This chapter argues that understanding the strategic competition between the United States and China requires examining not only the transfer of material power but, more importantly, the starkly different strategic cultures that shape the two nations’ perceptions and approaches of wielding power. While offensive realism, exemplified by John Mearsheimer, predicts that China will inevitably replicate the aggressive rise of the United States historically, based on the exclusive and zero-sum nature of power, this chapter argues that this view overlooks profound cultural differences. This chapter conceptualizes strategic culture as the “invisible hand” or “operating system” of power and identifies three key dimensions of difference between the United States and China. First, in the understanding of power: the United States views power as exclusive and dominant, while China emphasizes relational and structural capabilities. Second, in the exercise of power: the United States tends to exert direct pressure through sanctions, military deployments, and alliances, while China tends to shape power indirectly through economic ties, institutional participation, and long-term planning. Third, regarding power and order: the United States seeks to dominate and reshape the international order around its own interests, while China tends to strategically embed itself within the existing framework and pursue gradual change. This chapter uses word frequency analysis and comparative policy analysis to demonstrate how these strategic cultural differences profoundly influence both sides’ perceptions of costs and policy decisions. Ultimately, the friction between the United States and China reflects not only a redistribution of power but also the strategic cultural differences in their respective views on power.