Institut des Sciences Cognitives

Evidence from pioneering animal research has suggested that the amygdala is involved in the processing of aversive stimuli, particularly fear-related information. Fear is central in the evolution of the mammalian brain: it is automatically and rapidly elicited by potentially dangerous and deadly events. The view that the amygdala shares the main characteristics of modular systems, e.g. domain specificity, automaticity, and cognitive impenetrability, has become popular in neuroscience. Because of its computational properties, it has been proposed to implement a rapid-response 'fear module'. In this article, we review recent patient and neuroimaging data of the human brain and argue that the fundamental criteria for the amygdala to be a modular system are not met. We propose a different computational view and suggest the notion of a specific involvement of the human amygdala in the appraisal of relevant events that include, but are not restricted to, fear-related stimuli. Considering the amygdala as a 'relevance detector' would integrate the 'fear module' hypothesis with the concept of an evolved neural system devoted to the processing of a broader category of biologically relevant stimuli. In primates, socially relevant events appear to have become, through evolution, the dominant elements of the amygdala's domain of specificity.

Facing the consequence of a decision we made can trigger emotions like satisfaction, relief, or regret, which reflect our assessment of what was gained as compared to what would have been gained by making a different decision. These emotions are mediated by a cognitive process known as counterfactual thinking. By manipulating a simple gambling task, we characterized a subject's choices in terms of their anticipated and actual emotional impact. Normal subjects reported emotional responses consistent with counterfactual thinking; they chose to minimize future regret and learned from their emotional experience. Patients with orbitofrontal cortical lesions, however, did not report regret or anticipate negative consequences of their choices. The orbitofrontal cortex has a fundamental role in mediating the experience of regret.

OBJECTIVE: The possibility that delusions of influence could be related to abnormal recognition of one's own actions was investigated in persons with schizophrenia. METHOD: Schizophrenic patients with (N=6) and without (N=18) delusions of influence were compared with normal subjects (N=29) on an action recognition task. The image of a virtual right hand holding a joystick was presented to the subjects through a mirror so that the image was superimposed on their real hand holding a real joystick. Subjects executed discrete movements in different directions. Angular biases and temporal delays were randomly introduced in some trials, such that the movement of the virtual hand departed from the movement executed by the subjects. After each trial, subjects were asked whether the movement they saw was their own. RESULTS: Compared with normal subjects, both patient groups made significantly more recognition errors in trials with temporal delays. In trials with angular biases, the error rate of patients with delusions of influence significantly differed from that of comparison subjects and from that of patients without delusions of influence. CONCLUSIONS: The findings support the hypothesis that delusions of influence are associated with a quantifiable difficulty in correct self-attribution of actions. This difficulty may be related to a specific impairment of a neural action attribution system.

Decision making consists of choosing among available options on the basis of a valuation of their potential costs and benefits. Most theoretical models of decision making in behavioral economics, psychology, and computer science propose that the desirability of outcomes expected from alternative options can be quantified by utility functions. These utility functions allow a decision maker to assign subjective values to each option under consideration by weighting the likely benefits and costs resulting from an action and to select the one with the highest subjective value. Here, we used model-based neuroimaging to test whether the human brain uses separate valuation systems for rewards (erotic stimuli) associated with different types of costs, namely, delay and effort. We show that humans devalue rewards associated with physical effort in a strikingly similar fashion to those they devalue that are associated with delays, and that a single computational model derived from economics theory can account for the behavior observed in both delay discounting and effort discounting. However, our neuroimaging data reveal that the human brain uses distinct valuation subsystems for different types of costs, reflecting in opposite fashion delayed reward and future energetic expenses. The ventral striatum and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex represent the increasing subjective value of delayed rewards, whereas a distinct network, composed of the anterior cingulate cortex and the anterior insula, represent the decreasing value of the effortful option, coding the expected expense of energy. Together, these data demonstrate that the valuation processes underlying different types of costs can be fractionated at the cerebral level.

