George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Abstract Interest in conflict prevention blossomed throughout the 1990s, and so did the literature on the subject. Moreover, conflict prevention is rapidly becoming a prominent focus of the new global security and global governance agenda with advocacy of preventive policies by international and regional organizations and nongovernmental actors, and the implementation of conflict prevention within many long-term development and post-conflict assistance programs. Nevertheless, the question of how to move from the rhetoric of conflict prevention to one of institutionalized practice still remains the major concern. Following an overview of conflict prevention in historical and contemporary perspective, this article surveys some of the major themes currently found in the literature on conflict prevention. While there are still skeptical views on the viability, legality, and effectiveness of conflict prevention, some significant strides have already been taken in the direction of creating a new normative international climate that permits increasingly the implementation of preventive action.

Abstract A collection of reference molecules for ligand‐based library design was compiled from the recent scientific literature. Selected properties of this set of 4,236 drugs and drug candidates were analyzed and compared to previous studies. Lipophilicity and molecular weight distributions revealed a trend toward larger, more lipophilic molecules of newer drug candidates. Using the compound collection as a source of reference data, a method for visualization of molecule distributions in a pharmacophore space by self‐organizing maps (SOM) was developed which can be used for virtual library design. Potential applications of this “pharmacophore road map” approach are discussed.

When women carry out a suicide attack they undermine the idea of who and what a terrorist is. What is generally not realized is the extent to which women are involved in terrorism. The purpose of this article is to explore and to analyze the multifaceted roles of the women in the movement of Al Qaeda. The argument is that the role of the women the world audience perceives is the one of a suicide bomber but the role of an ideological supporter and operational facilitator is more important for the maintenance of the operational capabilities and the ideological motivation for a terrorist organization. This article argues that the women follow a gender-specific interpretation of the radical ideology, the female Jihad. The concept of the female Jihad means that the women carry out a political act by supporting their male relatives, educating their children in the ideology and facilitating terrorist operations. The female Jihad is defective when the women follow the male Jihad interpretation of the Jihad by carrying out attacks. For the survival of a terrorists organization women are more important when they follow the female version of the ideology. Because the men could get arrested, die in an attack, or could get shot by the security forces, the women continue to take care about the financial issues of the organization and continue to educate the children in the “right” belief. To verify these arguments the article is divided into three parts. The first part will look at the motivation of women participation at a terrorism organization and the motivation of a terrorism organization to use women for its purposes. The second part tries to throw some light on the female suicide bombers who acted under the umbrella of the movement of Al Qaeda. In this part the female terrorist attacks will be analyzed. In the third part Sisterhoods will be explained and the concept of the female Jihad will be analyzed. The findings of this article about the involvement of women in the movement of Al Qaeda will bring us to conclusion that women do play an essential role in these organizations and groups. Following the argument that successful counterterrorism should address both the motivation and the operational capabilities of a terrorist organization there is an essential need for the national security forces to expand their capabilities to look more carefully at women.

The term hybrid warfare has been widely analyzed by scholars, policymakers and commentators since Russia occupied Crimea in March 2014.The topic has ceased to be a subject only studied by military strategists, but has entered the wider policy domain as a significant security challenge for the West.This article seeks to place the debate about hybrid warfare in a broader analytical and historical context and summarizes discussion to date on this and related strategic concepts.The Russian approach to hybrid warfare as demonstrated by operations in Ukraine is a particular focus for discussion.

Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has forced the greatest a re-appraisal of European security since the end of the Cold War. In the Nordic region, this has led to preparations for great power armed conflict in the region after a long period of strategic neglect. All three of the Nordic states examined here, Finland, Sweden and Norway, have adopted so called total defence policies. Total defence combines the armed forces and civil society in a comprehensive whole of society approach to security intended to deter an attack by making a target state a very challenging prospect for an aggressor. Finland retained a total defence policy after the Cold War, but has had to re-examine its utility for the contemporary threat environment. For Norway and Sweden, total defence means significant challenges reviving Cold War era planning in a very different security and societal context. This study examines current Nordic security concepts through the critical, elements of total defence policies: national resilience and territorial defence. It also addresses the role that alliances and partnerships play in contemporary Nordic total defence planning. An important question is the extent to which these total defence concepts effectively address the perceived political and military threat from Russia.

An unprecedented number of Western women have recently joined the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group has envisaged strictly non-combat roles for them, but violence is an essential part of their embraced ideology and several signs suggest that they could claim a more militant role. Their marginalization, however, is essential for the preservation of ISIS's power system and it is consequently unlikely that it would accommodate such aspiration, at least in the areas of the proclaimed caliphate. It could be different in the West, where women returning from conflict areas or those, even more numerous, anxious to join but unable to travel, could engage in violent acts.

