Laboratoire de Psychologie du Développement et de L’Education de l’enfant

BACKGROUND: Melatonin synchronizes central but also peripheral oscillators (fetal adrenal gland, pancreas, liver, kidney, heart, lung, fat, gut, etc.), allowing temporal organization of biological functions through circadian rhythms (24-hour cycles) in relation to periodic environmental changes and therefore adaptation of the individual to his/her internal and external environment. Measures of melatonin are considered the best peripheral indices of human circadian timing based on an internal 24-hour clock. METHODS: First, the pharmacology of melatonin (biosynthesis and circadian rhythms, pharmacokinetics and mechanisms of action) is described, allowing a better understanding of the short and long term effects of melatonin following its immediate or prolonged release. Then, research related to the physiological effects of melatonin is reviewed. RESULTS: The physiological effects of melatonin are various and include detoxification of free radicals and antioxidant actions, bone formation and protection, reproduction, and cardiovascular, immune or body mass regulation. Also, protective and therapeutic effects of melatonin are reported, especially with regard to brain or gastrointestinal protection, psychiatric disorders, cardiovascular diseases and oncostatic effects. CONCLUSION: This review highlights the high number and diversity of major melatonin effects and opens important perspectives for measuring melatonin as a biomarker (biomarker of early identification of certain disorders and also biomarker of their follow-up) and using melatonin with clinical preventive and therapeutic applications in newborns, children and adults based on its physiological regulatory effects.

Among the multiple possibilities to study human pathologies, animal models remain one of the most used pathways. They allow to access to unavailable answers in human patients and to learn about mechanisms of action of drugs. Primarily developed with rats, animal models in anxiety have been adapted with a mixed success for mice, an easy-to-use mammal with better genetic possibilities than rats. In this review, we have focused on the most used animal models in anxiety in mice. Both conditioned and unconditioned models are described, to represent all types of animal models of anxiety. Behavioural studies require strong care for variable parameters, linked to environment, handling or paradigm; we have discussed about this topic. Finally, we focused on the consequences of re-exposure to the apparatus. Test-retest procedures can bring in new answers, but should be deeply studied, to revalidate the whole paradigm as an animal model of anxiety.

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.

Recent studies on conflict detection during thinking suggest that reasoners are sensitive to possible conflict between their heuristic judgement and elementary logical or probabilistic principles. I have argued that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical intuitions and has implications for the way we conceive the interaction between System-1 and System-2 in dual process theories. In this paper I clarify potential misconceptions about this work, discuss the link with other approaches, and sketch directions for further research.

Abstract In this article we have presented a theoretical outline and a body of empirical work relating to the processes of social differentiation and social originality. If, in a competition, someone else seems to possess a decisive advantage or if mere comparison with this other person constitutes a threat to social identity, there are signs, in given conditions, of a tendency to differentiate oneself from the other, to be different or to do something else, to invent new criteria of being or doing with others or to combine accepted criteria in an original way. In other words, one tends to give proof of originality or, to use a Darwinian metaphor, to occupy ‘vacant places’. Doubtless the strategies described here only apply to certain social systems in which the visibility of the agent is an important social value and in which comparison may pose a threat to that identity. The restoring of identity by way of the search for otherness merits the attention of social psychology. But originality is not necessarily accepted or not necessarily immediately. Innovation may take time, may necessitate the creation of schismatic groups and the waging of battles for recognition, etc. We give a brief account of observations made with regard to groups of children in summer camps, laboratory experiments and the results of surveys in the scientific and artistic communities which fit into our theoretical framework. It will not be difficult for the reader to see that this article is a first step in a direction which, in our eyes, holds out a great deal of promise.

Influential work on reasoning and decision-making has popularised the idea that sound reasoning requires correction of fast, intuitive thought processes by slower and more demanding deliberation. We present seven studies that question this corrective view of human thinking. We focused on the very problem that has been widely featured as the paradigmatic illustration of the corrective view, the well-known bat-and-ball problem. A two-response paradigm in which people were required to give an initial response under time pressure and cognitive load allowed us to identify the presumed intuitive response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Across our studies, we observe that correct final responses are often non-corrective in nature. Many reasoners who manage to answer the bat-and-ball problem correctly after deliberation already solved it correctly when they reasoned under conditions that minimised deliberation in the initial response phase. This suggests that sound bat-and-ball reasoners do not necessarily need to deliberate to correct their intuitions; their intuitions are often already correct. Pace the corrective view, findings suggest that in these cases, they deliberate to verify correct intuitive insights.