How do we understand what we are told, resolve ambiguities, appreciate metaphor and irony, and grasp both explicit and implicit content in verbal communication? This book provides the first comprehens

Neural correlates of responses to emotionally valenced olfactory, visual, and auditory stimuli were examined using positron emission tomography. Twelve volunteers were scanned using the water bolus method. For each sensory modality, regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) during presentation of both pleasant and unpleasant stimuli was compared with that measured during presentation of neutral stimuli. During the emotionally valenced conditions, subjects performed forced-choice pleasant and unpleasant judgments. During the neutral conditions, subjects were asked to select at random one of a two key-press buttons. All stimulations were synchronized with inspiration, using an airflow olfactometer, to present the same number of stimuli for each sensory modality. A no-stimulation control condition was also performed in which no stimulus was presented. For all three sensory modalities, emotionally valenced stimuli led to increased rCBF in the orbitofrontal cortex, the temporal pole, and the superior frontal gyrus, in the left hemisphere. Emotionally valenced olfactory and visual but not auditory stimuli produced additional rCBF increases in the hypothalamus and the subcallosal gyrus. Only emotionally valenced olfactory stimuli induced bilateral rCBF increases in the amygdala. These findings suggest that pleasant and unpleasant emotional judgments recruit the same core network in the left hemisphere, regardless of the sensory modality. This core network is activated in addition to a number of circuits that are specific to individual sensory modalities. Finally, the data suggest a superior potency of emotionally valenced olfactory over visual and auditory stimuli in activating the amygdala.

Much developmental work has been devoted to scalar implicatures. These are implicitly communicated propositions linked to relatively weak terms (consider how Some pragmatically implies Not all) that are more likely to be carried out by adults than by children. Children tend to retain the linguistically encoded meaning of these terms (wherein Some is compatible with All). In three experiments, we gauge children's performance with scalars while investigating four factors that can have an effect on implicature production: (i) the role of (the presence or absence of) distractor items; (ii) the nature of the task (verbal judgments versus action-based judgments); (iii) the choice of scalar expression (the French quantifier quelques versus certains); and (iv) the type of scale that contextualizes the weak utterance (the affirmative All versus the negative None). Experiment 1 replicated earlier findings showing that 9-year-olds are more likely than adults to consider as true statements such as Some turtles are in the boxes (uttered when all turtles are in the boxes) while employing the quantifier certains in a truth evaluation task containing multiple distractor items. The task in Experiment 2 increased implicature production across all ages (4-, 5-, and 7-year-olds as well as adults) but maintained the developmental effect while using quelques in an action-based task containing no distractor items. Experiment 3 showed that 9-year-olds are more likely to produce implicatures with quelques than they are with certains in the action task while adults are not affected by the choice of term. Overall, these results identify seemingly harmless task features that can prevent even older children (9-year-olds) from carrying out implicatures (e.g., through the inclusion of distractors) while also showing how implicature production among even young children (4- to 5-year-olds) can be facilitated by task features (e.g., the use of an action task) and without the introduction of special training.

A recently emerging view sees language understanding as closely linked to sensory and motor processes. The present study investigates this issue by examining the influence of processing action verbs and concrete nouns on the execution of a reaching movement. Fine-grained analyses of movement kinematics revealed that relative to nouns, processing action verbs significantly affects overt motor performance. Within 200 msec after onset, processing action verbs interferes with a concurrent reaching movement. By contrast, the same words assist reaching movement when processed before movement onset. The cross-talk between language processes and overt motor behavior provides unambiguous evidence that action words and motor action share common cortical representations and could thus suggest that cortical motor regions are indeed involved in action word retrieval.

To ensure their survival, animals exhibit a number of reward-directed behaviors, such as foraging for food or searching for mates. This suggests that a core set of brain regions may be shared by many species to process different types of rewards. Conversely, many new brain areas have emerged over the course of evolution, suggesting potential specialization of specific brain regions in the processing of more recent rewards such as money. Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging in humans, we identified the common and distinct brain systems processing the value of erotic stimuli and monetary gains. First, we provide evidence that a set of neural structures, including the ventral striatum, anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and midbrain, encodes the subjective value of rewards regardless of their type, consistent with a general hedonic representation. More importantly, our results reveal reward-specific representations in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC): whereas the anterior lateral OFC, a phylogenetically recent structure, processes monetary gains, the posterior lateral OFC, phylogenetically and ontogenetically older, processes more basic erotic stimuli. This dissociation between OFC representations of primary and secondary rewards parallels current views on lateral prefrontal cortex organization in cognitive control, suggesting an increasing trend in complexity along a postero-anterior axis according to more abstract representations. Together, our results support a modular view of reward value coding in the brain and propose that a unifying principle of postero-anterior organization can be applied to the OFC.

