Max Planck Institute Luxemburg for International, European and Regulatory Procedural Law

This short essay presents a legal analysis of cyber force, an intangible form of international coercion that exploits computer networks leaving havoc in its wake. After providing recent examples of this phenomenon, as well as circumscribing its scope, the essay sets out to determine to what extent cyber force can be reconciled with contemporary jus ad bellum. Two key questions will be addressed: is cyber force a use of force as defined in article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and if so, could it conceivably rise to level of an armed attack justifying self-defence as meant by article 51 of the same document? In order to respond to these queries, the analysis hinges upon the interpretative techniques of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties as well as the current doctrinal debates regarding cyber force. The essay ends with a brief consideration of plausible prospects with respect to the regulation of this novel form of coercion.

Journal Article The Voice of the International: Who is Speaking? Get access Immi Tallgren Immi Tallgren * * Research fellow, The Erik Castrén Institute of International Law and Human Rights, University of Helsinki; Senior Visiting Fellow, Centre for International Studies, London School of Economics. [immi.tallgren@helsinki.fi] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of International Criminal Justice, Volume 13, Issue 1, March 2015, Pages 135–155, https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqu086 Published: 25 January 2015

Defence date: 29 July 2011; Examining Board: Professor Marise Cremona, EUI Professor ; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, EUI Professor ; Giorgio Gaja, University of Florence ; Dr Esa Paasivirta, European Commission

WTO law does not require its direct effect in domestic legal orders. Whilst the stances taken in these are diverse, showing that direct effect is not denied on the whole to WTO law, all the major trading members of the WTO deny it. The fact that, in a case where a WTO member does not comply and is targeted by trade sanctions, the economic actors who in practice bear the burden of these sanctions are deprived of any recourse, may be considered unfair enough to question again the denial of direct effect. The analysis focuses notably on the EU where the debate has expanded more than anywhere else and concludes that direct effect should, even in the name of fairness or justice, be handled with caution.

The evolution over the years of the mandates and missions of international organizations has reached an important milestone with the emergence and multiplication in the last decade of procedures and mechanisms having a direct impact on individuals and companies. This has gone together with the call for the creation of international remedies with judicial features. International organizations, including the World Bank, have established sanctions mechanisms in an effort to combat corruption and fraud. They are applicable to companies and individuals involved in activities with international financial institutions through procurement or consultancy activities. The World Bank experience offers an interesting example: the decision to sanction individuals and companies entailed the need to provide access to remedies to such non-state actors. External and internal pressures have pushed the institution into putting in place very quickly a mechanism with judicial features. Due process requirements have had a substantial impact on the profile of remedies available to non-state actors in this area.

International audience

The article critiques the book "The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law," edited by Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, focusing on the relationship between globalization and the law, as well as the reported efforts to overcome Eurocentrism in the history of international law. Author Robert Kolb and the rules governing the conduct of warfare outside of Europe are mentioned. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, slavery, and standards of civilization are also examined.

Abstract This article focuses on the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) – the diplomatic body, consisting of representatives of WTO members, that administers the dispute settlement system. Focusing on the WTO, the article provides one perspective on the relationship between international tribunals and the political bodies that oversee the governance of such tribunals. Specifically, I argue that the DSB operates as an important ‘voice’ mechanism, which enables members to provide regular feedback to WTO adjudicators, and helps sustain the internal legitimacy of WTO adjudication. However, the DSB can also be used in ways that undermine judicial independence. In short, the DSB is a key site where the tension plays out between WTO adjudicators’ independence from members, and control by, and accountability to, members. The episodes examined in detail to develop this argument are the crisis of a generation ago over amicus curiae briefs, and the ongoing crisis over Appellate Body appointments.