Human reasoning is often conceived as an interplay between a more intuitive and deliberate thought process. In the last 50 years, influential fast-and-slow dual-process models that capitalize on this distinction have been used to account for numerous phenomena - from logical reasoning biases, over prosocial behavior, to moral decision making. The present paper clarifies that despite the popularity, critical assumptions are poorly conceived. My critique focuses on two interconnected foundational issues: the exclusivity and switch feature. The exclusivity feature refers to the tendency to conceive intuition and deliberation as generating unique responses such that one type of response is assumed to be beyond the capability of the fast-intuitive processing mode. I review the empirical evidence in key fields and show that there is no solid ground for such exclusivity. The switch feature concerns the mechanism by which a reasoner can decide to shift between more intuitive and deliberate processing. I present an overview of leading switch accounts and show that they are conceptually problematic - precisely because they presuppose exclusivity. I build on these insights to sketch the groundwork for a more viable dual-process architecture and illustrate how it can set a new research agenda to advance the field in the coming years.

Prospective memory performance shows a decline in late adulthood. The present article examines the role of 3 main executive function facets (i.e., shifting, updating, and inhibition) as possible developmental mechanisms associated with these age effects. One hundred seventy-five young and 110 older adults performed a battery of cognitive tests including measures of prospective memory, shifting, updating, inhibition, working memory, and speed. Age effects were confirmed in prospective memory and also obtained in shifting, updating, and inhibition. Yet, facets of executive control differently predicted prospective memory performance: While inhibition and shifting were strong predictors of prospective memory performance and also explained age differences in prospective memory, updating was not related to prospective memory performance across adulthood. Furthermore, considering executive function measures increased the amount of explained variance in prospective remembering and reduced the influence of speed. Working memory was not revealed to serve as a significant predictor of prospective memory performance in the present study. These findings clarify the role of different facets of controlled attention on age effects in prospective memory and bear important conceptual implications: Results suggest that some but not all facets of executive functioning are important developmental mechanisms of prospective memory across adulthood beyond working memory and speed. Specifically, inhibition and shifting appear to be essential aspects of cognitive control involved in age-related prospective memory performance.

Any attempt to give “foundations”, for category theory or any domain in mathematics, could have two objectives, of course related. (0.1) Noncontradiction : Namely, to provide a formal frame rich enough so that all the actual activity in the domain can be carried out within this frame, and consistent, or at least relatively consistent with a well-established and “safe” theory, e.g. Zermelo-Frankel (ZF). (0.2) Adequacy , in the following, nontechnical sense: (i) The basic notions must be simple enough to make transparent the syntactic structures involved. (ii) The translation between the formal language and the usual language must be, or very quickly become, obvious. This implies in particular that the terminology and notations in the formal system should be identical, or very similar, to the current ones. Although this may seem minor, it is in fact very important. (iii) “Foundations” can only be “foundations of a given domain at a given moment”, therefore the frame should be easily adaptable to extensions or generalizations of the domain, and, even better, in view of (i), it should suggest how to find meaningful generalizations. (iv) Sometimes (ii) and (iii) can be incompatible because the current notations are not adapted to a more general situation. A compromise is then necessary. Usually when the tradition is very strong (ii) is predominant, but this causes some incoherence for the notations in the more general case (e.g. the notation f ( x ) for the value of a function f at x obliges one, in category theory, to denote the composition of arrows ( f, g ) → g∘f , and all attempts to change this notation have, so far, failed).

This review from the International Consortium on Hallucinations Research intends to question the pertinence of the excitatory-to-inhibitory (E/I) imbalance hypothesis as a model for hallucinations. A large number of studies suggest that subtle impairments of the E/I balance are involved in neurological and psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia. Emerging evidence also points to a role of the E/I balance in maintaining stable perceptual representations, suggesting it may be a plausible model for hallucinations. In support, hallucinations have been linked to inhibitory deficits as shown with impairment of gamma-aminobutyric acid transmission, N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor plasticity, reductions in gamma-frequency oscillations, hyperactivity in sensory cortices, and cognitive inhibition deficits. However, the mechanisms by which E/I dysfunctions at the cellular level might relate to clinical symptoms and cognitive deficits remain unclear. Given recent data advances in the field of clinical neuroscience, it is now possible to conduct a synthesis of available data specifically related to hallucinations. These findings are integrated with the latest computational frameworks of hallucinations, and recommendations for future research are provided.

