Research indexJournal article
Pricing with Algorithms
Lamba, Zhuk
American Economic Review: Insights1 Sep 2026Open access
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20261109/DA87C16DDOI10.1257/aeri.20240436
Pricing with Algorithms
Lamba, Zhuk · American Economic Review: Insights · 2026
NobleIDark:/48914/w1/20261109/DA87C16DDOI10.1257/aeri.20240436
Abstract
This paper studies Markov perfect equilibria in a repeated duopoly model where sellers choose algorithms. An algorithm is a mapping from the competitor's price to own price. Once set, the algorithms respond quickly. Customers arrive randomly, and sellers can periodically revise their algorithms. The main results are that (i) for the simple two-price model with standard profit functions, monopoly pricing is the unique equilibrium outcome and (ii) for any general finite price grid, all equilibrium outcomes feature supracompetitive pricing. Sustenance of such collusion seems outside the scope of current antitrust laws, for it does not involve any direct communication. (JEL C73, D21, D43, K21)