectionally dependent errors. In the empirical application, using data on a sample of forty countries over the 1965–2010 period, we find no evidence for a universally applicable threshold effect in the relationship between public debt and economic growth. Regardless of the threshold, however, we find significant negative effects of public debt buildup on output growth.

ABSTRACT We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.

The paper proposes a new measure of exogenous oil supply shocks. The timing, the magnitude, and the sign of this measure may differ greatly from current state-of-the-art estimates. It is shown that only a small fraction of the observed oil price increases during oil crisis periods can be attributed to exogenous oil production disruptions. Exogenous oil supply shocks cause a sharp drop of U.S. real GDP growth after five quarters rather than an immediate and sustained reduction in economic growth and a spike in CPI inflation after three quarters. Overall, exogenous oil supply shocks made remarkably little difference for the evolution of the U.S. economy since the 1970s, although they did matter for some historical episodes.

Abstract This paper develops a cross-sectionally augmented distributed lag (CS-DL) approach to the estimation of long-run effects in large dynamic heterogeneous panel data models with cross-sectionally dependent errors. The asymptotic distribution of the CS-DL estimator is derived under coefficient heterogeneity in the case where the time dimension (T) and the cross-section dimension (N) are both large. The CS-DL approach is compared with more standard panel data estimators that are based on autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) specifications. It is shown that unlike the ARDL-type estimator, the CS-DL estimator is robust to misspecification of dynamics and error serial correlation. The theoretical results are illustrated with small sample evidence obtained by means of Monte Carlo simulations, which suggest that the performance of the CS-DL approach is often superior to the alternative panel ARDL estimates, particularly when T is not too large and lies in the range of 30–50.

In this paper, we examine empirically whether credit plays a role as a nonlinear propagator of shocks. This propagation takes the form of a threshold vector autoregression in which a regime change occurs if credit conditions cross a critical threshold. Using nonlinear impulseresponse functions, we evaluate the dynamics implied by the threshold model. These suggest that shocks have a larger effect on output in the ''tight'' credit regime than is normally the case, and that contractionary monetary shocks typically have a larger effect than expansionary shocks. Finally, using a nonlinear version of historical decompositions, we attempt to determine the relative contribution to output growth of shocks and the nonlinear structure.

For many years, fuel switching between natural gas and residual fuel oil kept natural gas prices closely aligned with those for crude oil. More recently, however, the number of U.S. facilities able to switch between natural gas and residual fuel oil has declined, and over the past seven years, U.S. natural gas prices have been on an upward trend with crude oil prices but with considerable independent movement. Natural gas market analysts generally emphasize weather and inventories as drivers of natural gas prices. Using an error-correction model, we show that when these and other additional factors are taken into account, movements in crude oil prices have a prominent role in shaping natural gas prices. Our findings imply a continuum of prices at which natural gas and petroleum products are substitutes.

Recent media and government reports suggest that immigrants are more likely to hold jobs with poor working conditions than U.S.-born workers, perhaps because immigrants work in jobs that "natives don't want." Despite this widespread view, earlier studies have not found immigrants to be in riskier jobs than natives. This study combines individual-level data from the 2003-2005 American Community Survey with Bureau of Labor Statistics data on work-related injuries and fatalities to take afresh look at whether foreign-born workers are employed in more dangerous jobs. The results indicate that immigrants are in fact more likely to work in risky jobs than U.S.-born workers, partly due to differences in average characteristics, such as immigrants' lower English-language ability and educational attainment.

Research on oil markets conducted during the last decade has challenged long-held beliefs about the causes and consequences of oil price shocks. As the empirical and theoretical models used by economists have evolved, so has our understanding of the determinants of oil price shocks and of the interaction between oil markets and the global economy. Some of the key insights are that the real price of oil is endogenous with respect to economic fundamentals and that oil price shocks do not occur ceteris paribus. As a result, one must explicitly account for the demand and supply shocks underlying oil price shocks when studying their transmission to the domestic economy. Disentangling cause and effect in the relationship between oil prices and the economy requires structural models of the global economy including the oil market.

Rising oil prices appear to retard aggregate U.S. economic activity by more than falling oil prices stimulate it. Past research suggests adjustment costs, financial stress, and/or monetary policy may be possible explanations for the asymmetric response. This paper uses a near vector autoregressive model of the U. S. economy to examine where the asymmetry might originate. The analysis uses counterfactual experiments to determine that monetary policy alone cannot account for the asymmetry.