A subset of investor–State arbitrations arise out of circumstances where there is a major backlash by a local population against an investment, and the host State, in responding to such concerns, takes actions, such as cancelling a permit, which prevent the future operations of a foreign investor.3 Such cases raise fundamental questions about the legitimate concerns, rights and responsibilities of local populations affected by investment activities, host State governments and foreign investors.4 The Award in Bear Creek Mining v Peru,5 rendered under the investment chapter of the Canada–Peru Free Trade Agreement,6 is another such dispute. As outlined below, the case concerned Peru’s revocation of an authorization for the foreign investor’s acquisition of concessions for a silver mine, in response to widespread protests. The Award runs to some 300 pages, and this comment will focus on two of its contributions that are of wider relevance. First, the Tribunal considered the relevant standard for determining whether the investor had obtained a social license and, in particular, what was required of the investor when consulting indigenous populations affected by its operations, referring to the international law framework governing the latter issue. Second, the Award is one of the first to apply an investment treaty that included criteria intended to distinguish indirect expropriations from legitimate regulation and a general exceptions clause based on Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).7 Both of these types of provisions have been included in many investment treaties over the last decade in an effort to increase States’ policy space, but they are largely untested before arbitral tribunals.8 This case comment will suggest that the Bear Creek Award highlights important ambiguities that remain in relation to such provisions and demand further attention from treaty drafters and arbitrators.

The Southern African Development Community (‘SADC’) Tribunal is one of the major sub-regional courts established by African countries over the past few decades. It was established pursuant to Article 9 (1) Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (‘SADC Treaty’) together with five other original SADC institutions to spearhead regional cooperation and integration in Southern Africa. As set out in Article 16 (1) SADC Treaty, the main purpose of the SADC Tribunal is ‘to ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and subsidiary instruments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to it’. As such, the SADC Tribunal is the judicial arm of the SADC. The Tribunal has been suspended since 2010 following its landmark ruling against the Republic of Zimbabwe in Mike Campbell (PVT) Ltd and 78 others v. The Republic of Zimbabwe, (‘the Campbell case’). A new Protocol was adopted to reconstitute the Tribunal with limited jurisdiction at the 34 th Summit of SADC Heads of State or Government (‘the Summit’) held in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, from 17 to 18 August 2014, but has not yet entered into force (para18 Communique of the 34 th SADC Summit). The suspension of the Tribunal has been plagued by continued reluctance of SADC Member States to sanction Zimbabwe for its blatant noncompliance with the decisions of the Tribunal, and complex legal arguments that have their roots in the poor drafting of the SADC legal instruments.

