Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg

A systematic analysis of the behavior of German society toward the Jews under National Socialism reveals a complex process that eludes static and one-dimensional explanations. Neither antisemitism nor dictatorial pressure alone, the author believes, can explain the dynamism in the rapid social exclusion of Jews. Instead, the process of persecution should be understood as a dynamic interaction between state and society—one that was shaped by four determinant factors: antisemitism, the conforming of personal interests to the norms propagated by the Nazi regime, the activation of social interests (in particular by the economic exclusion of Jews) and the growing consensual support for the regime after 1933.

AbstractIn the early 1990s, German artist Gunter Demnig initiated the commemoration of individual victims of Nazi Germany by means of cobble stone-sized memorials, so-called Stolpersteine ('stumbling blocks'), that are inserted in the footpath. While initially Stolpersteine were hotly debated, today they are no longer considered controversial. The fact that dedicating a Stolperstein means to have to research the fate of an individual victim distinguishes this commemorative form from others. In this article, I explore a variety of approaches to and motives for sponsoring Stolpersteine, and responses to them. I argue that the success of the Stolpersteine is due to the fact that they make complex and burdensome historical relationships manageable, and that they offer emotional relief because they are a public sign of expressing empathy with victims.Keywords:: commemorationpolitics of memoryHolocaust memorialsRoma and Sinti Notes 1. See Demnig's website www.stolpersteine.com for more information about the Stolpersteine project. Similar forms of commemoration exist in Chile for the victims of the military dictatorship; see Peter Read and Marivic Wyndham's article in this issue of Rethinking History. In Argentina, the victims of state terrorism are commemorated with baldosas de la memoria, large and colourful 'tiles of memory' that also are installed in the pavements. 2. A couple of recent examples: In the East German town of Greifswald, 11 Stolpersteine disappeared in the night of 9 November 2012 (the anniversary of the 1938 Reichskristallnacht pogrom); see www.ndr.de/regional/mecklenburg-vorpommern/stolpersteine127.html. In December 2012, five Stolpersteine were stolen in the East German town of Sassnitz; see www.aktuell.meinestadt.de/sassnitz/2012/12/05/stolpersteine-in-sassnitz-gestohlen-und-beschaedigt/ 3. See www.stolpersteine-hamburg.de/index.php?RECORD_ID = 98 and www.stolpersteine-hamburg.de/index.php?MAIN_ID = 8 4. See, for example, for Berlin: www.stolpersteine-berlin.de/; for Leipzig: www.stolpersteine-leipzig.de/; for Bremen: www.stolpersteine-bremen.de/; for Frankfurt: www.stolpersteine-frankfurt.de/ 5. See the database about the Stolpersteine in Cologne, http://www.museenkoeln.de/ns-dokumentationszentrum/default.aspx?s = 1204&vgr = Sinti%20und%20Roma. Natascha Winter, who later became the head of the Cologne-based Sinti-Allianz, convinced Demnig to change the inscriptions and helped him decide whether a particular victim was a Sinti or a Roma. I thank Karola Fings for this information. 6. Email communication, Johann-Hinrich Möller to the author, 17 February 2009. 7.www.antifaelmshorn.blogsport.de/2010/04/15/20-04-2010-stolpersteine-elmshorn/. Many Germans would be aware that Adolf Hitler was born on 20 April. In Nazi Germany, Hitler's birthday was an occasion for large-scale celebrations. Even 60 years after Hitler's death, the designated premier of the state of Baden-Württemberg considered the date sufficiently problematic to ask that his swearing-in be deferred for a day. 8. The story of Trollmann's persecution is told on a website created by his great-nephew Manuel Trollmann: www.johann-trollmann.de 9. For an example of a campaign to install a Stolperstein for a man who was arrested for vagrancy and later murdered in a concentration camp, see www.stolpersteine-fuer-norddeich.blogspot.de/10. Oral communication, Gunter Demnig, Haifa, 17 November 2010.11. The suggestion to 'memorialise' perpetrators was made by Neumann (Citation2005, Citation2006) in the context of public discussions about the commemoration of the Celle 'Hasenjagd'.12. See, for example, the instructions provided by Stolpersteine Hamburg: www.stolpersteine-hamburg.de/?MAIN_ID = 21Additional informationNotes on contributorsLinde ApelLinde Apel is Director of the Werkstatt der Erinnerung at the Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg. She is the author of Jüdische Frauen im Konzentrationslager Ravensbrück 1939–1945 (Metropol, 2003) and of numerous papers on the politics of memory. Her research interests include the methodology of oral history and memories of the Holocaust.

The dynamic of change in the long 1960s was pushed forward significantly by the young. The assumption that this happened mainly in conflict with the older generations is not based on fact. In reality, older people reacted to new patterns of behaviour in a measured way and adapted to them relatively quickly. In particular, there is not much evidence for intra-family conflict between the generations. On the other hand, an increasing number of youth subcultures appeared, which distanced themselves from the political and cultural mainstream. Within society as a whole, there was considerable conflict, since there were many cultural, but only a few political, opportunities for young people.

