Research indexBook chapter
Trust Versus Rationality
Dunning, Schlösser, Fetchenhauer
Routledge eBooks8 May 2026
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20261105/9C9D3362DOI10.4324/9781003654247-4
Trust Versus Rationality
Dunning, Schlösser, Fetchenhauer · Routledge eBooks · 2026 · Subscription
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20261105/9C9D3362DOI10.4324/9781003654247-4
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Abstract
Trust between people is essential for individuals and societies to flourish, yet making oneself vulnerable to another person contradicts the rational actor model, a theoretical perspective that has dominated many behavioral and biological science disciplines over the last century. We discuss this paradox and what it means for understanding trust. We suggest that although people may trust others in part out of rational self-interest, work on economic games suggests that trust is also driven by a normative component. People trust because they believe it is what they should do. Thus, people do not interpret trust decisions along economic principles of gain and loss as much as along matters of morality, etiquette, and social obligation. We demonstrate this dynamic most directly by showing how differently people respond to the trust game versus another classic economic game, the prisoner&s;s dilemma. This perspective suggests that people may act more because of emotion rather than calculation, focus more on their actions rather than on outcomes, may not choose what they prefer, need not be guided by altruism, and may not consciously understand what leads them to trust (see also Goel; Forgas, this volume). Trust has distinct cognitive, behavioral, and emotional components, and those components may not cohere. There might be an approach to resolving the contradiction between trust and rational choice, but it requires redefining for whom trust is the rational act.