Several armed conflicts have marked the past two decades in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). As a result, the DRC is facing an unprecedented humanitarian disaster with the death of hundreds of thousands of people, the large-scale displacement of civilians and the rape of thousands of women, girls and men. These armed conflicts have led to the metamorphosis of the concept of ‘crime’ with the emergence of new forms of sexual violence, particularly the widespread sexual violence used by armed groups as a tactic of war. In response to this avalanche of sexual violence, the DRC has taken a series of legislative measures. It began with the ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) on 11 April 2002. This was followed by the promulgation of the Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code on 18 November 2002 (MJC and MCC, respectively) criminalizing, inter alia, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. In 2006, the Congolese legislator criminalized various forms of sexual crimes as defined by international law in the Military Penal Code. On 31 December 2015, the Congolese authorities promulgated Law No. 15/022, amending and supplementing the Military Penal Code, for the implementation of the Rome Statute. Through this Law, the legislator has included in the Congolese Ordinary Criminal Code rape and other sexual assaults constituting war crimes, and in some circumstances, crimes against humanity. In terms of prosecutions, around 40 cases of rape classified as war crimes and crimes against humanity have been tried by Congolese military courts, and a few other cases are being investigated. This article seeks to assess the progress made by the DRC in prosecuting rape as a war crime and the challenges to such prosecutions. La République démocratique du Congo (RDC) a été marquée par plusieurs conflits armés au cours des deux dernières décennies. Il en résulte que ce pays est confronté à une catastrophe humanitaire sans précédent avec la mort de centaines de milliers de personnes, le déplacement à grande échelle de civils et le viol de milliers de femmes, de filles et d'hommes. Ces conflits armés ont entraîné une métamorphose du concept de ‘crime’ avec l'émergence de nouvelles formes de violence sexuelle, notamment la violence sexuelle généralisée utilisée par les groupes armés comme tactique de guerre. En réponse à cette avalanche de violences sexuelles, la RDC a adopté une série de mesures législatives. La première fut la ratification du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale (Statut de Rome) le 11 avril 2002. Cette ratification fut suivie par la promulgation du Code judiciaire militaire et du Code pénal militaire le 18 novembre 2002 (respectivement le CMJ et le CCM) qui criminalisent, entre autres, les crimes de guerre, les crimes contre l'humanité et le génocide. En 2006, le législateur congolais a incriminé dans le Code pénal militaire diverses formes de crimes sexuels tels que définis par le droit international. Le 31 décembre 2015, les autorités congolaises ont promulgué la loi no 15/022, modifiant et complétant le Code pénal militaire, pour la mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome. A travers cette loi, le législateur a inclus dans le Code pénal ordinaire congolais les viols et autres agressions sexuelles constitutifs de crimes de guerre, et dans certaines circonstances, de crimes contre l'humanité. En termes de poursuites, une quarantaine de cas de viols qualifiés de crimes de guerre et de crimes contre l'humanité ont été jugés par les tribunaux militaires congolais, et quelques autres cas sont en cours d'instruction. Cet article vise à évaluer les progrès réalisés par la RDC en matière de poursuites pénales pour viol en tant que crime de guerre et les défis auxquels ces poursuites sont confrontées. Verschillende gewapende conflicten hebben de afgelopen twee decennia hun stempel gedrukt op de Democratische Republiek Congo (DRC). Als gevolg daarvan wordt de DRC geconfronteerd met een ongekende humanitaire ramp die gepaard gaat met de dood van honderdduizenden mensen, de grootschalige ontheemding van burgers en de verkrachting van duizenden vrouwen, meisjes en mannen. Die gewapende conflicten hebben geleid tot een metamorfose van het begrip ‘misdaad’ met de opkomst van nieuwe vormen van seksueel geweld, in het bijzonder het wijdverspreide seksuele geweld dat door gewapende groepen als oorlogstactiek wordt gebruikt. Als reactie op die lawine van seksueel geweld heeft de DRC een reeks wetgevende maatregelen genomen. Het begon met de ratificatie van het Statuut van het Internationaal Strafhof (Statuut van Rome) op 11 april 2002, gevolgd door de afkondiging van het militair gerechtelijk wetboek en het militair strafwetboek op 18 november 2002. Daarin worden onder meer oorlogsmisdaden, misdaden tegen de mensheid en genocide strafbaar gesteld. In 2006 heeft de Congolese wetgever verschillende vormen van seksuele misdrijven, zoals omschreven in het internationaal