Research indexBook chapter
Computer Systems
Johnson
Cambridge University Press eBooks9 May 2011
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20260515/544F92C4DOI10.1017/cbo9780511978036.015
Computer Systems
Johnson · Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2011 · Subscription
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20260515/544F92C4DOI10.1017/cbo9780511978036.015
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Abstract
In this paper i will argue that computer systems are moral entities but not, alone, moral agents. In making this argument I will navigate through a complex set of issues much debated by scholars of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and computer ethics. My claim is that those who argue for the moral agency (or potential moral agency) of computers are right in recognizing the moral importance of computers, but they go wrong in viewing computer systems as independent, autonomous moral agents. Computer systems have meaning and significance only in relation to human beings; they are components in socio-technical systems. What computer systems are and what they do is intertwined with the social practices and systems of meaning of human beings. Those who argue for the moral agency (or potential moral agency) of computer systems also go wrong insofar as they overemphasize the distinctiveness of computers. Computer systems are distinctive, but they are a distinctive form of technology and have a good deal in common with other types of technology.