Abstract Preclinical imaging studies offer a unique access to the rat brain, allowing investigations that go beyond what is possible in human studies. Unfortunately, these techniques still suffer from a lack of dedicated and standardized neuroimaging tools, namely brain templates and descriptive atlases. Here, we present two rat brain MRI templates and their associated gray matter, white matter and cerebrospinal fluid probability maps, generated from ex vivo $${\mathrm{T}}_2^ \ast$$ <mml:math xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"> <mml:msubsup> <mml:mrow> <mml:mi>T</mml:mi> </mml:mrow> <mml:mrow> <mml:mn>2</mml:mn> </mml:mrow> <mml:mrow> <mml:mo>*</mml:mo> </mml:mrow> </mml:msubsup> </mml:math> -weighted images (90 µm isotropic resolution) and in vivo T 2 -weighted images (150 µm isotropic resolution). In association with these templates, we also provide both anatomical and functional 3D brain atlases, respectively derived from the merging of the Waxholm and Tohoku atlases, and analysis of resting-state functional MRI data. Finally, we propose a complete set of preclinical MRI reference resources, compatible with common neuroimaging software, for the investigation of rat brain structures and functions.

Building on the old adage that the deliberate mind corrects the emotional heart, the influential dual process model of moral cognition has posited that utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas (i.e., choosing the greater good) requires deliberate correction of an intuitive deontological response. In the present article, we present 4 studies that force us to revise this longstanding "corrective" dual process assumption. We used a two-response paradigm in which participants had to give their first, initial response to moral dilemmas under time-pressure and cognitive load. Next, participants could take all the time they wanted to reflect on the problem and give a final response. This allowed us to identify the intuitively generated response that preceded the final response given after deliberation. Results consistently show that in the vast majority of cases (+ 70%) in which people opt for a utilitarian response after deliberation, the utilitarian response is already given in the initial phase. Hence, utilitarian responders do not need to deliberate to correct an initial deontological response. Their intuitive response is already utilitarian in nature. We show how this leads to a revised model in which moral judgments depend on the absolute and relative strength differences between competing deontological and utilitarian intuitions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The fractionation of the nitrogen isotopes 14 N and 15 N in the denitrification process has been studied in laboratory experiments for the step NO 2 − → N 2 O. This study has been carried out on natural soils under anaerobic conditions (helium atmosphere). Reduction of N 2 O is blocked by introduction of a small amount of acetylene in the incubator atmosphere. Variation of experimental conditions of incubation (temperatures, direct or after air-drying incubation of the soil, addition of glucose), greatly modify the reaction rate. 15 N is enriched in the substrate during denitrification. The isotopic enrichment factor changes with experimental conditions from about −33 to −11‰. Greatest enrichment is obtained for the lowest reduction rate (low temperature, undried soil). For high rates of denitrification (higher temperature, addition of glucose), the isotopic fractionation decreases. An exponential relation is found between isotopic enrichment, ε p/s , and the reaction rate.

Developmental cognitive neuroscience studies tend to show that the prefrontal brain regions (known to be involved in inhibitory control) are activated during the generation of creative ideas. In the present article, we discuss how a dual-process model of creativity-much like the ones proposed to account for decision making and reasoning-could broaden our understanding of the processes involved in creative ideas generation. When generating creative ideas, children, adolescents, and adults tend to follow "the path of least resistance" and propose solutions that are built on the most common and accessible knowledge within a specific domain, leading to fixation effect. In line with recent theory of typical cognitive development, we argue that the ability to resist the spontaneous activation of design heuristics, to privilege other types of reasoning, might be critical to generate creative ideas at all ages. In the present review, we demonstrate that inhibitory control at all ages can actually support creativity. Indeed, the ability to think of something truly new and original requires first inhibiting spontaneous solutions that come to mind quickly and unconsciously and then exploring new ideas using a generative type of reasoning.

OBJECTIVE: To identify the clinical determinants of occurrence of postictal generalized EEG suppression (PGES) after generalized convulsive seizures (GCS). METHODS: We reviewed the video-EEG recordings of 417 patients included in the REPO2MSE study, a multicenter prospective cohort study of patients with drug-resistant focal epilepsy. According to ictal semiology, we classified GCS into 3 types: tonic-clonic GCS with bilateral and symmetric tonic arm extension (type 1), clonic GCS without tonic arm extension or flexion (type 2), and GCS with unilateral or asymmetric tonic arm extension or flexion (type 3). Association between PGES and person-specific or seizure-specific variables was analyzed after correction for individual effects and the varying number of seizures. RESULTS: A total of 99 GCS in 69 patients were included. Occurrence of PGES was independently associated with GCS type (p < 0.001) and lack of early administration of oxygen (p < 0.001). Odds ratio (OR) for GCS type 1 in comparison with GCS type 2 was 66.0 (95% confidence interval [CI 5.4-801.6]). In GCS type 1, risk of PGES was significantly increased when the seizure occurred during sleep (OR 5.0, 95% CI 1.2-20.9) and when oxygen was not administered early (OR 13.4, 95% CI 3.2-55.9). CONCLUSION: The risk of PGES dramatically varied as a function of GCS semiologic characteristics. Whatever the type of GCS, occurrence of PGES was prevented by early administration of oxygen.

