Research indexBook chapter
Introduction
Piccinini
Oxford University Press eBooks1 Jun 2015
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20260525/1E2E481FDOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658855.003.0001
Introduction
Piccinini · Oxford University Press eBooks · 2015 · Subscription
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20260525/1E2E481FDOI10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658855.003.0001
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Abstract
Extract This book is about the nature of concrete computation—the physical systems that perform computations and the computations they perform. I argue that concrete computing systems are a kind of functional mechanism. A functional mechanism is a system of component parts with causal powers that are organized to perform a function. Computing mechanisms are different from non-computing mechanisms because they have a special function: to manipulate vehicles based solely on differences between different portions of the vehicles in accordance with a rule that is defined over the vehicles and, possibly, certain internal states of the mechanism. I call this the mechanistic account of computation. When I began articulating and presenting the mechanistic account of computation to philosophical audiences over ten years ago, I often encountered one of two dismissive responses. Response one: your view is obvious, well known, and uncontroversial—utterly dull. Response two: your view is counterintuitive, implausible, and untenable—totally worthless. These were not the only responses. Plenty of people engaged the substance of the mechanistic account of computation and discussed its pros and cons. But these radical responses were sufficiently common that they deserve to be addressed upfront.