Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco

ABSTRACT The standard class of affine models produces poor forecasts of future Treasury yields. Better forecasts are generated by assuming that yields follow random walks. The failure of these models is driven by one of their key features: Compensation for risk is a multiple of the variance of the risk. Thus risk compensation cannot vary independently of interest rate volatility. I also describe a broader class of models. These aessentially affine‐ models retain the tractability of standard models, but allow compensation for interest rate risk to vary independently of interest rate volatility. This additional flexibility proves useful in forecasting future yields.

A typical two-digit industry in the United States appears to have approximately constant returns to scale. Three puzzles emerge, however. First, estimates rise at higher levels of aggregation. Second, apparent decreasing returns contradicts evidence of small economic profits. Third, estimates with value added differ substantially from those with gross output. A representative-firm paradigm cannot explain these puzzles but a simple story of aggregation over heterogeneous units can. The authors discuss implications of heterogeneity for calibrating one-sector macroeconomic models, showing that these models sometimes require firm-level parameters but at other times require the 'biased' aggregate parameters. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

This paper develops a generalization of the widely used difference-in-differences method for evaluating the effects of policy changes. We propose a model that allows the control and treatment groups to have different average benefits from the treatment. The assumptions of the proposed model are invariant to the scaling of the outcome. We provide conditions under which the model is nonparametrically identified and propose an estimator that can be applied using either repeated cross section or panel data. Our approach provides an estimate of the entire counterfactual distribution of outcomes that would have been experienced by the treatment group in the absence of the treatment and likewise for the untreated group in the presence of the treatment. Thus, it enables the evaluation of policy interventions according to criteria such as a mean-variance trade-off. We also propose methods for inference, showing that our estimator for the average treatment effect is root-N consistent and asymptotically normal. We consider extensions to allow for covariates, discrete dependent variables, and multiple groups and time periods. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.

The natural rate of interest—the real interest rate consistent with output equaling its natural rate and stable inflation—plays a central role in macroeconomic theory and monetary policy. Estimation of the natural rate of interest, however, has received little attention. We apply the Kalman filter to estimate jointly time-varying natural rates of interest and output and trend growth. We find a close link between the natural rate of interest and the trend growth rate, as predicted by theory. Estimates of the natural rate of interest, however, are very imprecise and subject to considerable real-time measurement error.

Yes. We construct a measure of aggregate technology change, controlling for aggregation effects, varying utilization of capital and labor, nonconstant returns, and imperfect competition. On impact, when technology improves, input use and nonresidential investment fall sharply. Output changes little. With a lag of several years, inputs and investment return to normal and output rises strongly. The standard one-sector real-business-cycle model is not consistent with this evidence. The evidence is consistent, however, with simple sticky-price models, which predict the results we find: when technology improves, inputs and investment generally fall in the short run, and output itself may also fall.

Analyses of the role of rational speculators in financial markets usually presume that such investors dampen price fluctuations by trading against liquidity or noise traders. This conclusion does not necessarily hold when noise traders follow positive-feedback investment strategies buy when prices rise and sell when prices fall. In such cases, it may pay rational speculators to try to jump on the bandwagon early and to purchase ahead of noise trader demand. If rational speculators' attempts to jump on the bandwagon early trigger positive-feedback investment strategies, then an increase in the number of forward-looking rational speculators can lead to increased volatility of prices about fundamentals.

Abstract Currency crises tend to be regional; they affect countries in geographic proximity. This suggests that patterns of international trade are important in understanding how currency crises spread, above and beyond any macroeconomic phenomena. We provide empirical support for this hypothesis. Using data for five different currency crises (in 1971, 1973, 1992, 1994 and 1997) we show that currency crises affect clusters of countries tied together by international trade. By way of contrast, macroeconomic and financial influences are not closely associated with the cross-country incidence of speculative attacks.

U.S. estimates of the natural rate of interest?the real short-term interest rate that would prevail absent transitory disturbances?have declined dramatically since the start of the global financial crisis. For example, estimates using the Laubach-Williams (2003) model indicate the natural rate in the United States fell to close to zero during the crisis and has remained there through the end of 2015. Explanations for this decline include shifts in demographics, a slowdown in trend productivity growth, and global factors affecting real interest rates. This paper applies the Laubach-Williams methodology to the United States and three other advanced economies?Canada, the Euro Area, and the United Kingdom. We find that large declines in trend GDP growth and natural rates of interest have occurred over the past 25 years in all four economies. These country-by-country estimates are found to display a substantial amount of comovement over time, suggesting an important role for global factors in shaping trend growth and natural rates of interest.