Urban development projects are usually specific. There is a concrete designation of what the land is going to be used for – housing, commerce, leisure –, what buildings will be built and what infrastructure will be required. This enables a meaningful discussion of the proposed concepts and the balancing of public and particularistic interests. But what happens when areas are designated for development and cleared of inhabitants as a measure of economic “provision,” without a precisely defined purpose and with a time schedule stretching decades into the future? This paper will discuss this question in the form of a historical case-study on port expansion in Hamburg in the 1970s and 1980s. It will shed light on public and political conflicts, some of which were the result of particularities of port planning in general, some were the result of specifics of place and time. In 1961 the Hamburg state parliament designated 2,500 hectares for port expansion. It was to be used for new docks, but also for industry. In 1973 the evacuation of the village of Altenwerder began, to make sure that there would be time for the long process of preparing the land for new use. While port expansion had been welcomed unanimously in 1961, from the mid-1970s on it met with resistance. The law of 1961, which allowed for expropriation of private properties without a development scheme, did not hold up in court. Equally problematic was, that the policy of the Hamburg Senate of economic and industrial expansion and the underlying ideology of growth were now called into question. The alleged benefits for the city as a whole in terms of jobs and tax revenue were compared to the ecological and social costs of sacrificing Altenwerder. In 1982 a Port Expansion Law was passed to create a new legal basis for planning. The option of expropriating land for port purposes without a designation of its future use was included and the law allowed for industrial development in the port. To overcome public resistance, the Senate characterized port expansion preparation now in countless speeches and publications as an act of “provision.” Taking advantage of positive implications of the term from social politics – foresight, reason, rationality, responsibility –, the government maintained that it was not only necessary but actually its duty to take provisionary measures in the interest of economic prosperity. The rhetoric of “provision” did not bridge the ideological gap between politicians, port planners, environmentalists and private citizens directly affected by the expansion plans, but the public discourse calmed down after the completion of the evacuation of Altenwerder in the late 1980s, because no other areas of the plan of 1961 have been activated so far.

Boarding schools are well-known institutions that have been extensively studied by historians. Yet, there are still many hidden histories associated with this type of schooling. This section presents a range of methods that might fruitfully be applied to under-utilised sources to gain new insights into the history of boarding schools for children outside "mainstream" histories. The introductory article provides an overview of the different ways in which boarding schools have been theorised as institutions. This is followed by three articles that explore how music and photographs as well as ego-documents can be used to further develop social and cultural historical approaches to obtain a broader understanding of the complexities of boarding school life. Overall, this dossier provides insight into how different sources and methodological innovations can help us uncover alternative or hidden histories of historical actors in boarding schools.

Interview mit Linde Apel von Andreas Möllenkamp im Rahmen des Forschungsprojekts <em>Open Interviews. Auf dem Weg zur Öffnung qualitativer Interviewforschung</em>. Im Interview geht es um die Archivierung und Nutzung von Interviews in der Werkstatt der Erinnerung, einem Oral History-Archiv, das an der Forschungsstelle für Zeitgeschichte in Hamburg angesiedelt ist. Das Interview wurde zwischen Januar und Mai 2019 per Email geführt. Das Projekt wurde durch das Fellow-Programm Freies Wissen vom Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft, Wikimedia Deutschland und der VolkswagenStiftung gefördert.

Le scandale des abus sexuels sur les enfants concerne l’Église catholique dans le monde entier et donc également l’Église allemande. Plusieurs rapports montrent à quel point les agressions par des clercs, mais aussi la dissimulation de ces actes par les dirigeants de l’Église, étaient répandues en Allemagne. Après une grande étude nationale publiée en 2018, plusieurs évêques ont commandé des études relatives à leurs diocèses. Après un aperçu des recherches sur ces questions, nous présentons les principaux résultats d’une étude sur l’histoire des abus sexuels au sein du diocèse de Münster, présentée au public en juin 2022. La question est posée de savoir dans quelle mesure les historiens peuvent contribuer à mettre en lumière les conditions structurelles des actes d’abus et de leur dissimulation.

After 1945, the Iron Curtain cut off half of the hinterland of Germany’s largest seaport, Hamburg. Located in the middle of Europe, the city found itself at the periphery of the Federal Republic and Western Europe. The political and economic elites of the city-state conceived the Policy of the Elbe to deal with this situation. Its proponents pursued apolitical strategies to reconnect it to Eastern Europe despite political obstacles and against national foreign policy principles. This article sheds light on the ideas and practices of a city forced to redefine its position in Cold War Europe.

The resilience of cities is usually tested by acute catastrophes such as physical destruction by natural disasters or wars or long-term processes of economic decline. This article discusses another type of catastrophe and the response of the political and economic elite of the city to it in the form of a case study on Germany’s biggest seaport city Hamburg in the aftermath of World War II. Although the air war of 1943-1945 had seriously damaged large parts of the port of Hamburg, the physical reconstruction began soon after the end of the war and made steady progress. This aspect of the disaster of war was to be overcome within a few years. But the war and its aftermath of political confrontation between East and West had changed the geopolitical position of Hamburg and moved it from the center of Europe to the periphery of the West. The hinterland of the port in Eastern Europe was cut off. The founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 with its focus on the Rhine-Ruhr area further seemed to marginalize Hamburg. These developments were quickly perceived as a greater disaster than the physical destruction. This article examines the strategies developed by the political and economic leaders in Hamburg in the late 1940s and 1950s for dealing with processes they had no control over and could not directly influence.