The Ukrainian crisis and Russia's annexation of Crimea marks a new low in Russia–NATO relations. When we examine the relationship between NATO and Russia through the post-Cold War era, we can ask: was the deterioration in relations determined by geopolitical, historical, cultural and identity factors, or could sustainable partnership might have been possible had alternative decisions been taken? We argue that different reasons account for each of the four instances of deterioration in the relationship. Throughout the period some constants can be identified: cooperative rhetoric rarely mirrored reality; a mismatch in expectations, commitments and perceptions torpedoed the prospect of a more stable cooperative partnership; and, a surprising persistence in low-key but significant cooperation can be noted. The article concludes with the observation that dissonance at the heart of NATO–Russia relations is best understood as the consequence of Russia's attempt to navigate its way through a strategic trilemma and divorce signals Russia's failure to square the circle.

On 20 March 2003, a US and UK-led coalition attacked Iraq, formally basing its action on UN Security Council resolutions stretching back over a decade. The operation,Iraqi Freedom, engendered widespread criticism by States, non-governmental organizations, and respected academics. However, even as the debate continued, Coalition forces quickly defeated the Iraqi military and conquered the country. Less than two months after commencement of military action, US President Bush declared from the deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln that major combat operations in Iraq have ended. This article explores, from a legal perspective, the published Coalition occupation policies implemented since the Iraqi defeat. Occupation authorities (the Coalition Provisional Authority-CPA) have promulgated most as regulations and orders. For purposes of analysis, they are grouped into five categories: governance, security, relief, the economy, and legal system. The 1907 Hague Convention IV (annexed Regulations) and the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention contain the relevant occupation law. Although 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions includes some occupation provisions, since neither the United States nor Iraq are Parties, it is inapplicable, except as it restates customary international law. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council has also adopted resolutions that both limit Coalition occupation activities, and expand them beyond the strict confines of international humanitarian law. These treaties and resolutions will serve as the normative standards against which Coalition policies will be evaluated.

(2005). Colorful Revolutions and the CIS : 'Manufactured' Versus 'Managed' Democracy? Problems of Post-Communism: Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 3-18.

IntroductionIn the wake of COVID-19, much has been written about Chinese and Russian attempts to use the crisis to reshape international order in favor of authoritarian regimes. Diplomatic initiatives, staged relief operations, and troll propaganda was

Since the advent of the Global War on Terror, the world has witnessed the continuation of terrorist activity under the banner of Salafi Jihad. With military action proving insufficient to defeat the propagators of the ideology, attention has turned to the ideology itself. Understanding the narratives that constitute this ideology and the systems in place that help propagate it is crucial to defeating it. Analysis brings to light elements that arguably constitute a Jihadist master narrative as well as support structures that help perpetuate key underlying messages of this master narrative. Successful counter-narratives should focus on rolling back and containing Jihadist narratives whilst simultaneously highlighting the values and attitudes of democratic, free societies

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War was the catalyst for profound changes in the global security and defence management environment, including: alterations in the size, struct

The Ukrainian presidential elections, which took place during November and December of 2004, have been labeled the “Orange Revolution.” Within former Soviet space, they have been interpreted as a Western-backed “exported revolution.” As such, these events are perceived to be part of a pattern of Western-backed revolutions stretching from Tirana and Belgrade to Tbilisi and Kiev, one that is now set to unfold in a tsunami-type chain reaction throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This article identifies the main arguments that support such a contention, questions its validity, and highlights key flaws and weaknesses in the assumptions that underpin it. It argues that the idea of Western-backed revolutions is so powerful that it has begun to shape foreignand security-policy responses within the CIS, not least the Russian Federation. The “Orange Revolution” will not result in honest elections, greater transparency and accountability, better governance, and peaceful transitions of power, but rather the opposite. “Immunization” from the “Orange virus” may only be secured through the adoption of the Belarus authoritarian model, by “tightening the screws.” This will have negative consequences for democratization efforts and the role and function of NGOs (both indigenous and foreign), diplomatic missions, international exchanges, and other organizations in Russia and the CIS.

The fight against terrorism frequently is plagued by the old adage: one person's terrorist is simply another's freedom fighter. In view of ever present terrorist violence in the Middle East and in the wake of the thesis advanced by Samuel Huntington that ‘the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural’ ‐ a ‘Clash of Civilizations’ of differing norms and values, a major question arises. Are there shared norms that transcend religion, culture, even civilizations that can and should provide a guide for distinguishing between terrorism and other acts of war or conflict? This article addresses one aspect of the overall question of shared norms. Its purpose is to examine the norms established in both western Christian and secular and Islamic ‘just war’ traditions and their modern derivatives in terms of their utility as a guide for differentiating between terrorism and what might otherwise simply be called irregular warfare. The article concludes that, despite the existence of ‘fundamentalist’ interpretations on all sides, generally shared norms indeed do exist among western Christian and secular and Islamic ‘just war’ traditions. The article, however, also concludes that a number of factors contribute to differences of perspective between and among Muslims and members of many western societies. Among these factors are (1) a revival of jus ad bellum thinking that operates to the detriment of jus in bello, (2) United Nations restrictions on the use of force are not universally accepted, and (3) the impact of national liberation movements and national liberation theology. Such factors have contributed to an absence of a clear consensus on the definition of terrorism, which has been complicated further by the tendency among many western nations to adopt definitions that are overly inclusive.