PURPOSE: To evaluate the effect of intraocular administration of nitric oxide (NO) donors in the rabbit eye on intraocular pressure (IOP), inflammation, and toxicity. METHODS: Intravitreal and intracameral injections of two NO donors, SIN-1 and SNAP, and SIN-1C and BSS were performed. Clinical examination, IOP measurements, protein evaluation in aqueous humor, and histologic analysis of the ocular globes were realized. Nitric oxide release was demonstrated by nitrite production in the aqueous humor and in the vitreous using the Griess reaction. RESULTS: The drastic decrease of IOP, observed after a single NO donor injection, was correlated directly with nitrite production and, thus, to NO release. Injection of inactive metabolite of SIN-1, SIN-1C, which is not able to release NO, did not modulate IOP. When administered in the aqueous humor or in the vitreous, NO did not diffuse from one segment of the eye to another. No inflammation or histologic damage was observed as a result of a single NO donor administration. CONCLUSIONS: Nitric oxide is implicated directly in the regulation of IOP and its acute, and massive release into the rabbit eye did not induce inflammation or other growth toxic effects on the ocular tissues.

CONTEXT: Outcomes of congenital adrenal hyperplasia due to classic 21-hydroxylase deficiency (21OHD) have been widely studied in children and women, but less so in men. OBJECTIVE: The objective was to analyze data from a network of metropolitan French teaching hospitals on the clinical outcome of classic 21OHD in a large sample of congenital adrenal hyperplasia/21OHD-genotyped adult men, and particularly the impact of 21OHD on the gonadotrope axis, testicular function, and fertility. METHODS: From April 2011 to June 2014, tertiary endocrinology departments provided data for 219 men with 21OHD (ages, 18-70 y; 73.6% salt wasters, 26.4% simple virilizers). Testicular sonography was performed in 164 men, and sperm analysis was performed in 71 men. RESULTS: Mean final height was 7.8 cm lower than in a reference population. Obesity was more common, and mean blood pressure was lower than in the reference population. None of the patients were diabetic, and lipid status was generally normal. Blood electrolyte status was normal in the vast majority of men, despite markedly elevated ACTH and renin levels. Serum progesterone, 17-hydroxyprogesterone, and androstenedione levels were above normal in the vast majority of cases. Hormonal profiling variously showed a normal gonadotrope-testicular axis, gonadotropin deficiency, or primary testicular insufficiency. Testicular sonography revealed testicular adrenal rest tumors (TARTs) in 34% of 164 men. Serum inhibin B and FSH levels were significantly lower and higher, respectively, in patients with TARTs. Severe oligospermia or azoospermia was found in 42% of patients and was significantly more prevalent in men with TARTs (70%) than in men with normal testes (3.6%; P < .0001). Among men living with female partners, TARTs were significantly more prevalent in those who had not fathered children. CONCLUSION: We report the spectrum of testicular/gonadotrope axis impairment in the largest cohort of 21OHD men studied to date. Our results suggest that French men with 21OHD managed in specialized centers frequently have impaired exocrine testicular function but that its reproductive implications are often overlooked.

Popular dual-process models of thinking have long conceived intuition and deliberation as two qualitatively different processes. Single-process-model proponents claim that the difference is a matter of degree and not of kind. Psychologists have been debating the dual-process/single-process question for at least 30 years. In the present article, I argue that it is time to leave the debate behind. I present a critical evaluation of the key arguments and critiques and show that-contra both dual- and single-model proponents-there is currently no good evidence that allows one to decide the debate. Moreover, I clarify that even if the debate were to be solved, it would be irrelevant for psychologists because it does not advance the understanding of the processing mechanisms underlying human thinking.

Abstract The prominent dual process model of moral cognition suggests that reasoners intuitively detect that harming others is wrong (deontological System-1 morality) but have to engage in demanding deliberation to realize that harm can be acceptable depending on the consequences (utilitarian System-2 morality). But the nature of the interaction between the processes is not clear. To address this key issue we tested whether deontological reasoners also intuitively grasp the utilitarian dimensions of classic moral dilemmas. In three studies subjects solved moral dilemmas in which utilitarian and deontological considerations cued conflicting or non-conflicting decisions while performing a demanding concurrent load task. Results show that reasoners’ sensitivity to conflicting moral perspectives, as reflected in decreased decision confidence and increased experienced processing difficulty, was unaffected by cognitive load. We discuss how these findings argue for a hybrid dual process model interpretation in which System-1 cues both a deontological and utilitarian intuition.

13 triads of familiar peers aged from 2;0 to 2;1 1 were brought together without adult presence in an experimental setting containing three sets of ten different categories of objects. This experimental situation made it possible to gather continuous filmed data, from which the authors are able to assess the importance of spontaneous imitative sequences, as well as put forward the social function of reciprocal imitation as a means of dialogue.