A major feature of globalization has been the enormous increase in international flows of goods and services: countries are now trading much more with each other. In this article, the authors demonstrate the greater role vertical specialization is playing in these increased flows. Vertical specialization occurs when a country uses imported intermediate parts to create a good it later exports--that is, the country links sequentially with other countries to produce a final good. Deriving evidence from four case studies as well as OECD input-output tables, the authors reveal that vertical specialization has accounted for a large and increasing share of international trade over the last several decades. They also note that because the trends encouraging vertical specialization--lower trade barriers and improvements in transportation and communications technologies--are likely to continue, this type of international trade should become even more prevalent in the next century.

Most US house price models break down in the mid-2000s, due to the omission of exogenous changes in mortgage credit supply (associated with the sub-prime mortgage boom) from house price-to-rent ratio and inverted housing demand models. Previous models lack data on credit constraints facing first-time home-buyers. Incorporating a measure of credit conditions - the cyclically adjusted loan-to-value ratio for first-time buyers - into house price-to-rent ratio models yields stable long-run relationships, more precisely estimated effects, reasonable speeds of adjustment and improved model fits.

This paper constructs a theoretical model to investigate the relationship between the two major forms of terrorism and foreign direct investment (FDI). We analyze with various estimators how these relationships are affected by foreign aid flows by focusing on 78 developing countries for 1984-2008. Both types of terrorism are found to depress FDI. Aggregate aid mitigates the negative consequences of domestic and transnational terrorism, but this aid appears more robust in ameliorating the adverse effect of domestic terrorism. However, when aid is subdivided, bilateral aid is effective in reducing the adverse effects of transnational terrorism on FDI, whereas multilateral aid is effective in curbing the adverse effects of domestic terrorism on FDI. For transnational terrorism, there is evidence in the literature that donor countries earmark some bilateral aid to counterterrorism. Aid's ability to curb the risk to FDI from terrorism is important because FDI is an important engine of development.

Based on rich novel survey data, we document that 35.2 percent of the US workforce worked entirely from home in May 2020, up from 8.2 percent in February.Highly educated, high-income and white workers were more likely to shift to working from home and maintain employment following the pandemic.Individuals working from home daily before the pandemic lost employment at similar rates as daily commuters.This suggests that, apart from the potential for home-based work, demand conditions also mattered for job losses.We find that 71.7 percent of workers that could work from home effectively did so in May.

We distinguish between three different strategies for estimating forecasting equations with real-time data and argue that the most popular approach should generally be avoided. The point is illustrated with a model that uses current-quarter monthly industrial production, employment, and retail sales data to predict real GDP growth. When the model is estimated using either of our two alternative methods, its out-of-sample forecasting performance is superior to that obtained using conventional estimation and compares favorably with that of the Blue Chip consensus.

Increases in oil prices have been held responsible for recessions, periods of excessive inflation, reduced productivity and lower economic growth. In this paper, we review the arguments supporting such views. First, we highlight some of the conceptual difficulties in assigning a central role to oil price shocks in explaining macroeconomic fluctuations, and we trace how the arguments of proponents of the oil view have evolved in response to these difficulties. Second, we challenge the notion that at least the major oil price movements can be viewed as exogenous with respect to the US macroeconomy. We examine critically the evidence that has led many economists to ascribe a central role to exogenous political events in modeling the oil market, and we provide arguments in favor of 'reverse causality' from macroeconomic variables to oil prices. Third, although none of the more recent oil price shocks has been associated with stagflation in the US economy, a major reason for the continued popularity of the oil shock hypothesis has been the perception that only oil price shocks are able to explain the US stagflation of the 1970s. We show that this is not the case.

Equality and efficiency are key issues in educational reform. Here the authors analyze the efficiency and equality consequences of various school finance reforms using a cost-indirect output distance function. This function readily models multiple-output production under conditions of budgetary constraint, and provides a natural measure of performance that is closely related to Farrell-type measures of efficiency. The analysis suggests that despite school district inefficiency, finance reforms can affect student achievement. However, any potential gains in output from redistribution are dwarfed by the potential gains from increased efficiency. More strikingly, the analysis demonstrates that budgetary reforms designed to equalize expenditures could actually increase the inequality of student achievement.

Abstract The Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) approach has proven to be a very useful approach to analyse interactions in the global macroeconomy and other data networks where both the cross‐section and the time dimensions are large. This paper surveys the latest developments in the GVAR modelling, examining both the theoretical foundations of the approach and its numerous empirical applications. We provide a synthesis of existing literature and highlight areas for future research.