No other bilateral relationship for India is as complex and challenging as the one with China. The intractable border dispute is at the root of their rivalry. The military stand-off at Doklam in 2017 had poisoned the bilateral relationship until steps were taken to remove mistrust and misunderstanding through two ‘informal’ summits between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in 2018 and 2019. Nonetheless, the sense of general improvement in Sino-Indian ties generated at Wuhan and Mamallapuram was shattered by China’s aggressive behaviour in June 2020 at the Galwan Valley in Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The article traces key events during the Doklam stand-off and the violent military clashes at Galwan, as well as the steps taken by India to enhance political trust at the highest level. It contends that since there has been no change in China’s policies on a range of issues that are critical for India, it is not possible for India to remain ambivalent on how to deal with China. The article concludes that there seems to be greater recognition of the challenge from China and the need to recalibrate the Indian response.

After the Cold War, international relations in the Arctic were characterised by cooperation and diplomacy. However, since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, largely peaceful relations in the High North have been endangered by growing military competition between Russia and Western Arctic powers. The lack of military to military dialogue between Russia and the West has exacerbated the situation. Consequently, an Arctic security dilemma has arisen, which threatens stability and increases the danger of unintended armed conflict resulting from accidents or misunderstandings. Security dilemmas are as old as international politics. They occur when states feel threatened by the expanding military capabilities of their neighbours even if there is no deliberate hostile intent. This article will examine the developing Arctic security dilemma and the chances of its mitigation. Two recent developments provide potential grounds for optimism. The new United States’ administration has pledged to return America to global engagement and multilateralism. In 2021, the Russian Federation is scheduled to become chair of the Arctic Council and the Arctic Coastguard Forum, the main intergovernmental institutions in the region. These events provide an opportunity to rebuild greater trust and confidence in relations between Russia and its Arctic neighbours and alleviate dangerous tensions.

This article examines British Army operations in Iraq. It focuses on the causes of the army's apparent failure to live up to its reputation for the conduct of small wars. The paper discusses the British experience of small wars in the context of Iraq, the influence of doctrine and strategy, and the political and moral factors that shaped the army's performance. The paper's conclusions suggest that the Iraq War may cause a significant reappraisal, not just of military doctrine and strategy, but also of Britain's role in future small wars.

In 1989, U.S. President George H.W. Bush presented a vision of the United States and Germany as “partners in leadership” in building a peaceful and secure post Cold War world. A confluence of factors brought this vision closest to realization during the overlapping tenures of U.S. President Barack Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Persistent limitations and shifting conditions including the election of U.S. President Donald Trump now call the future viability of the vision into question, even as U.S.-German ties remain the most plausible anchor of cooperative transatlantic ties in a period of global change.

Corruption is one of the major issues the Western Balkans is facing, challenging both domestic and foreign companies in doing business. This article examines the role of corruption in hindering foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Western Balkans during the 1992–2012 time frame, using generalized method of moments (GMM) estimations applied to dynamic panel data. The empirical data point to the negative role of corruption for the attraction of FDI to the Western Balkans. This research also suggests that corruption is negatively related with the income level in the region, where countries suffering higher levels of corruption have lower incomes per capita. The other channels in which corruption hinders economic development in the Western Balkans include distorted composition of government expenditure, negative current account balances, tax evasion, lack of competitiveness, and low levels of economic innovation. This article suggests that engaging in international marketing is the best way for the Western Balkans to increase economic competitiveness, improve skills, advance levels of technology, and reduce levels of corruption. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

The US role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance is a 65-year history of retrenchment and renewal. When Washington has sought a retrenchment from the world, it traditionally increased burden sharing pressure on Europe to do more. During times of increased global ambition, the USA reaffirmed its traditional leadership role in the Alliance and its commitment to NATO effectiveness and relevance. This cycle of NATO retrenchment and renewal, however, is halting. Though the USA will continue to go through periods of relative increases and decreases in security policy ambition, signs point to a permanent defense and security retrenchment in Europe. Germany is the ally singularly capable of filling the resulting security gap. If NATO is to avoid the drift toward irrelevance many critics have predicted, Germany will need to cast off old inhibitions toward security and defense leadership. These trends and their implications for NATO's future are explored through historical case studies and the shifting contemporary security environment.