recht, strafbaar gesteld in het militair strafwetboek. Op 31 december 2015 hebben de Congolese autoriteiten wet nr. 15/022 tot wijziging en aanvulling van het militair strafwetboek uitgevaardigd, met het oog op de uitvoering van het Statuut van Rome. Met die wet heeft de wetgever verkrachting en andere vormen van seksueel geweld die te beschouwen zijn als oorlogsmisdaden, en in sommige omstandigheden misdaden tegen de mensheid, in het gewone Congolese Wetboek van Strafrecht opgenomen. Wat vervolging betreft, zijn ongeveer 40 gevallen van verkrachting die als oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de mensheid werden aangemerkt, door de Congolese militaire rechtbanken berecht, en enkele andere gevallen worden momenteel onderzocht. Deze studie heeft tot doel na te gaan welke vooruitgang de DRC heeft geboekt bij de vervolging van verkrachting als oorlogsmisdaad en voor welke uitdagingen dergelijke vervolgingen staan. Varios conflictos armados han dejado huella en las dos décadas pasadas en la República Democrática del Congo (RDC). A resultas de ello, la RDC se está enfrentando a un desastre humanitario sin precedentes con la muerte de cientos de miles de personas, desplazamiento de civiles a gran escala y la violación de miles de mujeres, niñas y hombres. Estos conflictos armados han llevado a la metamorfosis del concepto de ‘crimen’ con la aparición de nuevas formas de violencia sexual, en particular el uso generalizado de la violencia sexual por grupos armados como táctica de guerra. En respuesta a esta avalancha de violencia sexual, la RDC ha adoptado una serie de medidas legislativas. Todo comenzó con la ratificación del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Internacional (Estatuto de Roma) el 11 de abril de 2002. A esto siguió la promulgación del Código Judicial Militar y del Código Penal Militar el 18 de noviembre de 2002 (Código Judicial Militar y Código Penal Militar, respectivamente), penalizando, entre otros, los crímenes contra la humanidad y el genocidio. En 2006, el legislador congoleño introdujo en el Código Penal Militar varias modalidades de crimen sexual tal y como se definen en el Derecho Internacional. El 31 de diciembre de 2015, la autoridades congoleñas promulgaron la Ley Núm. 15/022, reformando y complementando el Código Penal Militar, con objeto de implementar el Estatuto de Roma. A través de esta ley, el legislador ha tipificado en el Código Penal Común la violación y otros ataques sexuales que constituyen crímenes de guerra y, en algunas circunstancias, crímenes contra la humanidad. En términos de procedimientos instruidos, cerca de 40 casos de violación tipificada como crímenes de guerra y crímenes contra la humanidad han sido tramitados por los tribunales militares congoleños, y varios casos más continúan siendo objeto de investigación. Este estudio busca valorar el progreso de la RDC en la persecución de la violación como crimen de guerra y los retos a los que se ha tenido que hacer frente en dicha tarea. Gli ultimi due decenni della Repubblica Democratica del Congo (RDC) sono stati segnati da diversi conflitti armati. Di conseguenza, la RDC sta affrontando un disastro umanitario senza precedenti con la morte di centinaia di migliaia di persone, lo sfollamento di civili su larga scala e lo stupro di migliaia di donne, ragazze e uomini. Questi conflitti armati hanno portato alla metamorfosi del concetto di ‘crimine’ con l'emergere di nuove forme di violenza sessuale, in particolare la diffusa violenza sessuale usata dai gruppi armati come tattica di guerra. In risposta a questa valanga di violenza sessuale, la RDC ha adottato una serie di misure legislative. È iniziato tutto con la ratifica dello Statuto della Corte penale internazionale (Statuto di Roma) l'11 aprile 2002. A ciò è seguita la promulgazione del Military Judicial Code and the Military Criminal Code il 18 novembre 2002 (rispet­tivamente Codice giudiziario militare e Codice penale militare), che hanno criminalizzato, tra l'altro, crimini di guerra, crimini contro l'umanità e genocidio. Nel 2006, il legislatore congolese ha definito come crimini varie forme di reati sessuali così come definito dal diritto internazionale nel Codice Penale Militare. Il 31 dicembre 2015 le autorità congolesi hanno promulgato la Legge n. 15/022, che modifica e integra il Codice Penale Militare, per l'attuazione dello Statuto di Roma. Attraverso questa legge, il legislatore ha incluso nel Codice penale Ordinario congolese lo stupro e altre aggressioni sessuali definiti crimini di guerra e, in alcune circostanze, crimini contro l'umanità. In termini di procedimenti penali, circa 40 casi di stupro classificati come crimini di guerra e crimini contro l'umanità sono stati processati dai tribunali militari congolesi e alcuni altri casi sono oggetto di indagine. Questo studio cerca di valutare i progressi compiuti dalla RDC nel perseguire lo stupro come crimine di guerra e l’impegno in tali procedimenti penali. Mehrere bewaffnete Konflikte haben die ver

