United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if botulinum toxin is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 23 representatives from academic, government, and private institutions with expertise in public health, emergency management, and clinical medicine. EVIDENCE: The primary authors (S.S.A. and R.S.) searched OLDMEDLINE and MEDLINE (1960-March 1999) and their professional collections for literature concerning use of botulinum toxin as a bioweapon. The literature was reviewed, and opinions were sought from the working group and other experts on diagnosis and management of botulism. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through April 2000 during the review and revisions of the consensus statement. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the working group's consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group convened to review the first draft in May 1999. Working group members reviewed subsequent drafts and suggested additional revisions. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained in the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized or foodborne botulinum toxin weapon would cause acute symmetric, descending flaccid paralysis with prominent bulbar palsies such as diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia that would typically present 12 to 72 hours after exposure. Effective response to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin will depend on timely clinical diagnosis, case reporting, and epidemiological investigation. Persons potentially exposed to botulinum toxin should be closely observed, and those with signs of botulism require prompt treatment with antitoxin and supportive care that may include assisted ventilation for weeks or months. Treatment with antitoxin should not be delayed for microbiological testing.

In late summer 1999, an outbreak of human encephalitis occurred in the northeastern United States that was concurrent with extensive mortality in crows (Corvus species) as well as the deaths of several exotic birds at a zoological park in the same area. Complete genome sequencing of a flavivirus isolated from the brain of a dead Chilean flamingo (Phoenicopterus chilensis), together with partial sequence analysis of envelope glycoprotein (E-glycoprotein) genes amplified from several other species including mosquitoes and two fatal human cases, revealed that West Nile (WN) virus circulated in natural transmission cycles and was responsible for the human disease. Antigenic mapping with E-glycoprotein-specific monoclonal antibodies and E-glycoprotein phylogenetic analysis confirmed these viruses as WN. This North American WN virus was most closely related to a WN virus isolated from a dead goose in Israel in 1998.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.

OBJECTIVE: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if tularemia is used as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 25 representatives from academic medical centers, civilian and military governmental agencies, and other public health and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to October 2000, using the Medical Subject Headings Francisella tularensis, Pasteurella tularensis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, bioterrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of these references led to identification of relevant materials published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other references and sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process were reviewed by members of the working group. Consensus was achieved on the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: A weapon using airborne tularemia would likely result 3 to 5 days later in an outbreak of acute, undifferentiated febrile illness with incipient pneumonia, pleuritis, and hilar lymphadenopathy. Specific epidemiological, clinical, and microbiological findings should lead to early suspicion of intentional tularemia in an alert health system; laboratory confirmation of agent could be delayed. Without treatment, the clinical course could progress to respiratory failure, shock, and death. Prompt treatment with streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline, or ciprofloxacin is recommended. Prophylactic use of doxycycline or ciprofloxacin may be useful in the early postexposure period.

Klebsiella pneumoniae is now recognized as an urgent threat to human health because of the emergence of multidrug-resistant strains associated with hospital outbreaks and hypervirulent strains associated with severe community-acquired infections. K. pneumoniae is ubiquitous in the environment and can colonize and infect both plants and animals. However, little is known about the population structure of K. pneumoniae, so it is difficult to recognize or understand the emergence of clinically important clones within this highly genetically diverse species. Here we present a detailed genomic framework for K. pneumoniae based on whole-genome sequencing of more than 300 human and animal isolates spanning four continents. Our data provide genome-wide support for the splitting of K. pneumoniae into three distinct species, KpI (K. pneumoniae), KpII (K. quasipneumoniae), and KpIII (K. variicola). Further, for K. pneumoniae (KpI), the entity most frequently associated with human infection, we show the existence of >150 deeply branching lineages including numerous multidrug-resistant or hypervirulent clones. We show K. pneumoniae has a large accessory genome approaching 30,000 protein-coding genes, including a number of virulence functions that are significantly associated with invasive community-acquired disease in humans. In our dataset, antimicrobial resistance genes were common among human carriage isolates and hospital-acquired infections, which generally lacked the genes associated with invasive disease. The convergence of virulence and resistance genes potentially could lead to the emergence of untreatable invasive K. pneumoniae infections; our data provide the whole-genome framework against which to track the emergence of such threats.

T lymphocyte chemotactic factor (TCF) was purified to homogeneity from the conditioned media of phytohemagglutinin-stimulated human blood mononuclear leukocytes by a sequence of chromatography procedures. The amino-terminal amino acid sequence of the purified TCF showed identity with neutrophil-activating protein (NAP-1). Both TCF and recombinant NAP-1 (rNAP-1) were chemotactic for neutrophils and T lymphocytes in vitro supporting the identity of TCF with NAP-1. Injection of rNAP-1 into lymphatic drainage areas of lymph nodes in Fisher rats caused accelerated emigration of only lymphocytes in high endothelial venules. Intradermal injection of rNAP-1 caused dose-dependent accumulation of neutrophils and lymphocytes.