The convolutions of the mammalian cortex are one of its most intriguing characteristics. Their pattern is very distinctive for different species, and there seems to be a remarkable relationship between convolutions and the architectonic and functional regionalization of the cerebral cortex. Yet the mechanisms behind the development of convolutions and their association with the cortical regionalization are poorly understood. Here we propose a morphogenetic model for the development of cortical convolutions based on the structure of the cortex as a closed surface with glial and axonal fibres pulling radially, the fundamental mechanical properties of cortex and fibres (elasticity and plasticity), and the growth of the cortical surface. The computer simulations of this model suggest that convolutions are a natural consequence of cortical growth. The model reproduces several aspects of convolutional development, such as the relationship between cortical surface and brain volume among mammals, the period of compensation in the degree of convolution observed in gyrencephalic brains and the dependence of the degree of convolution on cortical thickness. We have also studied the effect of early cortical regionalization on the development of convolutions by introducing geometric, mechanic and growth asymmetries in the model. The morphogenetic model is thus able to reproduce the gradients in the degree of convolution, the development of primary, secondary and tertiary convolution, and the overproduction of sulci observed in animals with altered afferent cortical connections.

Self-motion detection requires the interaction of a number of sensory systems for correct perceptual interpretation of a given movement and an eventual motor response. Parietal cortical areas are thought to play an important role in this function, and we have thus studied the encoding of multimodal signals and their spatiotemporal interactions in the ventral intraparietal area of macaque monkeys. Thereby, we have identified for the first time the presence of vestibular sensory input to this area and described its interaction with somatosensory and visual signals, via extracellular single-cell recordings in awake head-fixed animals. Visual responses were driven by large field stimuli that simulated either backward or forward self-motion (contraction or expansion stimuli, respectively), or movement in the frontoparallel plane (visual increments moving simultaneously in the same direction). While the dominant sensory modality in most neurons was visual, about one third of all recorded neurons responded to horizontal rotation. These vestibular responses were typically in phase with head velocity, but in some cases they could signal acceleration or even showed integration to position. The associated visual responses were always codirectional with the vestibular on-direction, i.e. noncomplementary. Somatosensory responses were in register with the visual preferred direction, either in the same or in the opposite direction, thus signalling translation or rotation in the horizontal plane. These results, taken together with data on responses to optic flow stimuli obtained in a parallel study, strongly suggest an involvement of area VIP in the analysis and the encoding of self-motion.

Automated driving can fundamentally change road transportation and improve quality of life. However, at present, the role of humans in automated vehicles (AVs) is not clearly established. Interviews were conducted in April and May 2015 with 12 expert researchers in the field of human factors (HFs) of automated driving to identify commonalities and distinctive perspectives regarding HF challenges in the development of AVs. The experts indicated that an AV up to SAE Level 4 should inform its driver about the AV's capabilities and operational status, and ensure safety while changing between automated and manual modes. HF research should particularly address interactions between AVs, human drivers and vulnerable road users. Additionally, driver-training programmes may have to be modified to ensure that humans are capable of using AVs. Finally, a reflection on the interviews is provided, showing discordance between the interviewees’ statements – which appear to be in line with a long history of HFs research – and the rapid development of automation technology. We expect our perspective to be instrumental for stakeholders involved in AV development and instructive to other parties.

The goal of this study was to characterize multisensory interaction patterns in cortical ventral intraparietal area (VIP). We recorded single-unit activity in two alert monkeys during the presentation of visual (drifting gratings) and tactile (low-pressure air puffs) stimuli. One stimulus was always positioned inside the receptive field of the neuron. The other stimulus was defined so as to manipulate the spatial and temporal disparity between the two stimuli. More than 70% of VIP cells showed a significant modulation of their response by bimodal stimulations. These cells included both bimodal cells, i.e., cells responsive to both tested modalities, and seemingly unimodal cells, i.e., cells responding to only one of the two tested modalities. This latter observation suggests that postsynaptic latent mechanisms are involved in multisensory integration. In both cell categories, neuronal responses are either enhanced or depressed and reflect nonlinear sub-, super-, or additive mechanisms. The occurrence of these observations is maximum when stimuli are in temporal synchrony and spatially congruent. Interestingly, introducing spatial or temporal disparities between stimuli does not affect the sign or the magnitude of interactions but rather their occurrence. Multisensory stimulation also affects the neuronal response latencies of bimodal stimuli. For a given neuron, these are on average intermediate between the two unimodal response latencies, again suggesting latent postsynaptic mechanisms. In summary, we show that the majority of VIP neurons perform multisensory integration, following general rules (e.g., spatial congruency and temporal synchrony) that are closely similar to those described in other cortical and subcortical regions.