International audience

Weak sub-Saharan African states use international law and its institutions to legitimate their actions and delegitimate their internal enemies. In this essay, I argue that during internal armed conflicts, African states use international criminal law to redefine the conflict as international and thereby rebrand domestic political opponents as international criminals/enemies who are a threat to the entire community. This in turn sets the stage for invoking belligerent privileges under international humanitarian law (IHL).

Abstract This article analyses the various ways in which investment law raises questions of change. It distinguishes between changes in international investment norms, and changes in a host state’s regulatory system which is subject to the control of such norms, and explains how these different manifestations of change relate to the distinct yet interrelated issues of interpretation and application. The article explains why, given features of the contemporary investment regime, on questions of interpretation, concerning the content of international investment norms, arbitrators operate within wider processes of law-development over which states, as treaty masters, also exercise significant influence. In contrast, arbitrators dominate the process of applying international investment norms to particular investor-state disputes to determine whether changes in a host state’s regulatory system breach applicable investment norms. This claim is demonstrated in relation to the two most prominent investment treaty standards: fair and equitable treatment, and the protection against indirect expropriation.

In the European Union insider trading has been regulated much more recently than in the United States, and it can be argued that, at least traditionally, it has been more aggressively and successfully enforced in the United States than in the European Union. Several different explanations have been offered for this difference in enforcement attitudes, focusing in particular on resources of regulators devoted to contrasting this practice, but also diverging cultural attitudes toward insiders. This situation has evolved, however, and the prohibition of insider trading has gained traction also in Europe. Few studies have focused on the substantive differences in the regulation of the phenomenon on the two sides of the Atlantic. This work contributes to the debate by contrasting and comparing insider trading regulation in the U.S. and in Europe, putting them in an historical perspective (essential in particular to understand the U.S. approach), but also considering some recent developments in this area of both sides of the Atlantic: the 2009 Dorozhko decision in the U.S., which seems to expand the notion of misappropriation; the reform of the Market Abuse Directive in Europe; and the very recent case Grande Stevens v. Italy decided by the European Court of Human Rights in March 2014, which deeply affects the European approach to insider trading. One of the contributions of the piece is to underline how the U.S. has both the advantages and disadvantages of the “first comer” in this area. Since when the Supreme Court abandoned the “equal access to information” theory in favor of a theory of insider trading based on fiduciary duties, an overly complex web of rules developed through an intricate web of case law and SEC regulations. Comparatively speaking, the European approach, based on the “equal access to information” theory is more clear, easy to apply and broad, even if some authors have questioned the effectiveness of actual enforcement of these rules in some European countries.

BACKGROUND: In October 2018, the Conference of the Parties of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC or Convention) adopted its first decision on novel and emerging tobacco products, including heated tobacco products (HTPs). The decision remains ambiguous, e.g. by making a distinction between tobacco sticks and HTP devices. Against this background, the article seeks to answer two interrelated questions: whether and to what extent HTPs are covered by the FCTC, and whether regime provided by the Convention is suitable for their regulation. RESULTS: HTPs need to be classified under the FCTC as tobacco products. The distinction made by the Conference of the Parties between sticks and devices leads however to unsatisfactory results as it creates loopholes in tobacco control standards existing at the international level. A better approach, as argued in this article, is to conceptualize the notion of 'tobacco products' in functional terms as a combination of both a device and stick. While subjecting HTPs to all FCTC disciplines is, in light of our current scientific knowledge, a rational approach, such classification can be modified in the future once a sufficient amount of new evidence on their risk profile is collected. Any decision on the optimal regulatory model for HTPs will need to take into account not only health risks and potential benefits for individual users, but also the specific systemic concerns (e.g. HTPs as a gateway product). The state of scientific research is however not the only factor that will determine the fate of HTPs under the Convention. What is equally important is a conceptualization of the FCTC's objectives. If a complete eradication of the tobacco epidemic is the ultimate goal, reduced levels of risk may not be enough to justify the different (i.e. more lenient) regulatory regime for HTPs. CONCLUSIONS: The Conference of the Parties should clarify the definition of tobacco products in light of recent changes in the market. When designing the regulatory regime for HTPs under the FCTC in the future, one has to consider not only scientific evidence but also pay attention to the objective of the Convention (or more generally to the values that underlie the current tobacco control paradigm).