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We develop a model that, at the aggregate level, is similar to the one-sector neoclassical growth model; at the disaggregate level, it has implications for the path of observable measures of technology adoption. We estimate it using data on the diffusion of 15 technologies in 166 countries over the last two centuries. Our results reveal that, on average, countries have adopted technologies 45 years after their invention. There is substantial variation across technologies and countries. Newer technologies have been adopted faster than old ones. The cross-country variation in the adoption of technologies accounts for at least 25 percent of per capita income differences. (JEL O33, O41, O47)

According to standard macroeconomic models, the zero lower bound greatly reduces the effectiveness of monetary policy and increases the efficacy of fiscal policy. However, private-sector decisions depend on the entire path of expected future short-term interest rates, not just the current short-term rate. Put differently, longer-term yields matter. We show how to measure the zero bound's effects on yields of any maturity. Indeed, 1- and 2-year Treasury yields were surprisingly unconstrained throughout 2008 to 2010, suggesting that monetary and fiscal policy were about as effective as usual during this period. Only beginning in late 2011 did these yields become more constrained. (JEL E43, E52, E62)

The authors present a model of portfolio allocation by noise traders with incorrect expectations about return variances. For such misperceptions, noise traders who do not affect prices can earn higher expected returns than rational investors with similar risk aversion. Moreover, such noise traders can come to dominate the market in that the probability that they eventually have a high share of total wealth is close to one. Noise traders come to dominate despite their taking of excessive risk and their higher consumption. The authors conclude that the case against their long-run viability is not as clear-cut as is commonly supposed. Coauthors are Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

This paper describes a real-time, quarterly growth-accounting database for the U.S. business sector. The data on inputs, including capital, are used to produce a quarterly series on total factor productivity (TFP). In addition, the dataset implements an adjustment for variations in factor utilization—labor effort and the workweek of capital. The utilization adjustment follows Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (BFK, 2006). Using relative prices and input-output information, the series are also decomposed into separate TFP and utilization-adjusted TFP series for equipment investment (including consumer durables) and “consumption” (defined as business output less equipment and consumer durables).

This paper develops and estimates a macro-finance model that combines a canonical affine no-arbitrage finance specification of the term structure with standard macroeconomic aggregate relationships for output and inflation. From this new empirical formulation, we obtain several important results: (1) the latent term structure factors from finance no-arbitrage models appear to have important macroeconomic and monetary policy underpinnings, (2) there is no evidence of monetary policy inertia or a slow partial adjustment of the policy interest rate by the Federal Reserve, and (3) both forward-looking and backward-looking elements play important roles in macroeconomic dynamics.

ABSTRACT In the 1980s, U.S. banks became systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures rose exponentially during this decade. The leading explanation for the persistence of these trends centers on fixed‐rate deposit insurance: the insurance gives bank equityholders an incentive to take on risk when the value of bank charters falls. We propose and test an alternative explanation based on corporate control considerations. We show that managerial entrenchment played a more important role than did the moral hazard associated with deposit insurance in explaining the recent behavior of the banking industry.

The recent financial crisis saw a dramatic and persistent jump in interest rate spreads between overnight federal funds and longer - term interbank loans. The Fed took several actions to reduce these spreads including the creation of the Term Auction Facility (TAF). The effectiveness of these policies depends on the cause of the increased spreads such as counterparty risk, liquidity, or other factors. Using a no-arbitrage pricing framework and various measures of risk, we find robust evidence that increased counterparty risk contributed to the rise in spreads but do not find robust evidence that the TAF had a significant effect on spreads. (JEL E43, E44, E52, G21)

After the Global Financial Crisis a controversial rush to fiscal austerity followed in many countries. Yet research on the effects of austerity on macroeconomic aggregates was and still is unsettled, mired by the difficulty of identifying multipliers from observational data. This paper reconciles seemingly disparate estimates of multipliers within a unified and state-contingent framework. We achieve identification of causal effects with new propensity-score based methods for time series data. Using this novel approach, we show that austerity is always a drag on growth, and especially so in depressed economies: a one percent of GDP fiscal consolidation translates into 4 percent lower real GDP after five years when implemented in the slump rather than the boom. We illustrate our findings with a counterfactual evaluation of the impact of the U.K. government's shift to austerity policies in 2010 on subsequent growth.

Conventional wisdom in economic history suggests that conflict between countries can be enormously disruptive of economic activity, especially international trade. We study the effects of war on bilateral trade with available data extending back to 1870. Using the gravity model, we estimate the contemporaneous and lagged effects of wars on the trade of belligerent nations and neutrals, controlling for other determinants of trade, as well as the possible effects of reverse causality. We find large and persistent impacts of wars on trade, national income, and global economic welfare. We also conduct a general equilibrium comparative statics exercise that indicates costs associated with lost trade might be at least as large as the conventionally measured direct costs of war, such as lost human capital, as illustrated by case studies of World Wars I and II.

This paper unveils a new resource for macroeconomic research: a long-run dataset covering disaggregated bank credit for 17 advanced economies since 1870. The new data show that the share of mortgages on banks’ balance sheets doubled in the course of the twentieth century, driven by a sharp rise of mortgage lending to households. Household debt to asset ratios have risen substantially in many countries. Financial stability risks have been increasingly linked to real estate lending booms, which are typically followed by deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Housing finance has come to play a central role in the modern macroeconomy.

Policy rules that are consistent with inflation targeting are examined in a small macro-econometric model of the US economy. We compare the properties and outcomes of explicit instrument rules as well as targeting rules. The latter, which imply implicit instrument rules, may be closer to actual operating procedures of inflation-targeting central banks. We find that inflation forecasts are central for good policy rules under inflation targeting. Some simple instrument and targeting rules do remarkably well relative to the optimal rule; others, including some that are often used as representing inflation targeting, do less well.