OBJECTIVE: To review and update consensus-based recommendations for medical and public health professionals following a Bacillus anthracis attack against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 23 experts from academic medical centers, research organizations, and governmental, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to January 2002, using the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Reference review identified work published before 1966. Participants identified unpublished sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft synthesized the gathered information. Written comments were incorporated into subsequent drafts. The final statement incorporated all relevant evidence from the search along with consensus recommendations. CONCLUSIONS: Specific recommendations include diagnosis of anthrax infection, indications for vaccination, therapy, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the environment, and suggested research. This revised consensus statement presents new information based on the analysis of the anthrax attacks of 2001, including developments in the investigation of the anthrax attacks of 2001; important symptoms, signs, and laboratory studies; new diagnostic clues that may help future recognition of this disease; current anthrax vaccine information; updated antibiotic therapeutic considerations; and judgments about environmental surveillance and decontamination.

Hantaviruses are carried by numerous rodent species throughout the world. In 1993, a previously unknown group of hantaviruses emerged in the United States as the cause of an acute respiratory disease now termed hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS). Before than, hantaviruses were known as the etiologic agents of hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome, a disease that occurs almost entirely in the Eastern Hemisphere. Since the discovery of the HPS-causing hantaviruses, intense investigation of the ecology and epidemiology of hantaviruses has led to the discovery of many other novel hantaviruses. Their ubiquity and potential for causing severe human illness make these viruses an important public health concern; we reviewed the distribution, ecology, disease potential, and genetic spectrum.

The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense has developed consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of plague as a biological weapon against a civilian population.The working group included 25 representatives from major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies.MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to June 1998 for the Medical Subject Headings plague, Yersinia pestis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of the bibliographies of the references identified by this search led to subsequent identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. Additional MEDLINE searches were conducted through January 2000.The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. The working group was convened to review drafts of the document in October 1998 and May 1999. The final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members.An aerosolized plague weapon could cause fever, cough, chest pain, and hemoptysis with signs consistent with severe pneumonia 1 to 6 days after exposure. Rapid evolution of disease would occur in the 2 to 4 days after symptom onset and would lead to septic shock with high mortality without early treatment. Early treatment and prophylaxis with streptomycin or gentamicin or the tetracycline or fluoroquinolone classes of antimicrobials would be advised.

Anthrax toxin is composed of three proteins: protective antigen (PA), lethal factor (LF), and edema factor (EF). These proteins individually cause no known physiological effects in animals but in pairs produce two toxic actions. Injection of PA with LF causes death of rats in 60 min, whereas PA with EF causes edema in the skin of rabbits and guinea pigs. The mechanisms of action of these proteins have not been determined. It is shown here that EF is an adenylate cyclase [ATP pyrophosphate-lyase (cyclizing), EC 4.6.1.1] produced by Bacillus anthracis in an inactive form. Activation occurs upon contact with a heat-stable eukaryotic cell material. The specific activity of the resulting adenylate cyclase nearly equals that of the most active known cyclase. In Chinese hamster ovary cells exposed to PA and EF, cAMP concentrations increase without a lag to values about 200-fold above normal, remain high in the continued presence of toxin, and decrease rapidly after its removal. The increase in cAMP is completely blocked by excess LF. It is suggested that PA interacts with cells to form a receptor system by which EF and perhaps LF gain access to the cytoplasm.

OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals following the use of anthrax as a biological weapon against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The working group included 21 representatives from staff of major academic medical centers and research, government, military, public health, and emergency management institutions and agencies. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE databases were searched from January 1966 to April 1998, using the Medical Subject Headings anthrax, Bacillus anthracis, biological weapon, biological terrorism, biological warfare, and biowarfare. Review of references identified by this search led to identification of relevant references published prior to 1966. In addition, participants identified other unpublished references and sources. CONSENSUS PROCESS: The first draft of the consensus statement was a synthesis of information obtained in the formal evidence-gathering process. Members of the working group provided formal written comments which were incorporated into the second draft of the statement. The working group reviewed the second draft on June 12, 1998. No significant disagreements existed and comments were incorporated into a third draft. The fourth and final statement incorporates all relevant evidence obtained by the literature search in conjunction with final consensus recommendations supported by all working group members. CONCLUSIONS: Specific consensus recommendations are made regarding the diagnosis of anthrax, indications for vaccination, therapy for those exposed, postexposure prophylaxis, decontamination of the environment, and additional research needs.