In this review, a description is offered of the way actions are represented, how these representations are built, and how their content can be accessed by the agent and by other agents. Such a description will appear critical for understanding how an action is attributed to its proper origin, or, in other words, how a subject can make a conscious judgement about who the agent of that action is (an agency judgement). This question is central to the problem of self-consciousness: Action is one of the main channels used for communication between individuals, so that determining the agent of an action contributes to differentiating the self from others.

Non-human primate neuroimaging is a rapidly growing area of research that promises to transform and scale translational and cross-species comparative neuroscience. Unfortunately, the technological and methodological advances of the past two decades have outpaced the accrual of data, which is particularly challenging given the relatively few centers that have the necessary facilities and capabilities. The PRIMatE Data Exchange (PRIME-DE) addresses this challenge by aggregating independently acquired non-human primate magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) datasets and openly sharing them via the International Neuroimaging Data-sharing Initiative (INDI). Here, we present the rationale, design, and procedures for the PRIME-DE consortium, as well as the initial release, consisting of 25 independent data collections aggregated across 22 sites (total = 217 non-human primates). We also outline the unique pitfalls and challenges that should be considered in the analysis of non-human primate MRI datasets, including providing automated quality assessment of the contributed datasets.

SEE SCHRAG AND POLITIS DOI101093/AWW190 FOR A SCIENTIFIC COMMENTARY ON THIS ARTICLE: Apathy, which can occur separately or in combination with depression and anxiety, is one of the most frequently encountered neuropsychiatric symptoms in Parkinson's disease. Pathophysiological evidence suggests that parkinsonian apathy is primarily due to a mesolimbic dopaminergic denervation, but the role of the serotonergic alteration has never been examined, despite its well-known involvement in the pathogenesis of depression and anxiety. To fill this gap, we address here the pure model of de novo Parkinson's disease, without the confounding effects of antiparkinsonian treatment. Fifteen apathetic (Lille Apathy Rating Scale scores ≥ -21) and 15 non-apathetic (-36 ≤ Lille Apathy Rating Scale scores ≤ -22) drug-naïve de novo parkinsonian patients were enrolled in the present study and underwent detailed clinical assessment and positron emission tomography imaging, using both dopaminergic [(11)C-N-(3-iodoprop-2E-enyl)-2-beta-carbomethoxy-3-beta-(4-methylphenyl)-nortropane (PE2I)] (n = 29) and serotonergic [(11)C-N,N-dimethyl-2-(-2-amino-4-cyanophenylthio)-benzylamine (DASB)] (n = 27) presynaptic transporter radioligands. Apathetic parkinsonian patients presented higher depression (P = 0.0004) and anxiety (P = 0.004) scores - as assessed using the Beck Depression Inventory and the part B of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, respectively - compared to the non-apathetic ones - who were not different from the age-matched healthy subjects (n = 15). Relative to the controls, the non-apathetic parkinsonian patients mainly showed dopaminergic denervation (n = 14) within the right caudate nucleus, bilateral putamen, thalamus and pallidum, while serotonergic innervation (n = 15) was fairly preserved. Apathetic parkinsonian patients exhibited, compared to controls, combined and widespread dopaminergic (n = 15) and serotonergic (n = 12) degeneration within the bilateral caudate nuclei, putamen, ventral striatum, pallidum and thalamus, but also a specific bilateral dopaminergic disruption within the substantia nigra-ventral tegmental area complex, as well as a specific serotonergic alteration within the insula, the orbitofrontal and the subgenual anterior cingulate cortices. When comparing the two parkinsonian groups, the apathetic patients mainly displayed greater serotonergic alteration in the ventral striatum, the dorsal and the subgenual parts of the anterior cingulate cortices, bilaterally, as well as in the right-sided caudate nucleus and the right-sided orbitofrontal cortex. Regression analyses also revealed that the severity of apathy was moreover mainly related to specific serotonergic lesions within the right-sided anterior caudate nucleus and the orbitofrontal cortex, while the degree of both depression and anxiety was primarily linked to serotonergic disruption within the bilateral subgenual parts and/or the right dorsal part of the anterior cingulate cortex, without prominent role of the dopaminergic degeneration in the pathogenesis of these three non-motor signs. Altogether, these findings highlight a prominent role of the serotonergic degeneration in the expression of the neuropsychiatric symptoms occurring at the onset of Parkinson's disease.

