Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia

Over the past several years, substantial research effort has gone into measuring the efficiency of financial institutions. Many studies have found that inefficiencies are quite large, on the order of 20% or more of total banking industry costs and about half of the industry's potential profits. There is no consensus on the sources of the differences in measured efficiency. this paper examines several possible sources, including differences in efficiency concept, measurement method, and a number of bank, market, and regulatory characteristics. We review the existing literature and provide new evidence using data on US banks over the period 1990–1995.

We study how unexpected changes in uncertainty about fiscal policy affect economic activity. First, we estimate tax and spending processes for the United States with time-varying volatility to uncover evidence of time-varying volatility. Second, we estimate a VAR for the US economy using the time-varying volatility found in the previous step. Third, we feed the tax and spending processes into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. Both in the VAR and in the model, we find that unexpected changes in fiscal volatility shocks can have a sizable adverse effect on economic activity. An endogenous increase in markups is a key mechanism. (JEL E12, E23, E32, E52, E62)

We show how changes in the volatility of the real interest rate at which small open emerging economies borrow have an important effect on variables like output, consumption, investment, and hours. We start by documenting the strong evidence of time-varying volatility in the real interest rates faced by four emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela. We estimate a stochastic volatility process for real interest rates. Then, we feed this process in a standard small open economy business cycle model. We find that an increase in real interest rate volatility triggers a fall in output, consumption, investment, hours, and debt. (JEL E13, E20, E32, E43, F32, F43, 011)

I use the stochastic cost frontier approach to investigate efficiency of banks operating in the Third Federal Reserve District, accounting for the quality and riskiness of bank output. In addition to the mean and mode of the conditional distribution of the one-sided error term, I calculate confidence intervals for the inefficiency measures based on the conditional distribution. The results indicate that Third District banks are operating at cost-efficient output levels and product mixes, but are not efficiently using their inputs. The second part of the article relates the inefficiency measures to several correlates.

This paper shows that standard international business cycle models can be reconciled with the empirical evidence on the lack of consumption risk sharing. First, we show analytically that with incomplete asset markets productivity disturbances can have large un-insurable effects on wealth, depending on the value of the trade elasticity and shock persistence. Second, we investigate these findings quantitatively in a model calibrated to the U.S. economy. With the low trade elasticity estimated via a method of moments procedure, the consumption risk of productivity shocks is magnified by high terms of trade and real exchange rate (RER) volatility. Strong wealth effects in response to shocks raise the demand for domestic goods above supply, crowding out external demand and appreciating the terms of trade and the RER. Building upon the literature on incomplete markets, we then show that similar results are obtained when productivity shocks are nearly permanent, provided the trade elasticity is set equal to the high values consistent with micro-estimates. Under both approaches the model accounts for the low and negative correlation between the RER and relative (domestic to foreign) consumption in the data the Backus Smith puzzle.

ABSTRACT We show that incentive conflicts between firms and their creditors have a large impact on corporate debt policy. Net debt issuing activity experiences a sharp and persistent decline following debt covenant violations, when creditors use their acceleration and termination rights to increase interest rates and reduce the availability of credit. The effect of creditor actions on debt policy is strongest when the borrower's alternative sources of finance are costly. In addition, despite the less favorable terms offered by existing creditors, borrowers rarely switch lenders following a violation.

We study, theoretically and quantitatively, the general equilibrium of an economy in which households smooth consumption by means of both a riskless asset and unsecured loans with the option to default. The default option resembles a bankruptcy filing under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Competitive financial intermediaries offer a menu of loan sizes and interest rates wherein each loan makes zero profits. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize the circumstances under which a household defaults on its loans. We show that our model accounts for the main statistics regarding bankruptcy and unsecured credit while matching key macroeconomic aggregates, and the earnings and wealth distributions. We use this model to address the implications of a recent policy change that introduces a form of “means testing” for households contemplating a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing. We find that this policy change yields large welfare gains.

ABSTRACT Can banks maintain their advantage as liquidity providers when exposed to a financial crisis? While banks honored credit lines drawn by firms during the 2007 to 2009 crisis, this liquidity provision was only possible because of explicit, large support from the government and government‐sponsored agencies. At the onset of the crisis, aggregate deposit inflows into banks weakened and their loan‐to‐deposit shortfalls widened. These patterns were pronounced at banks with greater undrawn commitments. Such banks sought to attract deposits by offering higher rates, but the resulting private funding was insufficient to cover shortfalls and they reduced new credit.

ABSTRACT. This paper explores the determinants of population and employment densities interregionally. The theoretical model, due to Steinnes and Fisher, permits simultaneous determination of population and employment densities. This is applied to data for about 3,000 counties in the U.S. to analyze the effects of economic, demographic, climatic, and policy‐related variables on the growth of population and employment, during the 1970s. Considering employment, differential county growth is explained in terms of economic and demographic conditions; regional and policy variables matter less. For population, climate matters as a preference for sunbelt states is found. Local government programs regarding education and tax policy seem to play a role.

