NC3 sits at the intersection of complex and occasionally contradictory strategic security and policy requirements, as well as attendant legal rights and obligations. For any nuclear State, a robust and dependable NC3 is therefore a necessity to ensure that the legal, policy, and strategic objectives for the State are consistently met. While the adoption of the TPNW is a welcome addition to the legal landscape, the current customary international law on nuclear weapons, as well as the law for those States not party to the TPNW, remains that nuclear weapons are not prima facie illegal. However, as explored in this study, the lack of a general prohibition on nuclear weapons does not create a legal landscape that leaves regulation of nuclear weapons solely to the discretion of the nuclear State. Such States must therefore ensure that their nuclear weapons are only ever used in extreme circumstances, and in strictest compliance with international law. Having clear guidelines on what is considered best practice in relation to NC3 architecture would go a considerable way to ensuring that nuclear weapons are only ever used as a last resort and in strict compliance with the applicable law and that accidental deployment of weapons never occurs.