Studies on the burden of human monkeypox in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) were last conducted from 1981 to 1986. Since then, the population that is immunologically naïve to orthopoxviruses has increased significantly due to cessation of mass smallpox vaccination campaigns. To assess the current risk of infection, we analyzed human monkeypox incidence trends in a monkeypox-enzootic region. Active, population-based surveillance was conducted in nine health zones in central DRC. Epidemiologic data and biological samples were obtained from suspected cases. Cumulative incidence (per 10,000 population) and major determinants of infection were compared with data from active surveillance in similar regions from 1981 to 1986. Between November 2005 and November 2007, 760 laboratory-confirmed human monkeypox cases were identified in participating health zones. The average annual cumulative incidence across zones was 5.53 per 10,000 (2.18-14.42). Factors associated with increased risk of infection included: living in forested areas, male gender, age < 15, and no prior smallpox vaccination. Vaccinated persons had a 5.2-fold lower risk of monkeypox than unvaccinated persons (0.78 vs. 4.05 per 10,000). Comparison of active surveillance data in the same health zone from the 1980s (0.72 per 10,000) and 2006-07 (14.42 per 10,000) suggests a 20-fold increase in human monkeypox incidence. Thirty years after mass smallpox vaccination campaigns ceased, human monkeypox incidence has dramatically increased in rural DRC. Improved surveillance and epidemiological analysis is needed to better assess the public health burden and develop strategies for reducing the risk of wider spread of infection.

The recently established virus family Flaviviridae contains at least 68 recognized members. Sixty-six of these viruses were tested by cross-neutralization in cell cultures. Flaviviruses were separated into eight complexes [tick-borne encephalitis (12 viruses), Rio Bravo (six), Japanese encephalitis (10), Tyuleniy (three), Ntaya (five), Uganda S (four), dengue (four) and Modoc (five)] containing 49 viruses; 17 other viruses were not sufficiently related to warrant inclusion in any of these complexes.

The number and diversity of viral sequences that are identified in metagenomic data far exceeds that of experimentally characterized virus isolates. In a recent workshop, a panel of experts discussed the proposal that, with appropriate quality control, viruses that are known only from metagenomic data can, and should be, incorporated into the official classification scheme of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV). Although a taxonomy that is based on metagenomic sequence data alone represents a substantial departure from the traditional reliance on phenotypic properties, the development of a robust framework for sequence-based virus taxonomy is indispensable for the comprehensive characterization of the global virome. In this Consensus Statement article, we consider the rationale for why metagenomic sequence data should, and how it can, be incorporated into the ICTV taxonomy, and present proposals that have been endorsed by the Executive Committee of the ICTV.

The role of redox molecules, such as NO and ROS, as key mediators of immunity has recently garnered renewed interest and appreciation. To regulate immune responses, these species trigger the eradication of pathogens on the one hand and modulate immunosuppression during tissue-restoration and wound-healing processes on the other. In the acidic environment of the phagosome, a variety of RNS and ROS is produced, thereby providing a cauldron of redox chemistry, which is the first line in fighting infection. Interestingly, fluctuations in the levels of these same reactive intermediates orchestrate other phases of the immune response. NO activates specific signal transduction pathways in tumor cells, endothelial cells, and monocytes in a concentration-dependent manner. As ROS can react directly with NO-forming RNS, NO bioavailability and therefore, NO response(s) are changed. The NO/ROS balance is also important during Th1 to Th2 transition. In this review, we discuss the chemistry of NO and ROS in the context of antipathogen activity and immune regulation and also discuss similarities and differences between murine and human production of these intermediates.

Outbreaks of emerging infections present health professionals with the unique challenge of trying to select appropriate pharmacologic treatments in the clinic with little time available for drug testing and development. Typically, clinicians are left with general supportive care and often untested convalescent-phase plasma as available treatment options. Repurposing of approved pharmaceutical drugs for new indications presents an attractive alternative to clinicians, researchers, public health agencies, drug developers, and funding agencies. Given the development times and manufacturing requirements for new products, repurposing of existing drugs is likely the only solution for outbreaks due to emerging viruses. In the studies described here, a library of 290 compounds was screened for antiviral activity against Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV). Selection of compounds for inclusion in the library was dependent on current or previous FDA approval or advanced clinical development. Some drugs that had a well-defined cellular pathway as target were included. In total, 27 compounds with activity against both MERS-CoV and SARS-CoV were identified. The compounds belong to 13 different classes of pharmaceuticals, including inhibitors of estrogen receptors used for cancer treatment and inhibitors of dopamine receptor used as antipsychotics. The drugs identified in these screens provide new targets for in vivo studies as well as incorporation into ongoing clinical studies.