We empirically examine whether access to deposits with inelastic rates (core deposits) permits a bank to make contractual agreements with borrowers that are infeasible if the bank must pay market rates for funds. Such access insulates a bank's costs of funds from exogenous shocks, allowing it to insulate its borrowers against exogenous credit shocks. We find that, controlling for loan market competition, banks funded more heavily with core deposits provide more loan rate smoothing in response to exogenous changes in aggregate credit risk. Thus we provide evidence for a novel channel linking bank liabilities to relationship lending.

This paper examines whether monetary policy has similar effects across regions in the United States. Impulse response functions from an estimated structural vector autoregression reveal a core of regions—New England, Mideast, Plains, Southeast, and the Far West— that respond to monetary policy changes in ways that closely approximate the U.S. average response. Of the three noncore regions, one (Great Lakes) is noticeably more sensitive to monetary policy changes, and two (Southwest and Rocky Mountains) are found to be much less sensitive. A state-level version of the model is estimated and used to provide evidence on the channels for monetary policy.

We estimate the elasticity of exports to credit using matched customs and firm-level bank credit data from Peru. To account for non-credit determinants of exports, we compare changes in exports of the same product and to the same destination by firms borrowing from banks differentially affected by capital-flow reversals during the 2008 financial crisis. We find that credit shocks affect the intensive margin of exports, but have no significant impact on entry or exit of firms to new product and destination markets. Our results suggest that credit shortages reduce exports through raising the variable cost of production, rather than the cost of financing sunk entry investments.

In this paper, we develop algorithms to independently draw from a family of conjugate posterior distributions over the structural parameterization when sign and zero restrictions are used to identify structural vector autoregressions (SVARs). We call this family of conjugate posteriors normal‐generalized‐normal. Our algorithms draw from a conjugate uniform‐normal‐inverse‐Wishart posterior over the orthogonal reduced‐form parameterization and transform the draws into the structural parameterization; this transformation induces a normal‐generalized‐normal posterior over the structural parameterization. The uniform‐normal‐inverse‐Wishart posterior over the orthogonal reduced‐form parameterization has been prominent after the work of Uhlig (2005). We use Beaudry, Nam, and Wang's (2011) work on the relevance of optimism shocks to show the dangers of using alternative approaches to implementing sign and zero restrictions to identify SVARs like the penalty function approach. In particular, we analytically show that the penalty function approach adds restrictions to the ones described in the identification scheme.

We amend the standard cost model to account for the role of financial capital in banking. The cost function is conditioned on the level of capital, but we model the demand for financial capital so that it can serve as a cushion against insolvency for potentially risk-averse managers and as a signal of risk for less informed outsiders. Scale economies are then computed without assuming that the bank chooses a level of capitalization that minimizes cost. We find evidence of substantial scale economies and that bank managers are risk averse and use the level of financial capital to signal the level of risk.

This article uses CPS gross flow data to analyze the business cycle dynamics of separation and job finding rates and quantify their contributions to overall unemployment variability. Cyclical changes in the separation rate are negatively correlated with changes in productivity and move contemporaneously with them, whereas the job finding rate is positively correlated with and tends to lag productivity. Contemporaneous fluctuations in the separation rate explain between 40 and 50% of fluctuations in unemployment, depending on how the data are detrended. This figure becomes larger when dynamic interactions between the separation and job finding rates are considered.

Free disposal of equity, which directly rules out the existence of negative rational bubbles in stock pric es, also imposes theoretical restrictions on the possible existence o f positive rational bubbles. The analysis in this paper shows that a positive rational bubble can start only on the first date of trading of a stock. Thus, the existence of a rational bubble at any date woul d imply that the stock has been overvalued relative to market fundame ntals since the first date of trading, and that prior to the first da te of trading the issuer of the stock and potential stockholders who anticipated the initial pricing of the stock expected that the stock would be overvalued. Copyright 1988 by Royal Economic Society.

ABSTRACT I develop a model of financial networks in which linkages not only spread contagion, but also induce private sector bailouts, where liquid banks bail out illiquid banks because of the threat of contagion. Introducing this bailout possibility, I show that linkages may be optimal ex ante because they allow banks to obtain some mutual insurance even though formal commitments are impossible. However, in some cases (e.g., when liquidity is concentrated among a small group of banks), the whole network may collapse. I also characterize the optimal network size and apply the results to joint liability arrangements and payment systems.

We consider a linear panel event-study design in which unobserved confounds may be related both to the outcome and to the policy variable of interest. We provide sufficient conditions to identify the causal effect of the policy by exploiting covariates related to the policy only through the confounds. Our model implies a set of moment equations that are linear in parameters. The effect of the policy can be estimated by 2SLS, and causal inference is valid even when endogeneity leads to pre-event trends (“pre-trends”) in the outcome. Alternative approaches perform poorly in our simulations. (JEL C23, C26)

ABSTRACT Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold‐up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank‐dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.