Research index
デカルトの自由論 (完)
瀧浦
Kyoto University Research Information Repository (Kyoto University)20 Jun 1954Open access
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20261005/29AA3A92DOI10.14989/jps_37_02_90
デカルトの自由論 (完)
瀧浦 · Kyoto University Research Information Repository (Kyoto University) · 1954
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20261005/29AA3A92DOI10.14989/jps_37_02_90
Abstract
With regard to the relation between the rôles played by the understanding and the will in a judgment, Descartes repeats the traditional proposition : Ex magna luce in intellectu sequitur magna propensio in voluntate. But on the other hand, the disparity between the two faculties is brought forth in order to account for the possibility of errors; the will being more extensive than the understanding, we cannot, according to him, keep it within the same limits as the understanding, and this is supposed to be the cause of our errors. Thus, however, the will which errs would cover more than that propensity which necessarily follows the understanding. As it is, we observe just the same structure as to the relation between the two faculties in errors as well as in the case of true cognitions. The problem of the 'methodical doubt' in virtue of which we can suspend any sort of judgment, has also to be considered, because, according to his reply to the fifth objection, this would be impossible without the freedom of the will of carrying itself here and there without receiving any determination from the understanding. Does the freedom of the human will then consist in what we may call the indifference of the will to the understanding? The paper attempts to localize the will in relation to the understanding as understood in the Cartesian doctrine, upon examination of some of his letters, somewhere midway between the pure indifference and the perfect subordination to the understanding.