ABSTRACT Since first discovered in the New York City area in 1999, West Nile virus (WNV) has become established over much of the continental United States and has been responsible for >10,000 cases of severe disease and 400 human fatalities, as well as thousands of fatal infections in horses. To develop appropriate surveillance and control strategies, the identification of which mosquito species are competent vectors and how various factors influence their ability to transmit this virus must be determined. Therefore, we evaluated numerous mosquito species for their ability to transmit WNV under laboratory conditions. This report contains data for several mosquito species not reported previously, as well as a summary of transmission data compiled from previously reported studies. Mosquitoes were allowed to feed on chickens infected with WNV isolated from a crow that died during the 1999 outbreak in New York City. These mosquitoes were tested approximately 2 wk later to determine infection, dissemination, and transmission rates. All Culex species tested were competent vectors in the laboratory and varied from highly efficient vectors (e.g., Culex tarsalis Coquillett) to moderately efficient ones (e.g., Culex nigripalpus Theobald). Nearly all of the Culex species tested could serve as efficient enzootic or amplifying vectors for WNV. Several container-breeding Aedes and Ochlerotatus species were highly efficient vectors under laboratory conditions, but because of their feeding preferences, would probably not be involved in the maintenance of WNV in nature. However, they would be potential bridge vectors between the avian-Culex cycle and mammalian hosts. In contrast, most of the surface pool-breeding Aedes and Ochlerotatus species tested were relatively inefficient vectors under laboratory conditions and would probably not play a significant role in transmitting WNV in nature. In determining the potential for a mosquito species to become involved in transmitting WNV, it is necessary to consider not only its laboratory vector competence but also its abundance, host-feeding preference, involvement with other viruses with similar transmission cycles, and whether WNV has been isolated from this species under natural conditions.

A review on the reported uses of chemicals derived from botanical sources is presented, along with the part of the plant used for extraction, the mosquito species studied and the bioactivity observed for 344 plant species. Examples of phytochemicals evaluated against mosquitoes as general toxicants, growth and reproduction inhibitors, repellents and ovipositional deterrents are given. The effects of mosquito species and life stage specificity, solvents used for extraction, phototoxic activity and the geographical source from where the plant compounds are derived are discussed.

OBJECTIVE: To develop consensus-based recommendations for measures to be taken by medical and public health professionals if hemorrhagic fever viruses (HFVs) are used as biological weapons against a civilian population. PARTICIPANTS: The Working Group on Civilian Biodefense included 26 representatives from academic medical centers, public health, military services, governmental agencies, and other emergency management institutions. EVIDENCE: MEDLINE was searched from January 1966 to January 2002. Retrieved references, relevant material published prior to 1966, and additional sources identified by participants were reviewed. CONSENSUS PROCESS: Three formal drafts of the statement that synthesized information obtained in the evidence-gathering process were reviewed by the working group. Each draft incorporated comments and judgments of the members. All members approved the final draft. CONCLUSIONS: Weapons disseminating a number of HFVs could cause an outbreak of an undifferentiated febrile illness 2 to 21 days later, associated with clinical manifestations that could include rash, hemorrhagic diathesis, and shock. The mode of transmission and clinical course would vary depending on the specific pathogen. Diagnosis may be delayed given clinicians' unfamiliarity with these diseases, heterogeneous clinical presentation within an infected cohort, and lack of widely available diagnostic tests. Initiation of ribavirin therapy in the early phases of illness may be useful in treatment of some of these viruses, although extensive experience is lacking. There are no licensed vaccines to treat the diseases caused by HFVs.

We evaluated the potential for several North American mosquito species to transmit the newly introduced West Nile (WN) virus. Mosquitoes collected in the New York City metropolitan area during the recent WN virus outbreak, at the Assateague Island Wildlife Refuge, VA, or from established colonies were allowed to feed on chickens infected with WN virus isolated from a crow that died during the 1999 outbreak. These mosquitoes were tested approximately 2 wk later to determine infection, dissemination, and transmission rates. Aedes albopictus (Skuse), Aedes atropalpus (Coquillett), and Aedes japonicus (Theobald) were highly susceptible to infection, and nearly all individuals with a disseminated infection transmitted virus by bite. Culex pipiens L. and Aedes sollicitans (Walker) were moderately susceptible. In contrast, Aedes vexans (Meigen), Aedes aegypti (L.), and Aedes taeniorhynchus (Wiedemann) were relatively refractory to infection, but individual mosquitoes inoculated with WN virus did transmit virus by bite. Infected female Cx. pipiens transmitted WN virus to one of 1,618 F1 progeny, indicating the potential for vertical transmission of this virus. In addition to laboratory vector competence, host-feeding preferences, relative abundance, and season of activity also determine the role that these species could play in transmitting WN virus.