United States Department of the Treasury

IMPORTANCE: The relationship between income and life expectancy is well established but remains poorly understood. OBJECTIVES: To measure the level, time trend, and geographic variability in the association between income and life expectancy and to identify factors related to small area variation. DESIGN AND SETTING: Income data for the US population were obtained from 1.4 billion deidentified tax records between 1999 and 2014. Mortality data were obtained from Social Security Administration death records. These data were used to estimate race- and ethnicity-adjusted life expectancy at 40 years of age by household income percentile, sex, and geographic area, and to evaluate factors associated with differences in life expectancy. EXPOSURE: Pretax household earnings as a measure of income. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Relationship between income and life expectancy; trends in life expectancy by income group; geographic variation in life expectancy levels and trends by income group; and factors associated with differences in life expectancy across areas. RESULTS: The sample consisted of 1,408,287,218 person-year observations for individuals aged 40 to 76 years (mean age, 53.0 years; median household earnings among working individuals, $61,175 per year). There were 4,114,380 deaths among men (mortality rate, 596.3 per 100,000) and 2,694,808 deaths among women (mortality rate, 375.1 per 100,000). The analysis yielded 4 results. First, higher income was associated with greater longevity throughout the income distribution. The gap in life expectancy between the richest 1% and poorest 1% of individuals was 14.6 years (95% CI, 14.4 to 14.8 years) for men and 10.1 years (95% CI, 9.9 to 10.3 years) for women. Second, inequality in life expectancy increased over time. Between 2001 and 2014, life expectancy increased by 2.34 years for men and 2.91 years for women in the top 5% of the income distribution, but by only 0.32 years for men and 0.04 years for women in the bottom 5% (P < .001 for the differences for both sexes). Third, life expectancy for low-income individuals varied substantially across local areas. In the bottom income quartile, life expectancy differed by approximately 4.5 years between areas with the highest and lowest longevity. Changes in life expectancy between 2001 and 2014 ranged from gains of more than 4 years to losses of more than 2 years across areas. Fourth, geographic differences in life expectancy for individuals in the lowest income quartile were significantly correlated with health behaviors such as smoking (r = -0.69, P < .001), but were not significantly correlated with access to medical care, physical environmental factors, income inequality, or labor market conditions. Life expectancy for low-income individuals was positively correlated with the local area fraction of immigrants (r = 0.72, P < .001), fraction of college graduates (r = 0.42, P < .001), and government expenditures (r = 0.57, P < .001). CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: In the United States between 2001 and 2014, higher income was associated with greater longevity, and differences in life expectancy across income groups increased over time. However, the association between life expectancy and income varied substantially across areas; differences in longevity across income groups decreased in some areas and increased in others. The differences in life expectancy were correlated with health behaviors and local area characteristics.

Many observers have argued that the regulatory framework in place prior to the global financial crisis was deficient because it was largely “microprudential” in nature. A microprudential approach is one in which regulation is partial equilibrium in its conception and aimed at preventing the costly failure of individual financial institutions. By contrast, a “macroprudential” approach recognizes the importance of general equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the financial system as a whole. In the aftermath of the crisis, there seems to be agreement among both academics and policymakers that financial regulation needs to move in a macroprudential direction. In this paper, we offer a detailed vision for how a macroprudential regime might be designed. Our prescriptions follow from a specific theory of how modern financial crises unfold and why both an unregulated financial system, as well as one based on capital rules that only apply to traditional banks, is likely to be fragile. We begin by identifying the key market failures at work: why individual financial firms, acting in their own interests, deviate from what a social planner would have them do. Next, we discuss a number of concrete steps to remedy these market failures. We conclude the paper by comparing our proposals to recent regulatory reforms in the United States and to proposed global banking reforms.