Three apraxic patients with lesions in the left parietal cortex were required to execute finger movements with either hand, while the visual feedback they received about the movement was manipulated systematically. We used a device which allowed us to present on a video monitor either the patient's hand or the examiner's hand simultaneously performing an identical or a different movement. In each trial, patients were required to decide whether the hand shown on the screen was their own or not. Hand movements produced in response to verbal command included simple (single-finger extension) and complex gestures (multi-finger extension). Ownership judgements were analysed and compared with those produced by six normal controls and two non-apraxic neurological patients. Apraxic patients and controls accurately recognized their own hand on the screen (own movement condition) and correctly identified the viewed hand as the examiner's when it performed a movement different from their own movement (incongruent movement condition). However, when the viewed hand was the examiner's hand executing their own movement (congruent movement condition), apraxic patients were significantly more impaired than controls. When the results were analysed as a function of gesture type, the number of correct responses was significantly lower for apraxic patients with respect to controls only for complex gestures. Interestingly, when patients executed the finger gestures inaccurately, they still failed to recognize the examiner's hand as alien, and claimed that the correct movement presented on the screen was their own. These results confirm that parietal lesions alter the representational aspects of gestures, and suggest a failure in evaluating and comparing internal and external feedback about movement. We conclude that the parietal cortex plays an important role in generating and maintaining a kinaesthetic model of ongoing movements.

Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn't it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared to solitary use, to arriving at better beliefs and decisions on our own. What reason does, rather, is help us justify our beliefs and actions to others, convince them through argumentation, and evaluate the justifications and arguments that others address to us. In other words, reason helps humans better exploit their uniquely rich social environment. This interactionist interpretation explains why reason may have evolved and how it fits with other cognitive mechanisms. It makes sense of strengths and weaknesses that have long puzzled philosophers and psychologists-why reason is biased in favor of what we already believe, why it may lead to terrible ideas and yet is indispensable to spreading good ones. Ambitious, provocative, and entertaining, The Enigma of Reason will spark debate among psychologists and philosophers, and make many reasonable people rethink their own thinking

Motor cortical beta activity (13-30 Hz) is a hallmark signature of healthy and pathological movement, but its behavioural relevance remains unclear. Using high-precision magnetoencephalography (MEG), we show that during the classical event-related desynchronisation (ERD) and event-related synchronisation (ERS) periods, motor cortical beta activity in individual trials (n > 12,000) is dominated by high amplitude, transient, and infrequent bursts. Beta burst probability closely matched the trial-averaged beta amplitude in both the pre- and post-movement periods, but individual bursts were spatially more focal than the classical ERS peak. Furthermore, prior to movement (ERD period), beta burst timing was related to the degree of motor preparation, with later bursts resulting in delayed response times. Following movement (ERS period), the first beta burst was delayed by approximately 100 milliseconds when an incorrect response was made. Overall, beta burst timing was a stronger predictor of single trial behaviour than beta burst rate or single trial beta amplitude. This transient nature of motor cortical beta provides new constraints for theories of its role in information processing within and across cortical circuits, and its functional relevance for behaviour in both healthy and pathological movement.

Abstract: This paper is concerned with the problem of self‐identification in the domain of action. We claim that this problem can arise not just for the self as object, but also for the self as subject in the ascription of agency. We discuss and evaluate some proposals concerning the mechanisms involved in self‐identification and in agency‐ascription, and their possible impairments in pathological cases. We argue in favor of a simulation hypothesis that claims that actions, whether overt or covert, are centrally simulated by the neural network, and that this simulation provides the basis for action recognition and attribution.