Corporate Taxation and Avoidance

Optimal Capital Structure Under Corporate and Personal Taxation

The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities

A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance

Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers

Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have

Corporate Social Responsibility: A Theory of the Firm Perspective

Determinants of corporate borrowing

ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*

A Survey of Corporate Governance

Real-Time Obstacle Avoidance for Manipulators and Mobile Robots

A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance

FINANCIAL RATIOS, DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND THE PREDICTION OF CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY

The Impact Of Human Resource Management Practices On Turnover, Productivity, And Corporate Financial Performance

The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders

Large Shareholders and Corporate Control

Strategy and society: the link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility

Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis

Corporate Ownership Around the World

Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature

THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.]