The authors examine survival rates of entrepreneurial enterprises and their growth, conditional on surviving. Their focus is on whether liquidity constraints increase the likelihood of entrepreneurial failure. The empirical strategy is based on the following logic: If entrepreneurs cannot borrow to attain their profit-maximizing levels of capital, then entrepreneurs with substantial personal financial resources will be more successful than those without. The authors examine the behavior of a group of sole proprietors who received substantial inheritances. The results are consistent with the notion that liquidity constraints exert a noticeable influence on the viability of entrepreneurial enterprises. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

We present new evidence on trends in intergenerational mobility in the United States using administrative earnings records. We find that percentile rank-based measures of intergenerational mobility have remained extremely stable for the 1971-1993 birth cohorts. For children born between 1971 and 1986, we measure intergenerational mobility based on the correlation between parent and child income percentile ranks. For more recent cohorts, we measure mobility as the correlation between a child's probability of attending college and her parents' income rank. We also calculate transition probabilities, such as a child's chances of reaching the top quintile of the income distribution starting from the bottom quintile. Based on all of these measures, we find that children entering the labor market today have the same chances of moving up in the income distribution (relative to their parents) as children born in the 1970s. However, because inequality has risen, the consequences of the “birth lottery” - the parents to whom a child is born - are larger today than in the past.

Dale Jorgenson has bestowed a great honor and no small challenge by inviting me to give this lecture: a great honor because of the distinguished list of economists who have preceded me; a challenge because of the standard they have set, and because there is no greater challenge for any economist than providing a coherent account of significant events to his scientific peers. I am sometimes asked by friends about the differences between academic life and life as a public official. There are many. Two stand out. First, as an academic, the gravest sin one can commit is to sign one’s name to something one did not write. As a public official it is a mark of effectiveness to do so as often as possible. Second, as an academic, if a problem is too hard and does not admit of a satisfactory solution, there is an obvious response: work on a different problem. That is not a luxury that one has in government. I have been reminded of this often in recent years as we have grappled with financial crises in a number of what had previously been considered emerging markets with unrestrained futures. Anyone who doubts the social importance of what economists do should consider the debates surrounding these crises. Hundreds of millions of people who expected rapidly rising standards of living have seen their living standards fall; hundreds of thousands if not millions of children have been forced to drop out of school and go to work; hundreds of billions of dollars of apparent wealth has been lost; the stability of large nations as nations has been called into question; and the United States has made its largest nonmilitary foreign-policyrelated financial commitments since the Marshall Plan. Almost all the issues involved in understanding, preventing, and mitigating these crises are the stuff of economics courses and research: fixed versus flexible exchange rates, moral hazard and multiple equilibria, speculation and liquidity, fiscal and monetary policies, regulation and competition. What economists think, say, and do has profound implications for the lives of literally billions of their fellow citizens. Whether it is discussing the role of derivatives in signaling exchange-rate commitments with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, or discussing an NBER working paper on inflation targeting with the Brazilian central bank governor Arminio Fraga, or discussing alternative approaches to bankruptcy law with Indonesia’s economic team, or optimal debt durations with the Mexican authorities, I am consistently struck by the impact of the kind of research discussed at the AEA meetings. The future well-being of the world’s people in large part will depend on how the ongoing process of global integration works out. This is a strong statement, but one that is supported by the global economy’s post-World War I failure and its post-World War II success. Central to global integration is financial integration: the flow of funds and of capital across international borders. And as the events of the late 1920’s and early 1930’s remind us, central to global disintegration can be international financial breakdowns. Today, I want to reflect on the issue of global financial integration in light of the dramatic and largely unpredicted events of recent years. It is perhaps a good time for reflection: there has been enough repair that priority can shift from * U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, DC 20005. This lecture reflects many things I have learned from experiences I have shared with colleagues in the United States government and governments around the world. I thank Brad DeLong, Marty Feldstein, Stephanie Flanders, Ken Rogoff, Andrei Shleifer, and Ted Truman for useful comments and suggestions. I am especially grateful to Nouriel Roubini and Stephanie Flanders for valuable discussions and assistance in the preparation of this lecture. The usual disclaimer applies.