Ruiz-Fabri Hélène. Genèse et disparition de l'État à l'époque contemporaine. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 38, 1992. pp. 153-178.

This article explores the contents and consequences of the Achmea judgment recently given by the European Court of Justice (6 March 2018, case C-284/16). In its first part, the article analyses the judgment from a European point of view. It notes that Achmea is primarily concerned with the autonomy of the EU legal order in international dispute resolution and only secondarily with investment arbitration. The judgment seamlessly ties in with the Court’s Opinion 2/13 on the Accession of the EU to the European Convention of Human Rights. In its second part, the article assesses the consequences of the judgment for current and future investment dispute resolution. It argues that (i) investment arbitration is over for intra-EU Bilateral Investment Treaties and (ii) most likely also for intra-EU disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty; (iii) the European Commission must be careful not to jeopardise the supremacy of the ECJ in interpreting the EU law when concluding future international dispute resolution agreements; (iv) the same holds true regarding dispute resolution under the UK Withdrawal Agreement when negotiating the Brexit.

Si la mondialisation favorise la circulation et la diffusion de concepts juridiques uniformes dans les divers espaces normatifs, il n'en reste pas moins que subsiste une tendance a la singularisation des concepts lors de leur reception dans chaque espace normatif. L'ouvrage prend comme point d'observation le droit de l'environnement au prisme de quatre espaces juridiques : a l'echelon universel, le droit de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce et le droit de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer ; au niveau regional, le droit de la Convention europeenne des droits de l'homme et le droit de l'Union europeenne. Ces espaces sont tous caracterises par la presence en leur sein d'un pouvoir juridictionnel institutionnalise et competent pour trancher des differends touchant a la protection de l'environnement. Du point de vue institutionnel, il s'agit d'espaces juridiques emboites. Du point de vue materiel, ils ont en commun que le juge international s'y trouve a arbitrer entre les exigences liees a la protection de l'environnement et les interets s'y opposant, qu'ils soient de nature economique ou sociale, publique ou privee. A l'interieur de chacun de ces espaces, s'impose donc la prise en compte des valeurs et interets environnementaux. Sur cette base, la recherche analyse les techniques de prise en compte de valeurs et interets environnementaux, ainsi que, parmi les techniques judiciaires de mise en œuvre, celles de mise en balance de ces valeurs et interets avec d'autres exigences juridiquement protegees. Les resultats sont presentes a partir d'une double perspective : intersystemique et intrasystemique. Celle-ci restitue l'existence de deux points de vue differents sur la problematique generale de cette recherche : celui de la pluralite des systemes (dimension individuelle) et celui des rapports entre systemes (dimension relationnelle).

Invited to speak at the opening of the Second Biennial Conference of the Asian Society of International Law, which focused on International Law in a Multi-Polar and Multi-Civilizational World: Asian Perspectives, Challenges, and Contributions , I had to reflect on the specific contributions our regional societies supposedly bring to international law. More specifically, the underlying idea was that of a regional vision or approach to international law which could be more or less rooted in a tradition. I soon realized that our regional societies could be viewed in a rather ambiguous or ambivalent way, since they could be seen as a means of promoting a regional vision as well as a means of enabling people to meet beyond the domestic scope, which is the horizon of most academics, if not practitioners, to share their views on international law at large. The two views are not entirely incompatible but they do not carry exactly the same spirit regarding the purpose of regional societies. The ambivalence originates in the necessity we feel to justify our own existence. On the one hand, we can be very pragmatic and point out that the regional level, empirically conceived, is a sort of “critical” level to organize events and network. National is not enough any more for most countries. Global is too much. Regional is, let us say, practicable.