We provide a survey of 31 quantitative measures of systemic risk in the economics and finance literature, chosen to span key themes and issues in systemic risk measurement and management. We motivate these measures from the supervisory, research, and data perspectives in the main text and present concise definitions of each risk measure—including required inputs, expected outputs, and data requirements—in an extensive Supplemental Appendix. To encourage experimentation and innovation among as broad an audience as possible, we have developed an open-source Matlab® library for most of the analytics surveyed, which, once tested, will be accessible through the Office of Financial Research (OFR) at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/ofr/Pages/default.aspx .

Climate change is expected to cause mass human migration, including immigration across international borders. This study quantitatively examines the linkages among variations in climate, agricultural yields, and people's migration responses by using an instrumental variables approach. Our method allows us to identify the relationship between crop yields and migration without explicitly controlling for all other confounding factors. Using state-level data from Mexico, we find a significant effect of climate-driven changes in crop yields on the rate of emigration to the United States. The estimated semielasticity of emigration with respect to crop yields is approximately -0.2, i.e., a 10% reduction in crop yields would lead an additional 2% of the population to emigrate. We then use the estimated semielasticity to explore the potential magnitude of future emigration. Depending on the warming scenarios used and adaptation levels assumed, with other factors held constant, by approximately the year 2080, climate change is estimated to induce 1.4 to 6.7 million adult Mexicans (or 2% to 10% of the current population aged 15-65 y) to emigrate as a result of declines in agricultural productivity alone. Although the results cannot be mechanically extrapolated to other areas and time periods, our findings are significant from a global perspective given that many regions, especially developing countries, are expected to experience significant declines in agricultural yields as a result of projected warming.

We characterize intergenerational income mobility at each college in the United States using data for over 30 million college students from 1999-2013. We document four results. First, access to colleges varies greatly by parent income. For example, children whose parents are in the top 1% of the income distribution are 77 times more likely to attend an Ivy League college than those whose parents are in the bottom income quintile. Second, children from low-and high-income families have similar earnings outcomes conditional on the college they attend, indicating that low-income students are not mismatched at selective colleges. Third, rates of upward mobilitythe fraction of students who come from families in the bottom income quintile and reach the top quintile -differ substantially across colleges because low-income access varies significantly across colleges with similar earnings outcomes. Rates of bottom-to-top quintile mobility are highest at certain mid-tier public universities, such as the City University of New York and California State colleges. Rates of upper-tail (bottom quintile to top 1%) mobility are highest at elite colleges, such as Ivy League universities. Fourth, the fraction of students from low-income families did not change substantially between 2000-2011 at elite private colleges, but fell sharply at colleges with the highest rates of bottom-to-top-quintile mobility. Although our descriptive analysis does not identify colleges' causal effects on students' outcomes, the publicly available statistics constructed here highlight colleges that deserve further study as potential engines of upward mobility.

Journal Article Methods for Analysis of Musts and Wines Get access Methods for Analysis of Musts and Wines. M. A. Amerine & C. S. Ough. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016, 1980. 341pp. Price $30.00. Randolph H Dyer Randolph H Dyer Department of the Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Rockville, MD 20850 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Association of Official Analytical Chemists, Volume 64, Issue 3, 1 May 1981, Page 779, https://doi.org/10.1093/jaoac/64.3.776d Published: 22 January 2020

This paper analyzes the role of liquidity constraints in the formation of new entrepreneurial enterprises. The basic empirical strategy is to determine whether an individual's wealth affects the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, and the conditional amounts of depreciable assets, ceteris paribus. If so, liquidity constraints are likely to be present. To be successful, such a research strategy requires a measure of asset variation that is both precisely measured and exogenous to the entrepreneurial decision. Our data are uniquely well-suited for this purpose. The sample consists of the 1981 and 1985 federal income tax returns of a group of people who received inheritances in 1982 and 1983, along with information on the size of those inheritances from a matched set of estate tax returns. Hence, we can examine how the exogenous receipt of capital affects the decision to become an entrepreneur and important financial characteristics of new enterprises. Our results suggest that the size of the inheritance has a substantial effect on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, and that conditional on becoming an entrepreneur, the size of the inheritance has a statistically significant and quantitatively important effect on the amount of capital employed. These findings are consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints.

Journal Article A Measure of `Export Similarity' and Its Possible Uses Get access J. M. Finger, J. M. Finger Department of the Treasury, Washington D.C. Michigan State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar M. E. Kreinin M. E. Kreinin Department of the Treasury, Washington D.C. Michigan State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 89, Issue 356, 1 December 1979, Pages 905–912, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231506 Published: 01 December 1979

We characterize the factors that determine who becomes an inventor in the United States, focusing on the role of inventive ability (“nature”) versus environment (“nurture”). Using deidentified data on 1.2 million inventors from patent records linked to tax records, we first show that children's chances of becoming inventors vary sharply with characteristics at birth, such as their race, gender, and parents' socioeconomic class. For example, children from high-income (top 1%) families are 10 times as likely to become inventors as those from below-median income families. These gaps persist even among children with similar math test scores in early childhood-which are highly predictive of innovation rates-suggesting that the gaps may be driven by differences in environment rather than abilities to innovate. We directly establish the importance of environment by showing that exposure to innovation during childhood has significant causal effects on children's propensities to invent. Children whose families move to a high-innovation area when they are young are more likely to become inventors. These exposure effects are technology class and gender specific. Children who grow up in a neighborhood or family with a high innovation rate in a specific technology class are more likely to patent in exactly the same class. Girls are more likely to invent in a particular class if they grow up in an area with more women (but not men) who invent in that class. These gender- and technology class-specific exposure effects are more likely to be driven by narrow mechanisms, such as role-model or network effects, than factors that only affect general human capital accumulation, such as the quality of schools. Consistent with the importance of exposure effects in career selection, women and disadvantaged youth are as underrepresented among high-impact inventors as they are among inventors as a whole. These findings suggest that there are many “lost Einsteins”-individuals who would have had highly impactful inventions had they been exposed to innovation in childhood-especially among women, minorities, and children from low-income families.

This paper explores investment fluctuations due to discrete changes in a plant's capital stock. The resulting aggregate investment dynamics are surprisingly rich, reflecting the interaction between a replacement cycle, the cross-sectional distribution of the age of the capital stock, and an aggregate shock. Using plant-level data, lumpy investment is procyclical and more likely for older capital. Further, the predicted path of aggregate investment that neglects vintage effects tracks actual aggregate investment reasonably well. However, ignoring fluctuations in the cross-sectional distribution of investment vintages can yield predictable nontrivial errors in forecasting changes in aggregate investment. (JEL E22, E32)

Abstract We analyze the effectiveness of consumer financial regulation by considering the 2009 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure (CARD) Act. We use a panel data set covering 160 million credit card accounts and a difference-in-differences research design that compares changes in outcomes over time for consumer credit cards, which were subject to the regulations, to changes for small business credit cards, which the law did not cover. We estimate that regulatory limits on credit card fees reduced overall borrowing costs by an annualized 1.6% of average daily balances, with a decline of more than 5.3% for consumers with FICO scores below 660. We find no evidence of an offsetting increase in interest charges or a reduction in the volume of credit. Taken together, we estimate that the CARD Act saved consumers $11.9 billion a year. We also analyze a nudge that disclosed the interest savings from paying off balances in 36 months rather than making minimum payments. We detect a small increase in the share of accounts making the 36-month payment value but no evidence of a change in overall payments.

This paper examines the long-term impacts of in-utero and early childhood exposure to ambient air pollution on adult labor market outcomes. We take advantage of a new administrative data set that is uniquely suited for addressing this question because it combines information on individuals ’ quarterly earnings together with their counties and dates of birth. We use the sharp changes in ambient air pollution concentrations driven by the implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments as a source of identifying variation, and we compare cohorts born in counties that experienced large changes in total suspended particulate (TSP) exposure to cohorts born in counties that had minimal or no changes. We find a significant relationship between TSP exposure in the year of birth and adult labor market outcomes. A 10 unit decrease in TSP in the year of birth is associated with a 1 percent increase in annual earnings for workers aged 29-31. Most, but not all, of this effect is driven by an increase in labor force participation. In present value, the gains from being born into a county affected by the 1970 Clean Air Act amount to about $4,300 in lifetime income for the 1.5 million individuals born into

Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data by Gerald E. Auten, Holger Sieg and Charles T. Clotfelter. Published in volume 92, issue 1, pages 371-382 of American Economic Review, March 2002

This paper examines tax-return-generated data on the labor force behavior of people before and after they receive inheritances. The results are consistent with Andrew Carnegie's century-old assertion that large inheritances decrease a person's labor force participation. For example, a single person who receives an inheritance of about $150, 000 is roughly four times more likely to leave the labor force than a person with an inheritance below $25, 000. Additional, albeit weaker, evidence suggests that large inheritances depress labor supply, even when participation is unaltered. Warren Kendall … heir to an insurance company fortune … says he's worth about $5 million and has an income of "about, oh, $300 and some thousand a year." [H]e has never held a job, or wanted to. Going down to sea in cruise ships is his full-time pursuit. He estimates that he has taken about 250 cruises over the past couple of decades, spending at least 50 percent to 70 percent of the year afloat [Morgenthaler, 1991, p. Al].

This article analyzes how patent-induced shocks to labor productivity propagate into worker compensation using a new linkage of U.S. patent applications to U.S. business and worker tax records. We infer the causal effects of patent allowances by comparing firms whose patent applications were initially allowed to those whose patent applications were initially rejected. To identify patents that are ex ante valuable, we extrapolate the excess stock return estimates of Kogan et al. (2017) to the full set of accepted and rejected patent applications based on predetermined firm and patent application characteristics. An initial allowance of an ex ante valuable patent generates substantial increases in firm productivity and worker compensation. By contrast, initial allowances of lower ex ante value patents yield no detectable effects on firm outcomes. Patent allowances lead firms to increase employment, but entry wages and workforce composition are insensitive to patent decisions. On average, workers capture roughly 30 cents of every dollar of patent-induced surplus in higher earnings. This share is roughly twice as high among workers present since the year of application. These earnings effects are concentrated among men and workers in the top half of the earnings distribution and are paired with corresponding improvements in worker retention among these groups. We interpret these earnings responses as reflecting the capture of economic rents by senior workers, who are most costly for innovative firms to replace.

Research on the distribution of income during the 1980s has identified a trend towards increasing inequality, which may be the continuation and acceleration of trends spanning several decades. This paper explores to what extent behavioral responses to the tax changes during the 1980s may also explain the rising inequality. The 1986 Tax Reform Act is used as a natural experiment to explore the roles played by both taxes and a variety of nontax factors. Our principal finding is that both tax rates and nontax factors appear to have had significant effects on relative income growth during the late 1980s.

Wine is an ancient beverage and has been prized throughout time for its unique and pleasing flavor. Wine flavor arises from a mixture of hundreds of chemical components interacting with our sense organs, producing a neural response that is processed in the brain and resulting in a psychophysical percept that we readily describe as "wine." The chemical components of wine are derived from multiple sources; during fermentation grape flavor components are extracted into the wine and new compounds are formed by numerous chemical and biochemical processes. In this review we discuss the various classes of chemical compounds in grapes and wines and the chemical and biochemical processes that influence their formation and concentrations. The overall aim is to highlight the current state of knowledge in the area of grape and wine aroma chemistry.